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I was surprised to learn recently, from Ron Chernow's illuminating
biography, that George Washington's teeth might have been pulled from
the mouths of his slaves.' I suppose I should not have been surprised. I
certainly knew that Washington kept slaves. I even knew that he was
capable of uncommon barbarity with respect to his slaves, forcing them,
2for example, to clear swamps in the bitterest of winter chill. But even as
a relatively sophisticated consumer of American legal and political his-
tory, I have been partly captured by the romantic myth around Washing-
ton. He paid for the teeth, it seems, 3 but the fact that he bought them
from someone from whom he was extracting free labor on pain of lash
(or worse) cannot help but lower Washington another notch in my
imagination.
I recount this inner intellectual conflict as an entr6e into a question
that I have been puzzling with for some time, and that this brief essay
can better identify than resolve. The question is whether, and if so to
what degree, a tension exists between African-American identity and
originalism. I do not mean to ask whether it is possible for someone who
identifies as African-American to hold originalist views about constitu-
tional interpretation. It is of course possible, as Justice Thomas might
attest.4 I also do not mean to ask whether someone who identifies as Af-
rican-American should be an originalist. I reject the illiberal notion that
my own views should have much to say about the relationship between
another's race and her political or intellectual commitments. The ques-
tion, rather, is whether African-Americans have especially good reason
to reject originalism, such that selling African-Americans on originalism
carries, and reasonably should carry, an unusually high burden of persua-
sion.
I suspect that for many this sounds like an easy question, but I doubt
that everyone who thinks it is easy agrees on the answer. On one hand, if
we believe that we can identify interpretive methodologies with constitu-
tional outcomes, and if we believe that originalism in particular is identi-
fied with outcomes that African-Americans tend not to support, then we
have a simple explanation for why many African-Americans might not
t Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Thanks to Olati Johnson and Jed
Purdy for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. RON CHERNOW, WASHINGTON: A LIFE 438 (2010).
2. See id. at 496.
3. Id. at 438.
4. See Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1996).
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have warm feelings toward originalism. This explanation, though, is con-
tingent on a set of assumptions about African-American political views
and about the actual or perceived substantive outcomes originalism en-
tails. Those assumptions might go some way toward explaining why so
few African-Americans in fact identify as originalists,5 but it does not
answer the more fundamental question of whether the methodology itself
is or is not, for lack of a better term, racially sensitive.
One potential answer, in the negative, relies on a version of what is
often called the "dead hand"6 argument, and it feels especially urgent
when it comes to matters of race. A familiar formulation goes something
like this: Accepting the authority of the original understanding of the
Constitution requires one to accept that the ratifying process has signifi-
cant democratic purchase.7 The reason we do not accept the constitutions
of France or Zimbabwe or Utah as binding the rest of us is that those
constitutions were enacted through processes in which we had no say.
The Constitution of 1787 was submitted to ratifying conventions in-
tended to be representative of relevant members of the population, but, as
we all know, those conventions were not in fact representative. Voting
for delegates to the state conventions largely excluded women, Indians,
blacks, and those who did not own property.8 The Constitution is as to
those marginalized persons as the Zimbabwe Constitution is to the rest of
us, and so its authority must follow not from its democratic pedigree but
from some other, more inclusive account.9
If we accept that argument, it applies not only to racial minorities
but also to women and even, perhaps, to many poor people. But the spe-
cial urgency on issues of race derives from the institution of slavery and
its associated badges and incidents. It is not just that people of African
5. In a recent study, my co-authors and I found that only four percent of African-American
survey respondents (compared to 29 percent of whites and 32 percent of Hispanics) are originalists,
where originalists were identified as those falling within the top quartile along a continuous index of
several different measures of originalist affinity. Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen An-
solabehere, Profiling Originalism, Ill COLUM. L. REV. 356, 406 (2011).
6. See generally Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606 (2008).
7. I acknowledge that one might distinguish between originalism as purely a question of
textual exegesis-divining the meaning of a text-and originalism as an authoritative guide to judi-
cial or political decision-making. This dichotomy sometimes goes under the label "interpretation"
versus "construction." See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 99 (2004); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:
ORIGINAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7-11 (1999); Larry Alexander,
Telepathic Law, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 139, 144 (2010). In my experience this distinction has cur-
rency only for specialists; most participants in methodological discourse, including legal scholars,
hold a conception of originalism that relies on an account of the political authority of the framers'
original intent or the original understanding of members of the ratifying generation. See generally
Samaha, supra note 6, at 636-37.
8. See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 240-42 (1913); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A
BIOGRAPHY 7 (2005).
9. See Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial ofthe United States Constitution,
101 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1987).
518 [Vol. 88:3
ORIGINALISM'S RACE PROBLEM
descent were not represented at Philadelphia or at the state ratifying con-
ventions, but that the Constitution that emerged from those conventions
preserved and protected both slavery itself and slavery's institutional
infrastructure. Start with the three-fifths clause, which counted slaves as
three-fifths of a person for purposes of representation and direct taxa-
tion.'o Slaves obviously could not vote in southern states, and so bringing
slaves into a state would increase a state's congressional representation
without giving blacks any additional political power. This is a bad incen-
tive.' The three-fifths compromise also affected the Electoral College,
since a state's number of electors is based on its congressional represen-
tation. It is no coincidence that all but two elected Presidents before Lin-
coln-the exceptions being one-termers John Adams and John Quincy
Adams-were slaveholders or expressed deep and open sympathy with
slaveholding interests.
The Constitution included two other direct accommodations for
slavery: the Fugitive Slave Clause, which required states to return any
escaped slaves and which, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, pre-
vented states from affording due process to their black citizens who were
accused of being fugitive slaves; 3 and the importation clause, which
prevented Congress from withdrawing from the international slave trade
prior to 1808.14 The importation clause was one of only three expressly
unamendable provisions in the 1787 Constitution, along with the prohibi-
tion on disproportionate capitation taxes (designed to prevent arbitrary
taxation of slaves) and equal state suffrage in the U.S. Senate.' 5 All three
were concessions to states' rights, the constitutional terms through which
much of the nation's institutionalized racism has been defended.
There are answers to this charge. The most persuasive is the sim-
plest: slavery was abolished by the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Con-
stitution's most obvious slavery-protecting provisions have been excised.
The process of constitutional design was unrepresentative along racial
lines in 1787, but the Constitution that emerged from that process has
been amended so as to be more inclusive. The Fourteenth Amendment
was drafted expressly to guarantee civil equality, and six of the last thir-
10. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3.
I1. Of course, the three-fifths compromise also increased the tax base of southern states
beyond what it would have been if slaves counted neither for representation nor for direct taxation,
but it is worth noting that the Constitution also provides that all revenue bills must originate in the
arguably perversely malapportioned House of Representatives. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 1. Moreo-
ver, per capita tax revenue represented a small share of federal-tax income in antebellum America.
See AMAR, supra note 8, at 93-94.
12. Paul Finkelman, Thomas R. Cobb and the Law of Negro Slavery, 5 ROGER WILLIAMS
U.L. REV. 75, 89 (1999).
13. U.S. CONST. art. IV § 2 cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; Prigg v. Pennsylva-
nia, 41 U.S. 539, 622-23 (1842).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I § 9 cl. 1.
15. U.S. CONST. art. V. The prohibition on disproportionate capitation taxes, like the importa-
tion clause, could be amended after 1808.
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teen constitutional amendments have related to voting rights, with every
one of them expanding the franchise.1 6 Correctly practiced, originalism
fixes on the whole Constitution, as amended, and it is to that Constitution
we should look in assessing originalism's democratic provenance.
More generally, to the extent the dead hand problem as I have ar-
ticulated it is a problem, it is not a "race" problem. The challenge to the
democratic representativeness of the Philadelphia Convention and the
state ratifying conventions is one we all share, regardless of race. It is
indeed the central challenge of constitutionalism more generally: How
can any political document retain democratic authority across successive
generations? Many able scholars have offered answers to that question,
but the important point here is that it looms so large that it overwhelms
considerations of the representativeness of the founders along racial
lines. Put another way, all successful strategies for overcoming the prob-
lem of intertemporal constitutional authority accommodate the problem
of racial representation at the founding. If originalism can surmount the
intertemporal hurdle, as many believe it can, whatever remaining defects
it might have as a mode of constitutional interpretation would not derive
from the fact that the constitutional conventions were not racially inclu-
sive.
This response might be adequate to one especially narrow version
of the dead hand argument, but for at least two reasons it is not adequate
to my original question. First, the most persuasive originalist response to
the problem of intertemporal authority raises additional, less easily dis-
missed race-related complications. One common originalist answer to the
problem seeks to identify some way in which current generations have
consented to constitutional provisions that justifies preserving the origi-
nal understandings of those provisions.' 8 For reasons I have elaborated
elsewhere, consent is not a persuasive justification for relying on original
understanding to answer current constitutional questions, not least be-
cause few Americans have a defensible understanding of what original-
ism would entail for constitutional law in practice.' 9 A better, more inter-
esting originalist response to the intertemporal problem is to argue that
the authority of the ratifying generation derives from its normative conti-
nuity with our own. On this argument, we are a complicated, multifac-
eted "people" constituted across time and in constant search of our better
16. U.S. CONST. amends. XIV, XV, XVII, XIX, XXIII, XXIV, XXVi.
17. See John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution,
98 GO. L.J 1693, 1697, 1757-64 (2010) (defending originalism in part on the ground that constitu-
tional provisions marginalizing women and blacks have been amended or excised).
1 8. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47
ND. L. 1, 3-4 (1971) (suggesting that the American people have consented to an originalist read-
ing of the Constitution).
19. See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 668-70 (2009).
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selves. 2 0 The originalist claim is that we locate our true values by looking
backward rather than laterally or forward. On this account, originalism is
best defended as a persuasive form of ethical argument; it is a normative
account of national identity.21
So understood, the divide between originalists and living constitu-
tionalists is between those who believe we are at our best when we are
who we have been and those who believe we are at our best when we are
who we might become. Jack Balkin has expressed this divide through the
competing aspirational narratives of constitutional "restoration" and con-
stitutional "redemption." 22 For Balkin, originalism may accommodate
both narratives-one might faithfully work out the meaning of broad
constitutional text either by fixing it in the past or by reimagining it in
the service of subsequent social and political agendaS23-but for most
everyone else, originalism is centrally committed to and indeed fixated
on a narrative of restoration. As Justice Scalia has written, the purpose of
constitutionalism from an originalist perspective is to "obstruct moder-
nity," and to prevent current majorities from diluting or altering the val-
ues of the past. 24 On this understanding, the potential for a race problem
becomes more transparent. For me, as an African-American, a narrative
of restoration is deeply alienating; what America has been is hostile to
my personhood and denies my membership in its political community.
The only way I can call this Constitution my own is to view it through a
lens of redemption, the lens that originalism rejects.
Accounts of the authority of original understanding that do not rely
on a narrative of restoration might avoid this problem, but few can avoid
a second, related but more trenchant race-based critique. Originalism
need not in theory, but in practice almost always assumes that the mean-
ing of any particular constitutional provision is fixed at some historical
moment.25 Indeed, I would argue that its claim as to the determinacy of
constitutional meaning is the single most consistent distinguishing fea-
20. See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT 145 (2001) ("Commitmentarian democracy holds that a people, understood as an
agent existing over time, across generations, is the proper subject of democratic self-government.").
21. See Jamal Greene, On the Origins ofOriginalism, 88 TEX. L. REv. 1, 82-85 (2009). Some
strategies for addressing the intertemporal problem consist in ignoring it-that is, defending origi-
nalism on prudential or pragmatic grounds. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 116-17 (2004) (arguing that originalism cannot be
justified based on consent, but is normatively appropriate because it best preserves individual lib-
erty); John 0. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, A Pragmatic Defense of Originalism, 101 Nw. U.L.
REV. 383, 385 (2007) (defending originalism on the ground that supermajoritarian processes produce
superior political rules). My argument does not turn on whether these defenses are persuasive.
22. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 301, 308-09
(2007).
23. Id. at 295-303.
24. See Antonin Scalia, Modernity and the Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE UNDER
OLD CONSTITUTIONS 313, 315 (Eivind Smith ed., 1995).
25. Again, Balkin is a lonely dissenter on this point. See supra note 22, at 295-303.
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26
ture of originalism, whose definition can otherwise be elusive. Insisting
that the meaning of the Constitution is fixed is an especially unsympa-
thetic response to the challenge Robert Cover posed nearly three decades
ago in his essay Nomos and Narrative.2 7 Cover criticized hyper-positivist
modes of interpretation as being, in his term, "jurispathic."28 On this
conception the judge who understands herself to be promulgating the
uniquely correct application of a legal norm is engaged in an act of vio-
lence, insofar as she is destroying the alteinative conceptions advanced
by dissenting normative communities. 29 Cover urged instead that judges
"stop circumscribing the nomos" and recognize the possibility of plural-
ity within legal interpretation. 30
African-Americans constitute a nomic (not to say monophonic)
community, if not generally, then around particular constitutional issues
likely to affect them. The role of the jurispathic judge in a case implicat-
ing our nomos is either to adopt it or to suppress it in favor of a compet-
ing one. This binary is not one any minority community likely wishes to
face, but it is especially daunting for one whose relative discreteness and
insularity leads and has historically led it both to be excluded from and to
resist normative assimilation. A jurispathic approach to legal interpreta-
tion wishes to deny that unassimilated norms hold legitimate claims to
legal authority. Yet, the possibility of indeterminacy, of plurality, within
law is precisely the mischief for which originalism is often promoted as
an especially effective remedy.3 1 Originalism treats nomoi that diverge
from the one blessed by the originalist judge as a scourge that it is the
function of law to eradicate.
Constitutional methodology translates, between word and deed,
hope and reality, authority and violence. To choose a methodology is to
choose the connective tissue between Constitution and subject. It is to
adopt a narrative that enables a people not merely to submit to the state
but to experience the Constitution as theirs. For that choice to be right, it
needs to feel right; it must resonate with how one in fact experiences
one's relationship with the nation and its commitments. A racially-
sensitive constitutionalism must always, therefore, hold out the possibil-
ity of legitimate dissent from history. Originalism denies that possibility,
and so for me, as I suspect for many African-Americans, it speaks in a
foreign tongue.
26. See Jamal Greene, Heller High Water? The Future of Originalism, 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y
REV. 325, 326-27 (2009).
27. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983).
28. Id. at 40.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 68.
31. Greene, supra note 21, at 74.
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POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM ON THE RIGHT: LESSONS
FROM THE TEA PARTY
CHRISTOPHER W. SCHMIDT
INTRODUCTION
Within the legal academy over the past decade or so, popular consti-
tutionalism has emerged as an important and often quite controversial
theoretical framework for understanding the dynamics of constitutional
development.' In its strongest and most provocative form, popular consti-
tutionalism demands that the American people play a central role in in-
terpreting the meaning of the Constitution, and that the courts should, to
one degree or another, defer to the legitimate constitutional claims of the
people and their elected representatives. The Supreme Court is not (or
should not be) the final arbiter of constitutional meaning.2 Ordinary citi-
zens should regularly engage with their Constitution, and they should do
so not just in some abstract sense, but in an immediate and active way.
Popular constitutionalism, in short, is based on the belief that responsibil-
ity for shaping the meaning of the Constitution is not just the province of
the courts; it is also a basic duty of the people themselves.
History provides a rich canvas for exploring the record and potential
of popular constitutionalism. Much of the work produced by scholars of
popular constitutionalism has been efforts to excavate past moments of
popular mobilization around constitutional claims. They have examined
episodes of U.S. history, identifying ways in which popular demands
made upon constitutional text and principles resulted in shifts in general
t Assistant Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law; Faculty Fellow, American Bar Foun-
dation. For helpful comments, criticisms, and discussions, I thank Kathy Baker, Chris Buccafusco,
Sarah Harding, Mark Rosen, as well as participants in the University of Colorado Law School's
Rothgerber Conference, and the Chicago-Kent Faculty Workshop.
I. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV.
959, 960 (2004) (describing the popular constitutionalism as an "emerging new discourse" within the
legal academy); David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, I 10 COLUM. L.
REV. 2047, 2048 n.1 (2010) (citing sources describing popularity of popular constitutionalism
among legal academics).
2. This normatively oriented version of popular constitutionalism is found most prominently
in the work of Larry Kramer. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court
2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6-7 (2001); see also, e.g., MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW
AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
3. Kramer, supra note 1, at 959 ("In a system of popular constitutionalism, the role of the
people is not confined to occasional acts of constitution making, but includes active and ongoing
control over the interpretation and enforcement of constitutional law.").
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assumptions and expectations about the Constitution.4 This, in turn, pres-
sured those in positions of official authority-most notably but not ex-
clusively judges-toward new interpretations of the Constitution. Popu-
lar constitutionalism thus offers a response to the tension inherent in de-
mocratic constitutionalism: between a commitment to popular sover-
eignty and a commitment to constitutionally entrenched norms that stand
above majoritarian decision-making. Through this dynamic of constitu-
tional responsiveness, both the Constitution and the courts benefit. A
constitutional system that is responsive to the constitutional commit-
ments of the people serves a crucial legitimating function.5
While American history reveals a robust tradition of popular consti-
tutional engagement, popular constitutionalists generally see develop-
ments of recent years as reasons for concern. Larry Kramer, whose book
The People Themselves is the single most prominent contribution to the
field of popular constitutionalism, laments that Americans no longer take
seriously their responsibility as interpreters of the Constitution.6 The
people have become too deferential to the courts; they have lost a sense
of authority over their founding document. In accepting judicial claims
of primacy over interpreting the Constitution, the people themselves have
abdicated a basic duty of constitutional citizenship.8
The modem judiciary-particularly the Supreme Court of recent
years-is also to blame for the decline of popular constitutional engage-
ment. Advocates of popular constitutionalism have attacked the Court's
efforts to assert a preeminent, even exclusive role in defining the mean-
ing of the Constitution for all of American society.9 By Kramer's ac-
4. The bulk of Kramer's book is a close reading of the practice of extrajudicial constitution
claim-making and judicial review in the early republic. KRAMER, supra note 2 passim; see also Jack
M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927
(2006); William E. Forbath, Popular Constitution in the Twentieth Century: Reflections on the Dark
Side, the Progressive Constitutional Imagination, and the Enduring Role of Judicial Finality in
Popular Understandings of Popular Self-Rule, 81 CHI-KENT L. REV. 967 (2006); William E. For-
bath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165 (2001); Hendrik Hartog, The Constitu-
tion of Aspiration and "The Rights That Belong to Us All", 74 J. AM. HisT. 1013 (1987); Robert
Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL.
L. REV. 1027 (2004) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism]; Robert C. Post & Reva
B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and
Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000) [hereinafter Post & Siegel, Equal Protection]; Reva B. Siegel,
Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De
Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
5. On this point, the work of Post and Siegel is essential. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel,
Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).
6. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 227-48.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Recent cases in which the Court has emphasized its exclusive interpretive supremacy on
questions of constitutional interpretation include Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 428
(2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 524 (1997); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866-67 (1992) ("Where, in the per-
formance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of in-
tensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a
dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not carry. It is the dimension present whenever
524 Vol. 88:3
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count, the Court's repeated claims that it is supreme in defining the
meaning of the Constitution, coupled with widespread popular accep-
tance of these claims, from both left and right, caused "popular constitu-
tionalism [to] fade[] from view" in the post-New Deal period.10 Popular
constitutionalists have called for increased popular engagement with the
nation's founding document as an antidote to the problem of judicial
supremacy.1
As if made to order, we are today witnessing in the Tea Party a po-
litical movement that has, to an extent unprecedented in modem Ameri-
can history, placed the Constitution at the center of its reform agenda.
This movement has done so with remarkably little concern for the courts
and judicial interpretations of the Constitution. As I explain below, Tea
Party constitutionalism is premised on a belief that citizens have a re-
sponsibility to read their Constitution, to stake out claims about its mean-
ing, and to demand that public officials act in accordance with these
claims. The Tea Party, it would seem, is precisely the kind of popular
assertion of responsibility over the Constitution that popular constitu-
tionalists had been calling for.
But the Tea Party has hardly been embraced by advocates of popu-
lar constitutionalism. The reason is not hard to discern. Although as a
formal matter, the theory of popular constitutionalism has no ideological
or partisan valence, it has for the most part been advocated by liberals
and progressives. It has generally been framed as a critique of recent
Supreme Court decisions, particularly those that have served conserva-
tive interests.12 The underlying assumption behind much of the scholar-
ship on popular constitutionalism is that the Supreme Court, at least in
recent years and perhaps as a general rule, is more conservative than the
populace.13 Therefore a more democratically responsive constitutional
system, a system in which popular claims on the Constitution play a
larger role, would generally serve the causes of most concern for liberals
the Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a national controversy to
end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution."). The semi-
nal articulation of this principle, prominently referenced in all these recent cases, is Cooper v. Aaron.
358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (proclaiming the Supreme Court to be "supreme in the exposition of the law of
the Constitution").
10. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 223.
I1. See, e.g., id. at 228-32.
12. Much of the momentum for popular constitutionalism as a scholarly movement derived
from (1) the Rehnquist Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), see, e.g., KRAMER,
supra note 2, at 231; Kramer, supra note 2, at 153; and (2) the Rehnquist Court's limitations on
congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in cases such as Trustees of the
University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7; Kimel
v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 637-38 (1999); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at
524; see, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People:
Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (2003) [hereinafter Post & Siegel,
Juricentric Restrictions]; Post & Siegel, Equal Protection, supra note 4, at 441-42.
13. Kramer, supra note 2, at 130-31.
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and progressives-most notably the promotion of various human rights
14causes.
So the Tea Party's emergence presents something of a dilemma.
Here we have a movement that seems to be doing much of what popular
constitutionalists have been calling for. It is claiming independent inter-
pretive authority over the Constitution. It is finding ways in which to act
upon its constitutional claims that do not depend upon the courts. Yet the
central claim on the Constitution that the Tea Party has embraced is a
commitment to sharply limited government. The Tea Party vision of the
Constitution is in direct opposition to the idea of the Constitution as a
vehicle for the protection of civil rights and social welfare rights that has
been at the heart of the popular constitutional project within the legal
academy. If this is popular constitutionalism, might it require a reconsid-
eration of some of the assumptions that have driven scholarship on popu-
lar constitutionalism?
In this Article, I consider the lessons that the Tea Party offers for
scholars of popular constitutionalism. Specifically, I argue that the expe-
rience of the Tea Party should spark a reconsideration of some assump-
tions that tend to drive much of the interest in popular constitutionalism.
Some who have embraced popular constitutionalism seem to assume that
popular constitutional mobilization is a vehicle particularly well suited
for advancing progressive constitutional claims. Alternately, some have
assumed that popular constitutionalism has no particular ideological or
partisan valence-that it is basically a neutral vehicle for advancing con-
stitution claims of all kinds. But the lessons of the Tea Party might re-
quire a rethinking of these assumptions. The Tea Party has shown that, at
least on the modem American scene, popular constitutional mobilization
is particularly effective at advancing causes much closer to the heart of
the conservative or libertarian agenda. Part of the explanation for this has
to do with the nature of constitutionalism as well as cultural assumptions
prevalent in recent American history. But, more importantly, it has to do
14. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 181 (defining "populist constitutionalism" as centered
on the promotion of human rights);
In a recent string of decisions invalidating federal civil rights legislation, the Supreme
Court has repeated the simple but powerful message: 'The Constitution belongs to the
courts'. . . .These decisions break with the judicial practice of the last half century, when
the Court employed doctrines of deference to vindicate democratic values in constitu-
tional interpretation, defining the scope of federal power in terms that gave great weight
to Congress's judgments about the nation's needs and interests. No longer does the Court
emphasize the respect due to the constitutional judgments of a coequal and democrati-
cally elected branch of government. Now it claims that only the judiciary can define the
meaning of the Constitution.
Post & Siegel, Juricentric Restrictions, supra note 12, at 1. Most of the historically oriented works
on popular constitutionalism have focused on moments in which popular movements advocated for
the expansion of federal authority in the name of promoting social welfare and civil rights. See
KRAMER, supra note 2, at 220; cf L.A. Powe, Jr., Are "the People" Missing in Action (and Should
Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 855, 887 (2005) (suggesting that "Kramer sees popular constitu-
tionalism only when he approves of the cause").
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with the mechanism available for popular constitutional mobilization.
These mechanisms serve certain causes better than others, and they serve
demands for less government regulation particularly well. This, I sug-
gest, has been the central lesson of the Tea Party for popular constitu-
tionalism.
In Part I of this Article, I examine the basic project of popular con-
stitutionalism, including its normative implications. I explore the chal-
lenges popular constitutionalists have had in defining their central con-
cept, and I offer a working definition of popular constitutionalism that
identifies what is unique about efforts of constitutional mobilization (as
differentiated from social movements that lead to constitutional change).
Part II describes the basic tenets of Tea Party constitutionalism. Here I
explore the substance of the Tea Party's constitutional vision, the strate-
gies of constitutional interpretation the Tea Party has embraced, and the
predominantly extrajudicial processes by which the Tea Party has sought
to advance its reading of the Constitution. Part III then considers whether
popular constitutionalism advances certain claims on the Constitution
better than others. Drawing on the lessons of the Tea Party, I look at
those mechanisms that have proven particularly effective at mobilizing
and advancing popular constitutional claims, and I question how differ-
ent kinds of claims might be advanced through these mechanisms. I sug-
gest that there is some evidence to support the hypothesis that popular
constitutionalism may be most effective when it is used to advance a
conservative-libertarian agenda, such as that of the Tea Party.
I. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM DEFINED
A. The Fundamentals of Popular Constitutionalism
The great contribution of popular constitutionalism scholarship has
been to draw our attention to the ideas and commitments of extrajudicial
actors on questions of constitutional meaning. By challenging the idea
that the Supreme Court is the only-or even the preeminent-
authoritative interpreter of the Constitution, popular constitutionalism
provides a more accurate description of American constitutional devel-
opment. This is popular constitutionalism as a descriptive claim.
There is also a normative component to much of popular constitu-
tional scholarship. For some popular constitutionalists, a better apprecia-
tion of the importance of the constitutional commitments of the Ameri-
can people and a more skeptical attitude toward the idea of judicial inter-
pretive supremacy points toward an alternative framework for arguing
how the constitutional system should work. Extrajudicial inputs are not
only a fact of life in the American constitutional system, but, according
to some advocates of popular constitutionalism, we are better off because
of it. We should encourage more popular engagement with the Constitu-
tion and its history. Taking this one step further (and here is the most
controversial element of popular constitutionalism), some advocates of
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popular constitutionalism argue that the courts should do more to recog-
nize and respect extrajudicial constitutional commitments, even when
they diverge from judicially defined constitutional law.15 In this critique
of judicial interpretive supremacy, popular constitutional scholarship
points toward a normative theory of judicial decision-making. On ques-
tions of constitutional interpretation, judges should view themselves in a
dialogue with the people and their elected representatives. Some scholars
have gone so far as to suggest that the proper attitude of the courts should
be one of deference to certain extrajudicial claims on the Constitution.
B. A Working Definition ofPopular Constitutionalism
A central challenge in defining popular constitutionalism is to locate
something distinctly "constitutional" about social movements that en-
gage in a variety of issues. Simply because a social movement claims
that its agenda is supported or inspired by the Constitution or by constitu-
tional principles cannot be enough to turn a social movement into a
popular constitutional movement. Or, if this is enough, then the concept
of popular constitutionalism has little to no analytical utility.
Drawing on the work of several leading scholars in the field, in this
section I offer a working definition of popular constitutionalism. My goal
here is not to come up with a categorical framework that conclusively
identifies one movement as being properly a popular constitutional
movement and another as outside the definition. Such an approach
would be of limited utility. Rather, I undertake this definitional project so
as to offer a framework by which we can compare different movements
in terms most relevant to popular constitutional analysis. The concept, as
I define it, is best understood as residing on a two-dimensional spectrum,
with one axis representing the "popular" component of the movement,
the other representing the "constitutional" component.
The relative "popularity" of a constitutional movement does not ref-
erence its level of popular support. Rather, it looks at the movement's
relationship to the courts, particularly the Supreme Court. A movement
that acts in ways that are largely autonomous from the courts and judicial
doctrine would score highly on this scale. A movement that is more def-
erential to judicial interpretive authority on constitutional questions, such
as a litigation-centered movement whose primary mission is to convince
the Court to rule a certain way in a constitutional case, would score
poorly.
Understood this way, then, a basic component of popular constitu-
tionalism is some level of assumed interpretive autonomy from the judi-
ciary. While a broad-based campaign aimed specifically at convincing
1 5. See, e.g., Post & Siegel, Juricentric Restrictions, supra note 12; Post & Siegel, Equal
Protection, supra note 4.
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the justices of the Supreme Court to chart a new path of constitutional
interpretation is a constitutional movement of a sort, it does not quite
capture the essence of popular constitutionalism, at least as that concept
has been developed over the past decade or so.1  For such an approach
would seem to grant to the courts the interpretive authority that is rightly
that of the activists. The critical actors in this scenario are lawyers and
judges, not the people themselves. In contrast, popular constitutionalism,
according to Kramer, "does not assume that authoritative legal interpreta-
tion can take place only in courts, but rather supposes that an equally
valid process of interpretation can be undertaken in the political branches
and by the community at large."l 7 Kramer, for one, has dismissed the
popular constitutional bona fides of most contenders to this label of the
past fifty years because they tend to frame their constitutional arguments
as challenges "directed at rather than against the Court."' 8
I would argue that popular constitutionalism must contain a self-
conscious move that is at the center of legal analysis: an effort to make a
distinction between law from politics. Specifically, for purposes of defin-
ing a popular constitutional movement, an extrajudicial constitutional
claim must include some effort to distinguish constitutionality from po-
litical or moral advisability-it must at least recognize the possibility that
there is a difference between the decision of what makes good or just
policy and the measure of a given policy's constitutional status.19 In for-
mulating their visions of popular constitutionalism, both Mark Tushnet
and Larry Kramer have identified some recognition of the law-politics
16. But see Post & Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, supra note 4, at 1029 ("In contrast to
Kramer, we do not understand judicial supremacy and popular constitutionalism to be mutually
exclusive systems of constitutional ordering."); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the
Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 351 (2001) ("A look at
our constitutional history suggests that judicial supremacy is, in important respects, a collaborative
practice, involving the Court in partnerships with the representative branches and the People them-
selves.").
17. Larry D. Kramer, "The Interest of the Man ": James Madison, Popular Constitutionalism,
and the Theory ofDeliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 700 (2006).
18. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 221; see also Kramer, supra note 17, at 698 n.3 (arguing that
recent anti-abortion activism has accepted the principle of judicial supremacy because the state-level
legislative restrictions on abortions these activists have advanced have been designed not as asser-
tions of "co-equal authority to say what the Constitution means," but as a way to get the Court to
revisit its prior holding in Roe).
19. A common criticism of the theory of popular constitutionalism is that it is impossible to
distinguish it from social and political activism generally. For example, James Fleming has written:
All of Kramer's historical examples of popular constitutionalism provide answers to the
question of who may interpret-and involve rejection of claims that courts rather than
other departments or the people themselves are the ultimate or exclusive interpreters of
the Constitution. None of them gives us any idea of what is the content of the constitu-
tionalism in popular constitutionalism and how it binds and guides the people themselves.
Thus, it is not clear that there is any particular content to popular constitutionalism that
constrains the people themselves .. . . The upshot of all this is that it is not clear that there
is a domain of popular constitutionalism as distinguished from the domains of ordinary
politics and justice.
James E. Fleming, Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy: Taking the Constitution Seriously
Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1377, 1392 (2005) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
529
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIEW
divide as a necessary attribute of the concept.20 In Taking the Constitu-
tion Away from the Courts, Tushnet insisted that his version of popular
constitutionalism (which he labeled "populist constitutional law") must
be understood as a legal concept. 2 1
The most problematic term here is law. How can constitution deci-
sions made away from the courts, particularly by ordinary citizens, be
law? ... [I]t is law because it is not in the first instance either the ex-
pression of pure preferences by officials and voters or the expression
of unfiltered moral judgments. 22
Kramer further develops the point: "[P]opular constitutionalism is
not mere politics, but is in fact a legal concept that treats the Constitution
as 'law' in its proper sense."23 The key distinction between law and poli-
tics is a sense that law "binds and limits" in ways that politics does not:
"The law itself encumbers the field of available action." 24 The extent of
this constraint is less important than a basic assumption "that applying
law differs from doing politics because it includes constraints that do no
exist in the political domain."2s
If we put together these two necessary components of popular con-
stitutionalism-an assumption that constitutional principles function
differently from policy and a measure of autonomy from the courts-
then it becomes clear that popular constitutionalism is best considered on
a spectrum. This spectrum would have on one end an exclusively
"juricentric" 26 or "legal constitutionalist" 27 or "catholic" 28 approach to
constitutional interpretation, which would include reform efforts aimed
exclusively at constitutional litigation. On the other end would be popu-
lar constitutionalism in its purest form-popular movements that mobi-
lize around constitutional interpretations that either act as if the Supreme
Court is irrelevant or act in direct opposition to existing constitutional
20. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at x-xi; Kramer, supra note 17, at 699.
21. TuSHNET, supra note 2, at x.
22. Id. at x-xi. Tushnet adds that while he identifies "populist constitutionalism" as a legal
concept, it still "accords a large place for politics, in two senses: Populist constitutional law gains its
content from discussions among the people in ordinary political forums, and political leaders play a
significant role in assisting the people [who] conduct those discussions." Id. at xi.
23. Kramer, supra note 17, at 699.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 699-700; see also KRAMER, supra note 2, at 30 (describing eighteenth-century
constitutionalism, which serves as a model for Kramer's concept of popular constitutionalism, as
"self-consciously legal in nature," albeit with a "notion of legality [that] was less rigid and more
diffuse [than modem conceptions]-more will willing to tolerate ongoing controversy over compet-
ing plausible interpretations of the constitution, more willing to ascribe authority to an idea as unfo-
cused as 'the people"').
26. Post & Siegel, Juricentric Restrictions, supra note 12, at 2 ("The juricentric Constitution
imagines the judiciary as the exclusive guardian of the Constitution.").
27. Kramer, supra note 17, at 699 (distinguishing "popular constitutionalism" from "legal
constitutionalism," defined as "the idea that constitutional interpretation has been turned over to the
judiciary and, in particular, the Supreme Court").
28. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 27-30 (1988).
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doctrine (with any modification of that doctrine only an incidental or
secondary goal of the constitutional mobilization).
II. TEA PARTY CONSTITUTIONALISM 29
Part II breaks down the elements of the Tea Party as a constitutional
movement. I first offer a brief summary of the emergence of the Tea
Party movement. Then I examine the core tenets of Tea Party constitu-
tionalism. I give particular attention to the ways in which the Tea Party's
ideas about how best to interpret the Constitution provide a platform for
constitution mobilization. I then describe the major areas of activism and
mobilization for the Tea Party's constitutional project.
A. The Emergence of the Tea Party Movement
The Tea Party was born in early 2009, when a series of scattered
rallies denouncing the Obama Administration's stimulus program (a con-
tinuation and expansion of policy begun under the Bush Administration),
coalesced into a loosely organized national movement flying the banner
of the "Tea Party. 30 (This name always harkened back to the revolution-
ary protest against British authority, but in the early stages of the move-
ment some supporters also promoted it as an acronym for "Taxed
Enough Already.") The Tea Party gained media attention with nation-
wide protest rallies on tax day, April 15, 2009. It was not clear at this
point whether this was going to be a flash in the pan, a brief flurry of
anger before people got back to their lives, or whether it had the potential
for something more sustained.
By the following summer, with the Tea Party still gaining adherents
and energy, its potential political force was put on display when the
movement aimed its attention on President Obama's health care reform. 32
Local Tea Party groups, encouraged and guided by a number of national
organizations that sought to capture and direct the energy of this growing
movement, organized protests at town hall meetings members of Con-
gress were holding around the country to discuss the pending health care
legislation. 33 Health care provided a convenient and effective focal point
for the second wave of Tea Party activism. When Congress went into its
summer recess in August, many of its members held town hall meetings
to talk to their constituents. 34 Tea Party leaders targeted these meetings
as a way for the Tea Party to get itself heard. As one leader explained in
29. The following section draws on material examined at considerably more lenth in Christo-
pher W. Schmidt, The Tea Party and the Constitution, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. (forthcoming,
2011).
30. Liz Robbins, Protesters Air Views on Government Spending at Tax Day Tea Parties
Across U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16,2009, at Al6.
31. Id.
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a strategic memo, Tea Partiers should follow the lessons of Chicago-
based community organizer Saul Alinksy: "freeze it, attack it, personal-
ize it, and polarize it." 35 There were two objectives at these meetings: to
challenge the Representative and to draw the audience's attention to the
fact that the Democratic leadership "is acting against our founders' prin-
ciples."3 Tea Partiers indeed attended these meetings in full force, often
using disruptive tactics.37
September 12, 2009, saw the largest round of Tea Party rallies yet.
These were organized in large part by FreedomWorks, a libertarian orga-
nization that has aligned itself with the Tea Party, and Glenn Beck, who
was launching what he called a "9-12" project.38
In 2010, the Tea Party emerged a major force on the national politi-
cal scene. The year began with Scott Brown's dramatic victory, on Janu-
ary 19, in the special election in Massachusetts to fill the senate seat of
Edward Kennedy. 39 Massachusetts showed the Tea Party's ability to
bring together grassroots activism and big-money support. The Brown
victory foreshadowed the power of the Tea Party as a player in the mid-
term elections the following fall. In the coming months, Tea Party-
backed candidates would produce numerous upsets in the Republican
primaries, and a number of them would go on to win in the November
elections. 40
Although early critics of the Tea Party dismissed it as a an artificial
movement, as "Astroturf," as a movement with powerful backers but
without real grassroots support, by 2010, the reality that this was a grass-
roots movement with widespread support became increasingly difficult
to deny.41 Time magazine reported in February 2010: "Across the coun-
try, from Muskegon, Mich., to Wetumpka, Ala., Tea Party meetings are
being convened in restaurants and living rooms and libraries and office
buildings-and online. Tea Party thinking has inspired hundreds of web-
sites and Facebook pages."4 2 By the spring of 2010, polls found almost
one in five Americans identifying themselves as supporting the Tea
Party, with four percent of the population saying they had given money
to a Tea Party group or attended a Tea Party event. Exit polling at the
November 2010 mid-term congressional elections found forty percent of
35. Id.
36. Id. at 83-84.
37. Id. at 84-85.
38. See id. at 24-25, 85.
39. Id. at 88-92.
40. Alex Altman, Primary Round-Up: A Tea Party Triumph (Or Two) Is a Win For Dems,
TIME, Sept. 15, 2010.
41. ZERNIKE, supra note 32, at 4.
42. David von Drehle, Why the Tea Party Movement Matters, TIME, Feb. 18, 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1964903,00.html.
43. Kate Zemike & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Finds Tea Party Backers Wealthier and More
Educated, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2010, at Al (summarizing a New York Times/CBS News poll).
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those who cast their votes saying they were sympathetic to the Tea Party
movement." The Tea Party closed 2010 by making the short list for Time
magazine's "Person of the Year." 45
B. The Fundamentals of Tea Party Constitutionalism
Attempting to make sense of the Tea Party is no easy task. Although
46there are a few national Tea Party-affiliated organizations, and a num-
ber of national figures who are identified with the movement,47 the Tea
Party has been largely driven by local groups that have popped up around
the country over the past two years. 48 Because of its decentralized orga-
nization, under its umbrella is a diverse collection of interests and agen-
das. The Tea Party, like any broad-based social movement, contains
many contradictions. Nonetheless, when one focuses on the Tea Party's
attitude toward the Constitution, a relatively coherent constitutional vi-
sion emerges.
Tea Party constitutionalism revolves around four fundamental as-
sumptions. The first is that the solutions to the problems facing the
United States today can be found in the words of the Constitution and the
insights of its framers. The Founding period was a special moment, never
to be replicated-the Founders were perhaps even divinely inspired. As
Tea Party-backed candidate for U.S. Senate, Christine O'Donnell ex-
plained in a speech: "When our country's on the wrong track, we search
back to our first covenant, our founding documents, and the bold and
inspired values on which they were based." 4 9
The second fundamental assumption is that the meaning of the Con-
stitution and the lessons of history are readily accessible to American
citizens who take the time to educate themselves. The Tea Party rejects
hierarchical assumptions about authoritative constitutional interpretation
in favor of more individualistic or community-based, decentralized ap-
44. Fox Hannity (Fox News Network television broadcast Mar. 4, 2011).
45. David von Drehle, 2010 Time Person ofthe Year Runner-Up: Tea Party, TIME, Dec. 15, 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2036683_2037118 2037102,00.html;
see also TODAY Viewers Want Chilean Miners to Win TIME Title, TODAY (Dec. 10, 2010, 3:37
PM), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/40609817/ns/today-today celebrates 2010/#.
46. The most prominent of these include: Tea Party Patriots, Tea Party Nation, and Free-
domWorks. Various local groups, such as the Chicago-based Sam Adams Alliance, have gained a
level of national prominence. The Tea Party Express, which is basically a conservative Republican
fund-raising group that targets certain electoral races, has also gain considerable influence. And
there are also various political action committees-such as the Koch-backed Americans for Prosper-
ity, that have effectively tapped into the Tea Party fervor. See von Drehle, supra note 44.
47. Glenn Beck is perhaps the most prominent single individual associated with the Tea Party.
Other significant figures include Sarah Palin, Ron Paul, and Michelle Bachmann. See Lydia DePillis,
The Tea Party Glossary: Everything You Need to Know About the Movement, From Nuts to Nuts,
NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 3, 2010, 11:50 PM), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/the-tea-party-glossary.
48. The Rise of the Tea Party, THE WEEK (Feb. 10, 2010, 11:36 AM),
http://theweek.com/article/index/1061 73/the-rise-of-the-tea-party.
49. Christine O'Donnell, Speech at the 2010 Values Voter Summit (Sept. 16, 2010), available
at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/17/christine-odonnell-n721382.html.
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proaches. Tea Party constitutionalism is premised on a commitment to
citizen empowerment. "Because YOU are the Government" reads the
motto of the Independence Caucus, a Utah-based group that has circu-
lated a list of questions designed to be given to potential candidates for
public office that tests their commitment to conservative constitutional-
ism.50 A foundational premise of Tea Party constitutionalism is that indi-
vidual citizens can read the document for themselves, come to conclu-
sions about constitutional meaning based on this reading, and act upon
these convictions.
The corollary of this belief in the accessibility of the Constitution,
and the third basic assumption of the Tea Party's constitution vision, is a
commitment to the idea that all Americans, not just lawyers and judges,
have a responsibility to understand the Constitution and to act faithfully
toward it. The Constitution is accessible. As Dick Armey, former House
Majority leader and now Chairman of FreedomWorks, likes to tell audi-
ences: "If you don't understand the Constitution, I'll buy you a diction-
ary."' A popular Tea Party bumper sticker reads: "I have this crazy idea
that the Constitution actually means something."52 One of the most nota-
ble aspects of Tea Party constitutionalism is the relatively minor place
the Tea Party allows for the courts in discussing constitutional issues.
The preferred battleground for the Tea Party's project of constitutional
reconstruction is not the courts.53 Rather, the Tea Party has made its ef-
forts in the area of educational outreach, state-level political mobiliza-
tion, and national electoral politics.
The fourth fundamental tenet of Tea Party constitutionalism in-
volves the movement's substantive idea of what the Constitution actually
means. At the heart of the Tea Party's vision is a belief that the overarch-
ing purpose of the Constitution is to ensure that the role of government,
and particularly the federal government, is limited. Only by following
constitutionally defined constraints on government can individual liber-
ties be preserved. In the words of Tea Party favorite Senator Rand Paul
of Kentucky, "belief in self-reliance, limited government and the Consti-
50. INDEPENDENCE CAUCUS, http://www.ourcaucus.com (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
si. zERNIKE, supra note 32, at 67; see also ANGELO M. CODEVILLA, THE RULING CLASS:
How THEY CORRUPTED AMERICA AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 44 (2010) (all that is needed to
understand the meaning of the Constitution is "the dictionary and grammar book").
52. Political Bumper Stickers, LIBERTY STICKERS, http://www.libertystickers.com/product/
I have crazyidea the-constitution MB (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
53. The relative inattention to the courts reflects a general sense among Tea Party supporters
that the Supreme Court is simply not on their side. See, e.g., CODEVILLA, supra note 50, at 42-43
(attacking the courts as having a "[d]isregard for the text of laws, for the dictionary definition of
words and the intentions of those who wrote them" and enforcing a "Constitution imagined by the
judge and supported by the ruling class"); MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME
COURT Is DESTROYING AMERICA 32 (2005).
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tution hold the keys to fixing our problems and getting our nation back
on track." 54
Conservative columnist Charles Krauthammer neatly summarizes
the assumptions underlying Tea Party constitutionalism:
What originalism is to jurisprudence, constitutionalism is to gov-
ernance: a call for restraint rooted in constitutional text. Constitution-
alism as a political philosophy represents a reformed, self-regulating
conservatism that bases its call for minimalist government-for rein-
ing in the willfulness of presidents and legislatures-in the words
and meaning of the Constitution... . In choosing to focus on a majes-
tic document that bears both study and recitation, the reformed con-
servatism of the Obama era has found itself not just a symbol but an
anchor.55
Here are all the basic elements of the Tea Party's constitutional vision:
the Constitution as a framework for "minimalist government"; the Con-
stitution invites individual "study and recitation"; the Constitution's
"words and meaning" are self-evident; the Constitution as "an anchor"
holding the nation fast to its founding principles.
C. Constitutional Interpretation as Social Mobilization
Tea Party constitutionalism has also coalesced around a particular
method of constitutional interpretation, namely originalism. This is a
notable development because the most prominent arguments in defense
of originalism have emphasized the ways in which it supposedly con-
strains judges. Originalism, this argument goes, relies upon tools of con-
stitutional analysis that are particularly suited to judges. It insulates
judges from relying upon their own value judgments when interpreting
the Constitution better than any other interpretive approach. Yet the ver-
sion of populist originalism that the Tea Party has embraced has de-
tached the case for originalism from concerns with judicial restraint. For
the Tea Party, originalism is a tool of extrajudicial constitutional mobili-
zation.
Radio show host Mark Levin in his 2009 best-seller, Liberty and
Tyranny, lays out the basic case for originalism as a tenet of movement
conservatism:
The Conservative is an originalist, for he believes that much like a
contract, the Constitution sets forth certain terms and conditions for
governing that hold the same meaning today as they did yesterday
and should tomorrow. It connects one generation to the next by re-
straining the present generation from societal experimentation and
54. Rand Paul, Rand Paul, Libertarian? Not Quite, USA TODAY (Aug. 9, 2010, 6:13 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2010-08-1 0-columnl 0 ST2_N.htm.
55. Charles Krauthammer, Op-Ed, Constitutionalism, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2011, at Al 9.
535
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
government excess. There really is no other standard by which the
Constitution can be interpreted without abandoning its underlying
principles altogether. 56
In various forms, this basic defense of originalism as an act of national
fidelity and a call to arms echoes throughout the Tea Party movement.
The Constitution "meant one thing when it was written, and it still means
the same thing," declared a speaker at an April 2009 Tea Party rally in
Athens, Texas. 57 "It's up to us to light a fire under our fellow citizens."58
Perhaps no major figure of the Tea Party has done more to insist
that the Founders must be at the forefront of contemporary policy discus-
sions than Glenn Beck. "In order to restore our country," he has said,
"we have to restore the men who founded it on certain principles to the
rightful place in our national psyche." 5 9 Beck has called for a "Refound-
ing."60 The Beck-inspired "9-12 Project" has identified nine principles
for its followers, each supported with a quotation from Jefferson or
Washington. 6 1 The group also calls on its followers to meet regularly
with family and neighbors to discuss the importance of the Founders'
design for America. 62 "When you read these guys [the Founders], it's
alive," Beck once said on his show. "It's like, you know, reading the
scriptures. It's like reading the Bible. It is alive today. And it only comes
alive when you need it."63
This last point-that the Founders and the Constitution they drafted
is "alive today"-is central to Tea Party ideology." For the Tea Party,
the Founders' ideas and personalities are present with us today. Their
portraits, their words, even their modem avatars (in the form of historical
re-enactors) are regularly found at Tea Party events. The Founders are
also generally portrayed as comfortable companions. They are not only
65
admirable and likable, but they also tend to agree with the Tea Party.
56. MARK R. LEVIN, LIBERTY AND TYRANNY: A CONSERVATIVE MANIFESTO 36 (2009).
57. Lauren Ricks, Anyone for TEA.?: 300 Gather at County Courthouse to Protest More
Taxes, ATHENS DAILY REV., Apr. 16, 2009, available at Westlaw ATHENSDLY.
58. Id. "I came because I want our country restored to our founding principles," explained an
attendee at the rally. Id.
59. JILL LEPORE, THE WHITES OF THEIR EYES: THE TEA PARTY'S REVOLUTION AND THE
BATTLE OVER AMERICAN HISTORY 156 (2010) (quoting The Glenn Beck Show (Fox News television
broadcast Apr. 30, 2010)).
60. Glenn Beck Reveals the Plan, GLENN BECK (Nov 26, 2009, 3:19 AM),
http://www.glennbeck.com/content/articles/article/1 98/33398.
61. 9 Principles, 12 Values, THE 9-12 PROJECT, http://the912-project.com/about/the-9-
principles-12-values/ (last visited Apr. 15,2011).
62. Our Mission, THE 9-12 PROJECT, http://www.the9l2project.com/2009/03/24/mission-
statement-2/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
63. LEPORE, supra note 59, at 157 (quoting The Glenn Beck Show (Fox News television
broadcast May 7, 2010)).
64. See Adam Liptak, Tea-ing Up the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2010, at WKl.
65. See, e.g., Adam Nagoumey, Tea Party Choice Scrambles in Taking on Reid in Nevada,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, at Al (writing that Sharron Angle, in response to Harry Reid's criticism
that she was too conservative, suggested that "they probably said that about Thomas Jefferson and
George Washington and Benjamin Franklin. And truly, when you look at the Constitution and our
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Furthermore, the Founders, by most Tea Party accounts, were in basic
agreement on the key points. The Founders were remarkable not only for
the force of their ideas, but also for their general agreement upon these
ideas. "One of the most amazing aspects of the American story," wrote
W. Cleon Skousen, the late ultra-conservative conspiracy theorist whose
work has become widely influential in the Tea Party,66 "is that, while the
nation's Founders came from widely divergent backgrounds, their fun-
damental beliefs were virtually identical."
Thus we can see in the Tea Party the transformation of originalism
from a method of constitutional interpretation whose primary attribute
was its claimed ability to limit judges into a method of constitutional
interpretation that has become a focal point for a movement that has
largely ignored the courts in promulgating its various constitutional
claims. Originalism in its populist form has become an act of respect,
even reverence, for the Founding generation. Populist originalists em-
phasize the accessibility of Founding Era history, offering clear and con-
sistent answers to the most pressing dilemmas of modem America. This
may not be good history, but it offers a powerful tool for constitutional
mobilization.
D. The Process of Constitutional Mobilization
One of the most important contributions of the Tea Party movement
for scholars of popular constitutionalism is that it has demonstrated the
viability of various extrajudicial mechanisms of popular constitutional
claim-making. 68 In this section, I examine the mechanisms by which the
Tea Party has sought to inject its constitutional vision into popular con-
sciousness and political practice. I categorize these mechanisms into
three categories: (1) the Tea Party's promotion of its constitutional vision
through educational outreach efforts; (2) state-level Tea Party activism,
including lobbying for state "sovereignty" and nullification measures;
and (3) national electoral politics, particularly the 2010 congressional
elections, which provided the Tea Party a platform for pursuing its con-
stitutional vision through the electoral process.
founding fathers and their writings . .. you might draw those conclusions: That they were conserva-
tive. They were fiscally conservative and socially conservative").
66. On Skousen's influential role in the Tea Party, see generally Sean Wilentz, Confounding
Fathers: The Tea Party's Cold War Roots, NEW YORKER, Oct. 18, 2010; see also Jeffrey Rosen,
Radical Constitutionalism, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 26, 2010, at 34.
67. W. CLEON SKOUSEN, THE MAKING OF AMERICA: THE MEANING AND SUBSTANCE OF THE
CONSTITUTION 10 (1985).
68. Various commentators have noted that the popular constitutionalists have been short on
concrete descriptions of "the particular institutional mechanisms that would make their vision a
reality in today's world." David L. Franklin, Popular Constitutionalism as Presidential Constitu-
tionalism?, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1069, 1069 (2006); see also David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as
Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2049-50 (2010); Todd E. Pettys, Popular
Constitutionalism and Relaxing the Dead Hand: Can the People Be Trusted?, 86 WASH. U. L. REV.
313, 321 (2008).
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1. Educational Outreach
Premised on the idea that the Constitution is a document that is
readily accessible to all Americans and a belief that higher levels of con-
stitutional consciousness will naturally support their cause, national and
local Tea Party groups have sought to promote constitutional literacy
among the citizenry. "We need to talk about and learn about the Consti-
tution daily," said Jeff Luecke, a Tea Party organizer from Dubuque,
Iowa, expressing a commonplace sentiment among the Tea Party faith-
ful. 69 Glenn Beck regularly rails against the lack of schooling about the
Constitution,70 and he has called on his listeners to act as a "constitu-
tional watchdog for America." 7 1 "Only citizens' understanding of and
commitment to law can possibly reverse the patent disregard for the
Constitution and statutes that has permeated American life," writes
Angelo Codevilla, the author of a widely discussed recent populist con-
servative manifesto. 72 One Tea Party-affiliated campaign-called "Save
the Constitution-Read It!"-promotes a six-point constitutional com-
mitment plan:
1. Commit to reading the Constitution today and reviewing it often.
2. Make a goal and write it down.
3. Mark your calendar to review the Constitution on the 17th of each
month.
4. Tell a friend about your goal.
5. Better yet, read it with a friend.
6. Place pocket Constitutions in your car or near your favorite
chair. 73
The Tea Party Patriots sell an "Official Tea Party Patriots' Coloring &
Activity Book" for children.7 4 According to their website, "[i]nspired by
the principles of Freedom and Liberty immortalized in the United States
Constitution . . . the book includes a simple and fun emphasis on funda-
69. Philip Rucker & Krissah Thompson, Two New Rules Will Give Constitution a Starring
Role in GOP-Controlled House, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2010, 10:57 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/29/AR2010122901402.html.
70. See Bradford Plumer, The Revisionaries, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 2010, at 16.
71. Ian Millhiser, Rally 'Round the True Constitution', AMER. PROSPECT, Aug. 25, 2009,
http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=rally round thentrue constitution.
72. CODEVILLA, supra note 51, at 84.
73. Commit, SAVE THE CONSTITUTION READ IT!, http://www.saveitreadit.org./page/ com-
mit.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
74. Coloring Book, TEA PARTY PATRIOTS, http://www.teapartypatriots.org/coloringbook.aspx
(last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
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mental freedoms and is part of a long term effort to educate the next gen-
eration of children on the basics of American liberty."7 5
Tea Party activists often compare their constitution classes to
Catholic catechism 76 or Bible study.77 They often proudly carry copies of
the Constitution, and pocket copies are regularly distributed at Tea Party
events.78 A group called Let Freedom Ring holds public readings of the
Constitution,79 and some Tea Party groups have requested opportunities
to go into schools to talk about the Constitution.80
2. State-Level Constitutional Mobilization
The second category of constitutional activity is state-level mobili-
zation. This has included campaigns to get state legislatures to pass "sov-
ereignty resolutions"-statements asserting a commitment to the princi-
ple of state sovereignty as recognized in the Tenth Amendment of the
Constitution.8 1 Some states have even gone so far as to declare the right
to nullify federal policy that the state legislature deems unconstitu-
tional.82 Another element of state-level constitutional activism is efforts
to mobilize support for certain Tea Party-favored amendments to the
Constitution.
The mobilization of states' rights ideology and even the possibility
of state nullification of federal policy has been one of the most contro-
versial elements of the Tea Party's constitutional project. The Tea
Party's embrace of these state-level projects of resistance to federal pol-
icy is significant not only because of the way they align with the move-
ment's constitutional vision, but also because they provide an arena for
constitutionally driven political mobilization that offers near-term, feasi-
ble targets, and the possibility of occasional victories. "We didn't get
75. Id.
76. ZERNIKE, supra note 32, at 79.
77. Rucker & Thompson, supra note 69 (describing Beth Mizell, a local Tea Party organizer,
comparing weekend classes on the Constitution to a church Bible study); Jill Lepore, The Com-
mandments: The Constitution and Its Worshippers, NEW YORKER, Jan. 17, 2011, at 76 ("Many
people are now reading [the Constitution], with earnestness and dedication, often in reading groups
mode[l]ed on Bible study groups.").
78. ZERNIKE, supra note 32, at 67; Bill Donahue, The Calling Chuck Henthorn Led Ohio Tea
Partiers to the Glenn Beck Rally: Can Their Vision Of Patriotism-Duty And God's Marching Or-
ders-Reshape America?, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2010, at W09; Mara Liasson, Tea Party: It's Not
Just Taxes, It's the Constitution, NPR, (July 14, 2010),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 128517427; Plumer, supra note 70, at 17.
79. Plumer, supra note 70, at 16.
80. Id.
81. Kathy Kiely, Some States Pass Sovereignty Measures, USA TODAY (May 17, 2009, 5:05
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-05-14-secede N.htm#; see also The 10th Amend-
ment Nullification Movement, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER,
http://www.tenthamendmentcenter.com/the-10th-amendment-movement/ (last visited Apr. 15,
2011).
82. Jack Kenny, N.H. House Asserts State 's Right to Nullify Federal Laws, THE NEW
AMERICAN (Mar. 31, 2011, 7:30 PM), http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/6935-
nh-house-claims-states-right-to-nullif-y-federal-laws.
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involved just to scream and shout; we actually have things that we'd like
to accomplish," explained a local Tea Party activist in Tennessee who
came to his state's capital to demand that the legislature attend to the Tea
Party's concerns.83 Even if these campaigns are often dismissed as
merely symbolic, the states nonetheless provide a powerful forum for
ongoing popular mobilization of the Tea Party's constitutional agenda.
The Tea Party's promotion of state-level resistance to federal
authority began in a rather haphazard, even farcical manner, but has
since developed into a standard element of its larger constitutional pro-
ject. Texas governor Rick Perry gained headlines when, at a Tea Party
rally in the spring of 2009, he went so far as to suggest secession as a
possible remedy for an overreaching federal government. 8 4 As talk of
Texas seceding from the union died down, a basic pattern of Tea Party
mobilization in the state legislatures developed. The first step was a
round of generic "state sovereignty" resolutions. A popular model resolu-
tion has been promoted by the Tenth Amendment Center: the non-
binding "10th Amendment Resolution."85 It includes some rather prosaic
Tea Partyesque rhetoric-a statement that sovereignty resides in the peo-
ple, not the government; the text of the Tenth Amendment; a reference to
unnamed federal "powers, too numerous to list for the purposes of this
resolution, [which] ... infringe on the sovereignty of the people of this
state" and may be unconstitutional. 8 6 It also includes some stronger lan-
guage-a demand that the federal government "cease and desist any and
all activities outside the scope of their constitutionally-delegated pow-
ers"; a resolution to form a committee "to recommend and propose legis-
lation which would have the effect of nullifying specific federal laws and
regulations"; a call for the creation of a "committee of correspondence"
87to rally support for these principles in other states.
The next step of the Tea Party's state-level constitutional project
has been the passage of state laws aimed at nullifying specific federal
regulatory policies. The primary target here has been the health care law,
although federal policies relating to the regulation of guns and medical
marijuana have also been challenged through nullification resolutions.
Even before passage of the federal health care bill in early 2010, local
Tea Party groups were calling upon their state legislatures to take a stand
against the looming possibility of a national health care program. A
January 2010 rally in Missouri saw numerous state officials expressing
support for an amendment to the state constitution prohibiting enforce-
83. Cara Kumari, Tea Partiers Tell Lawmakers To Deliver, WSMV (Jan. 12, 2011, 9:40 PM),
http://www.wsmv.com/politics/26471655/detail.html.
84. W. Gardner Selby & Jason Embry, Perry Stands by Secession Idea, Says He Won't Push
It, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Apr. 17, 2009, at A01.
85. 10th Amendment Resolution, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER,
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ment of the individual mandate.8 8 After the health care bill was signed
into law, several states passed statutes expressing opposition to the law;
some even went so far as to refuse to enforce the law.89 Virginia was the
first to do so, passing its nullification law on March 4, 2010.90 At this
time, thirty-six other states were considering similar legislation.91 These
nullification resolutions were based on a template being circulated by the
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), titled the "Freedom of
Choice in Healthcare Act."92 By the end of 2010, the model legislation
had been introduced or announced in forty-two states; six states (Vir-
ginia, Idaho, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Missouri), had passed ver-
sions of the bill; and two (Arizona and Oklahoma) had passed the bill as
a constitutional amendment. 93 In early 2011, Tennessee passed a law that
would allow residents to choose to opt-out of the health care mandate.94
When it comes to opposing the constitutionality of federal policy,
nullification laws have obvious attractions from a movement mobiliza-
tion perspective. "Nullification Begins With You," explains a Tenth
Amendment Center brochure designed to promote its "Nullify Now
Tour." 95
Nullification is not something that requires any decision, statement or
action from any branch of the federal government. Nullification is
not the result of obtaining a favorable court ruling.
Nullification is not the petitioning of the federal government to start
doing or to stop doing anything. Nullification doesn't depend on any
88. THOMAS E. WOODS, NULLIFICATION: How TO RESIST FEDERAL TYRANNY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 122 (2010).
89. Becky Bohrer, Alaska Gov. Refusing to Enact Health Care Law, MSNBC (Feb. 17, 2011,
5:44 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/41651066/#.
90. Act of March 10, 2010, ch. 106, 2010 Va. Acts 106 (adding § 38.2-3430.1.1 to the Vir-
ginia Code: "No resident of this Commonwealth ... shall be required to obtain or maintain a policy
of individual insurance coverage ..... ) (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3430.1.1 (2010)).
91. Chelsey Ledue, Virginia is the First State to Pass National Healthcare Nullification Law,
HEALTHCARE FINANCE NEWS (Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.healthcarefinancenews.cominews/ vir-
ginia-first-state-pass-national-healthcare-nullification-law.
92. ALEC s Freedom of Choice in Health Care Act, AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL,
http://www.alec.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=FOCA&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&Cont
entlD=1 5323 (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
93. Id.; see also David Lightman, All Over Map on Health Care, CHI. TRIBUNE, Feb. 22,
2011, at C4.
94. State House Passes Health Freedom Act, THE CHATTANOOGAN.COM (Mar. 7, 2011),
http://www.chattanoogan.com/articles/article_ 196197.asp. The newest state-level tactic being pur-
sued is the creation of an interstate compact that, if it received congressional approval, would ex-
empt member states from participation in the national health care program. See Fred Barnes, Nullify-
ing Obamacare, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.weeklystandard.com
/articles/nullifying-obamacare 524862.html; The Compact-Health Care Compact, HEALTHCARE
COMPACT, http://www.healthcarecompact.org/compact.
95. Nullifying Federal Mandates, TENTH AMENDMENT CENTER,
http://www.tenthamendmentcenter.com/wp-content/uploads/brochures/Nullification-Brochure.pdf.
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Federal law being repealed. Nullification does not require permission
96
from any person or institution outside of one's own State.
One of the constant challenges of constitutional mobilization is
keeping a sense of purpose and forward momentum to the cause. Consti-
tutional change can be so slow, the realization of constitutional goals
often seem impossibly distant. Lobbying state legislatures to stand up for
their Tenth Amendment rights has proven a particularly effective way in
which the Tea Party addressed this challenge.
3. National Politics
The third area of Tea Party constitutional activism I consider takes
place in the arena of national electoral politics. The plan here is straight-
forward: to make fidelity to the Constitution a central qualification for
elected office. The constitutional principle of limited federal power can
be effectuated simply by demanding that members of Congress recognize
their constitutional responsibilities-and voting them out of office if they
fail to do so. One of the Tea Party's goals was to transform the elections
into a debate over the appropriate scope of congressional power under
the Constitution. Thus far, it is here, in congressional politics, that the
Tea Party's constitutional agenda has had its most significant impact.
"It is becoming apparent to millions of voters the solution lies in
electing officials who understand, respect and abide by the Constitution
as much as we citizens are expected to follow the law," explained long-
time conservative fundraiser Richard Viguerie. 97 FreedomWorks Chair-
man Dick Armey's basic advice to the newly elected Tea Party-
supported members of Congress is quite simple:
Look to the Constitution to govern your policy. You do not swear an
oath to the Republican Party or the tea party-your pledge is to de-
fend the Constitution. Let this govern your votes. The Constitution
was designed to limit government power, so make sure your votes go
only to bills that are right and necessary.
The Independence Caucus, an organization that describes itself as a
"national citizens organization" and has been aligned with local Tea
Party groups, created a lengthy list of yes-or-no "vetting questions" for
congressional candidates. 99 It is basically a test of Tea Party bona fides,
designed to measure a candidate's commitment to the Independence
96. Id.
97. Richard Viguerie, Constitutionally, the Next Time, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2009, 5:45
AM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/nov/23/constitutionally-the-next-time/.
98. Dick Armey, Stay True to Principle - and the Constitution, POLITICO (Jan. 18, 2011,
04:25 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0111/47697.html.
99. See The Process: Vetting Questions, INDEPENDENCE CAUCUS, http://www.icaucus.org/
vetting-process/the-questions (last visited June 29, 2011).
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Caucus's mission of promoting limited government, fiscal responsibility,
and "adherence to constitutional authority."100
Mike Lee, newly elected U.S. Senator from Utah and a Tea Party
favorite, has been quite explicit in talking about the constitutional com-
mitments he, as an elected representative, would feel compelled to fol-
low, regardless of existing judicial doctrine. In a speech to the Federalist
Society in November 2010, soon after his election victory, Lee stated,
that the solution to federal overreach lies in focusing on the political
branches. Members of Congress must take more responsibility for the
Constitution, he explained. They must not forget the fact that
under Article VI, each member of Congress is required to take an
oath to uphold the Constitution. In my mind, that means more than
doing that which you can get away with in court. . .. [M]embers of
Congress need to be held accountable, and need to hold themselves
accountable, to their oath, regardless of what the courts might be
willing to enforce-that that needs to become part of the American
political discourse.10'
When the new Republican House majority was installed in early
2011, one of the most publicized changes was to require that all federal
laws specify the constitutional basis for congressional authority.102 This
was a proposal the Tea party had advocated during the 2010 elections.'o3
The reason this requirement gained so much traction has much to do with
a moment in the fall of 2009 during the height of the debate over the
federal health care bill. At a press conference held by House Speaker
Nancy Pelosi, a reporter from a conservative news organization asked the
Speaker where in the Constitution she found the basis for the individual
mandate provision of the health care bill.104 "Are you serious? Are you
serious?" she asked. 05 When the reporter responded in the affirmative,
she shook her head and moved on to another questioner.'0 6 This confron-
tation, and Pelosi's dismissive attitude toward the question of the law's
100. Mission Statement, INDEPENDENCE CAUCUS, http://www.icaucus.org/ in-
dex.php?option=com content&view=article&id=5 1&Itemid=81 (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
101. Senator-Elect Michael S. Lee, Address to 2010 National Lawyers Convention (Nov. 19,
2010), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/audioLib/LeeAddress-1 1-19-10.mp3.
102. See, e.g., Rucker & Thompson, supra note 69.
103. See About Us, CONTRACT FROM AMERICA, http://www.thecontract.org/aboutus (last
visited Apr. 19, 2011). The Contract From America was created by Ryan Hecker, an activist affili-
ated with the Houston Tea Party Society. The proposal was also included in the Republican Pledge
to America, which the party rolled out during the 2010 elections. Republicans in Congress, A Pledge
to America: A New Governing Agenda Built on the Priorities of our Nation, the Principles We Stand
For, & America's Founding Values, http://pledge.gop.gov/resources/ library/documents/pledge/a-
pledge-to-america.pdf ("We will require each bill moving through Congress to include a clause
citing the specific constitutional authority upon which the bill is justified.").
104. Matt Cover, When Asked Where the Constitution Authorizes Congress to Order Ameri-
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constitutionality, has been referenced again and again in Tea Party litera-
ture.10 7 It is regularly cited as clear evidence that the Democratic leader-
ship was playing fast and loose with the Constitution, ignoring conserva-
tive concerns that health care and other measures pushed beyond the
boundaries of Congress's constitutionally enumerated powers.
The House Tea Party Caucus began a high-profile Constitution
study group, not unlike the ones that have popped up around the nation
with the encouragement of local Tea Party groups. Michelle Bachmann,
U.S. Representative from Minnesota and founder of the Tea Party Cau-
cus, organized a series of what she called "Conservative Constitutional
Seminars" for members of Congress. 08 The class became a major news
story before it even began, when Bachmann announced that Justice
Scalia would lead the group's first meeting.' 0 9
There was also the highly publicized reading of the Constitution
from the floor of the House of Representatives at the start of the term of
the 112th Congress-the first time this had ever been done in the history
of the House." 0 Republican Congressman Bob Goodlatte of Virginia, a
fiscal conservative and staunch opponent of the health care bill,"' initi-
ated the idea. "One of the resounding themes I have heard from my con-
stituents is that Congress should adhere to the Constitution and the finite
list of powers it granted to the federal government," he said in a press
release.1 2 "As the written expression of the consent the American people
gave to their government-a consent with restrictions and boundaries-
the public reading of the Constitution will set the tone for the I12th Con-
gress.""' "Call it the tea party-ization of Congress," Washington Post
107. See, e.g., CODEVILLA, supra note 51, at 45; WOODS, supra note 88, at 1; Ken Klukowski,
Letter to the Editor, POLITICO (Oct. 28, 2009, 05:09 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
1009/28787.html ("Yes, Madame Speaker, I'm serious. The individual mandate is unconstitutional.
If Obamacare passes, we'll see you in court.").
108. Justice Scalia to Address Conservative Constitutional Seminar, CONGRESSWOMAN
MICHELE BACHMANN (Dec. 15, 2010), http://bachmann.house.gov/News/ DocumentSin-
gle.aspx?DocumentlD=217599; Gabriella Schwarz, Congress To Be Schooled, CNN.COM (Dec. 15,
2010, 11:24 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/12/15/congress-to-be-schooled-2/#more-
139906.
109. Editorial, Justice Scalia and the Tea Party, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2010, at WK7; Schwarz,
supra note 108. On January 24, Scalia talked at the seminar. According to reports of some who
attended, Scalia gave his trademark defense of originalism and urged the lawmakers to read the
Federalist Papers and to follow the Constitution as it was written. David G. Savage & Kathleen B.
Hennessey, Scalia Gives Talk on Constitution to Members ofHouse, CHI. TRIBUNE, Jan. 25, 2011, at
C12.
110. Felicia Sonmez, Constitution Day: House Holds First-Ever Floor Reading of Founding
Document, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2011, 11:45 AM), http://voiceswashingtonpost.com/44/
2011/01/constitution-day-house-to-hold-I.html.
Ill. As Goodlatte wrote in defending his opposition to the health care bill: "All Americans
should be worried anytime the federal government tries to trample on or ignore our Constitution . . ,
." The Wrong Prescription for America, CONGRESSMAN BOB GOODLA1TE (Mar. 26, 2010),
http://goodlatte.house.gov/2010/03/the-wrong-prescription-for-america.shtml.
112. Goodlatte to Lead Historic Reading of US. Constitution on House Floor, CONGRESSMAN
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reporters wrote about the newfound congressional fascination with the
Constitution.1 4 "After handing out pocket-size Constitutions at rallies,
after studying the document article by article and after demanding that
Washington return to its founding principles, tea party activists have
something new to applaud. A pillar of their grass-roots movement will
become a staple in the bureaucracy that governs Congress."
By turning to congressional elections and lawmaking as an arena of
constitutional contestation, the Tea Party has found a way in which eve-
ryday citizens can stake out constitutional claims and then demand, in a
relatively direct manner, that government abide by these constitutional
principles. This approach to constitutionalism is far more empowering
and far more effective as a tool of movement mobilization than working
through the courts. Although critics often dismiss these Tea Party-
inspired episodes and reforms as little more than publicity stunts, they
have been effective at keeping the Tea Party's constitution claims in the
public eye. The Tea Party has achieved something considerable in creat-
ing a viable popular constitutional movement-a movement that has
been able, for the most part, to avoid becoming dependent on the out-
comes of constitutional litigation but at the same time has had consider-
able success in keeping its agenda focused on the Constitution's text and
its history.
III. LESSONS FROM THE TEA PARTY
In its self-conscious commitment to extrajudicial constitutional in-
terpretation, the Tea Party offers one of the clearest demonstrations of
the dynamics of popular constitutionalism in modern American history.
This still-unfolding movement might offer valuable lessons about the
capacities and limitations of popular constitutional mobilization.
In this section, I will explore one possible lesson that emerges from
the Tea Party case study. The hypothesis I will consider is that (1) popu-
lar constitutionalism is better suited to advancing certain kinds of consti-
tutional claims over others, and that (2) the Tea Party experience sug-
gests that popular constitutional mobilization can be particularly effec-
tive in advancing the small-government, anti-regulation agenda that is at
the heart of the modem conservative-libertarian movement.
In pursuing this hypothesis, I am challenging an assumption preva-
lent within popular constitutional scholarship. Scholarship on popular
constitution has had something of a leftward tilt. Most of the most enthu-
siastic proponents of popular constitutionalism in the legal academy self-
identify as political liberals or progressives.l16 They envision popular
114. Rucker & Thompson, supra note 69.
115. Id.
116. This observation is explored in Lee J. Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?:
Theoretical Possibilities and Practical Differences, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011),
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engagement with the Constitution as an antidote to a Supreme Court that,
for reasons having to do both with the ideological commitments of par-
ticular justices and the institutional constraints of the judiciary, has too
often blocked progressive reforms favored by the elected branches and
by popular movements."'7 Popular constitutionalism is thus assumed to
offer an attractive oppositional force to a Supreme Court that today and
perhaps more generally (with the Warren Court as an aberrational mo-
ment) is basically a conservative institution. In treating popularly based
constitutional commitments as oppositional to a conservative judiciary,
popular constitutionalists assume that popular constitutional mobilization
is well suited to the kinds of claims favored by progressives. Or, at
minimum, they assume that popular constitutionalism provides ideologi-
cally neutral mechanisms through which all kinds of constitution
claims-those favored by progressives as well as those favored by con-
servatives--can be advanced. The Tea Party experience raises the ques-
tion of whether unleashing the people themselves as autonomous claim-
ants on constitution meaning results in predictably progressive constitu-
tion claims. More provocatively, the Tea Party experience might suggest
that popular constitutionalism could in fact have a rightward tilt. At least
in the modem American scene, it would seem that those mechanisms that
are most readily available for advancing extrajudicial constitutional
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1 658549. One need only look at the
contributor list to a volume that emerged from a conference co-sponsored by the American Constitu-
tion Society and dedicated to strategizing the advancement of a progressive constitutional vision, to
see the obvious overlap between liberal law professors and the leading proponents of popular consti-
tutionalism and its variants. THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds.,
2009). One should not take this point too far, however. While it seems clear that the majority of the
most important advocates of popular constitutionalism (at least in its most recent incarnation) have
been liberal, two qualifications are necessary. First, some of the theory's most prominent critics are
also liberal. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular
Constitutionalism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 673 (2004). And some of the most prominent proponents of
variations on the theory of popular constitutionalism are well-known conservatives. Advocacy of
variants of extrajudicial constitutionalism can be traced back to Edwin Meese and are found in the
scholarship of Michael Stokes Paulson and others. Second, popular constitutionalism, as a theory of
constitutional development, does not call for any particular outcome, whether liberal or conservative.
As David Pozen has written:
Popular constitutionalists do not tend to claim that judicial supremacy has diminished so-
cial welfare or social justice, though they occasionally draw attention to the Court's pro-
pensity to thwart progressive legislation or to the fragility of constitutional commitments
that lack a grounding in public support. The focus is on process and culture more than
outcomes. As normative theorists, popular constitutionalists have stressed a nonconse-
quentialist point about the courts' ability to impede collective self- determination.
Pozen, supra note 1, at 2057.
117. See, e.g., William E. Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk Different from All Other Rights
Talk? Demoting the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1771, 1772 (1994)
("[A]s the federal judiciary continues roughly on the course set in the 1980s, resuming its historic
role as a largely conservative, sometimes reactionary force in American life, perhaps progressive
constitutional thinkers can do more. The Constitution, after all, was not written solely for courts to
interpret, nor does it mean only what judges say it means. On the contrary, the Constitution often has
been the terrain for broad public debates. And until relatively recently, neither popular nor scholarly
discussion of constitutional matters focused so narrowly on judicial doctrine. For most of United
States history, when politicians, reformers-and scholars-debated the meaning of the Constitution,
they far more often addressed the citizenry and the legislatures than the courts.").
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claims tend to serve conservative and libertarian interests better than
progressive ones. What follows is a provisional effort to sketch some of
the factors that could be drawn upon to evaluate this claim.
A. The Conservative Constitution
A central factor in considering the possible ideological tilt of popu-
lar constitutional mobilization is the nature of the Constitution itself.
Most of the Constitution's text is quite old. Although the Constitution
can be read many ways, it is, first and foremost, a monument to a vision
of governance from a past era. The "lessons" that can be easily extracted
from this document, extracted without much intermediary direction (such
as judicial doctrine), are not the kinds of lessons that tend to inspire those
on the left today.
"The Framers' constitution, to a large degree, represented values we
should abhor or at least reject today," Michael Klarman stated in his
2010 Constitution Day lecture." 8 "The Constitution was drafted over 200
years ago by people with very different concerns and values."' 19 Not only
is there the obvious point that the original Constitution actively sup-
ported the institution of slavery, but there is the point that "the Framers'
constitution was mostly a conservative, aristocratic response to what they
perceived as the excesses of democracy that were overrunning the states
during the 1780s."l120 The Framers were skeptical of democracy, Klarman
emphasizes, and they were fully accepting of limiting the vote to white
male property owners. 121 Those provisions that would seem to prevent
the government from doing what a majority of the people believe it
should do are generally stretched or ignored. The idea of enumerated
powers for Congress has largely been pushed aside; the administrative
state is clearly problematic on separation of powers and nondelegation
grounds, but it is here to stay; we now have an "imperial executive" that
is a far cry from what the Founders envisioned for this office.12 2 "The
Framers would not recognize our system of government today," explains
Klarman, "yet the idea that courts would strike it down as unconstitu-
tional seems almost inconceivable. The original design of the Constitu-
tion has become almost completely irrelevant."l 23
This kind of skepticism was the central theme of Justice Thurgood
Marshall's controversial remarks on the document's bicentennial:
I do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was forever
'fixed' at the Philadelphia Convention. Nor do I find the wisdom, fore-
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sight, and sense of justice exhibited by the Framers particularly pro-
found. To the contrary, the government they devised was defective
from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war, and momen-
tous social transformation to attain the system of constitutional gov-
ernment, and its respect for the individual freedoms and human rights,
we hold as fundamental today. When contemporary Americans cite
'The Constitution,' they invoke a concept that is vastly different from
what the Framers barely began to construct two centuries ago.124
It would be hard to find a description of constitutional development more
at odds with the Tea Party movement than Marshall's. For Marshall, the
Founding Fathers were deeply flawed men, as was the Constitution they
created. "[T]he true miracle was not the birth of the Constitution, but its
life."1 25
What is important to note is that Marshall's speech is that it was a call
for a kind of constitutionalism, but it was a constitutionalism based in a
skepticism toward the original document and the history surrounding the
framing of the document. It sought to demote the centrality of the text
and of the late eighteenth century and to elevate the subsequent history of
struggles to, in Jack Balkin's phrase, "redeem" the Constitution.126 Not a
miraculous moment in the summer of 1787, but subsequent struggles to
overcome the limitations of the 1787 generation are at the heart of Mar-
shall's constitutional vision and, more generally, contemporary progres-
sive constitutionalism.
Justice Marshall had faith that his vision of the Constitution-a vi-
sion of the Constitution largely detached form its eighteenth century
roots-aligned with that of "contemporary Americans." But, as demon-
strated in opinion polls showing considerable support for originalism and
in the successes of the Tea Party in pushing an originalist conception of
the Constitution, this assumption appears questionable, at least in today's
political environment. The case of the Tea Party indicates that, at least in
the context of modern American political and constitutional culture,
popular constitutionalism serves insurgent conservatism remarkably
well. Most obviously, insisting, as the Tea Party has done, that the text
and history of the Constitution play a role in debates over federal policy
tends to provide added leverage to those who advocate more limited
government. While resistance to federal regulatory authority can be
found across the political spectrum (consider, for instance, the liberal-
libertarian alliance that briefly blocked renewal of the Patriot Act in early
2011), it has been the centerpiece of the modem conservative agenda. As
124. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987).
125. Id. at 5.
126. JACK BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD
(2011).
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a matter of popular constitutional mobilization, demanding that Congress
do less (or that it repeal what it has already done) because of constraints
based in constitutional text and history is a powerful weapon. The un-
avoidable fact that the federal regulatory state has grown immeasurably
since the nation's beginning means that the Founding Era contains plenty
of material with which to challenge the proposed policy on originalist
grounds. To insist that the Constitution be a central factor in the debate
has tended to bolster the case of small-government opponents of new
regulations more than its proponents. When it comes to political and so-
cial mobilization, the benefits of going constitutional, at least on the
modem American scene, seem to favor the cause of small-government
conservatism.
B. Populist Conservative Constitutionalism-The Historical Record
In using popular constitutional mobilization in the name of limiting
the power of the federal government and mobilizing around states' rights
principles, the Tea Party locates itself into a venerable tradition dating
back to at least to the period of the American Revolution. Considered
historically, many of the most powerful expressions of popular constitu-
tionalism have been in the service of resistance to federal government
authority.
In delineating this intellectual history of popular constitutionalism,
Kramer identifies the eighteenth-century Anglo-American concept of
"fundamental law" as "law created by the people to regulate and restrain
government, as opposed to ordinary law, which is law enacted by the
government to regulate and restrain the people."1 27 Kramer elaborates
that "[t]he object of fundamental law was to regulate public officials,
who were thus in the position of ordinary citizens with respect to it and
required to do their best to ascertain its meaning while going about the
daily business of governing."l 2 8 In defending the newly drafted Constitu-
tion against Anti-Federalist charges that it created a national government
that would devour the states, Federalists emphasized the ways in which
the people could protect themselves against federal over-reach. 129 In
Federalist No. 46, James Madison famously recognized the importance
of popular mobilization as a mechanism for resisting unconstitutional
encroachments of federal authority.13 o When faced with a federal law that
transcends the limits of constitutional authority, states, Madison insisted,
retained considerable ability to mobilize opposition:
The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and, perhaps, re-
fusal to co-operate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of the
127. KRAMER, supra note 2, at 29.
128. Id. at 30.
129. See id. at 83-91.
130. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison).
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executive magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by leg-
islative devices, which would often be added on such occasions,
would oppose, in any State, difficulties not to be despised; would
form, in a large State, very serious impediments; and where the sen-
timents of several adjoining States happened to be in unison, would
present obstructions which the federal government would hardly be
willing to encounter.
But ambitious encroachments of the federal government, on the
authority of the State governments, would not excite the opposition
of a single State, or of a few States only. They would be signals of
general alarm. Every government would espouse the common cause.
A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance would be
concerted. One spirit would animate and conduct the whole. 131
Many of the most conspicuous episodes of popular constitutional
mobilization in American history have been aimed at standing up against
federal power based on an originalist or fundamentalist reading of the
Constitution.132 This was the case when Jefferson and Madison sought to
mobilize opposition within the states to the Alien and Sedition Acts of
1798.'"3 This was also the case in the lead-up to the Civil War, when the
South argued that the Constitution protected slavery against federal inter-
ference, while abolitionists who refused to enforce federal fugitive slave
laws also claimed to be acting on constitutional principle. 134
Moving into the twentieth century, we can see a similar pattern of
social and political movements drawing on the text and history of the
Constitution in order to protect against the growth of federal power. The
Constitution became a powerful symbol of what was perceived to be a
simpler and more principled time-it became, in essence, a rallying point
for those who sought to slow the social and political changes of modem
society. In his cultural history of the Constitution, A Machine that Would
Go of Itself historian Michael Kammen locates the first nationwide ef-
fort to mobilize the American people in order to specifically promote and
defend the Constitution as taking shape in the 1910s and continuing
through the 1930s.'13 Like today's Tea Party, this was a movement that
was ideologically conservative, reacting against the trend toward the
centralization of governmental power, increased federal regulations, and
perceived encroachments by governing philosophies that were seen as
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Forbath, supra note 4, 167 n.10 (noting that prior to the New Deal, the tradition
of the extrajudicial constitutional interpretation, which he terms the "political Constitution," "fo-
cused chiefly on the powers of state versus federal government and on interbranch allocations of
power" and that "[i]ndividual rights arose more rarely as objects of direct congressional interpreta-
tion and enforcement").
133. JONATHAN ELLIOT, 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 528-29, 540-44 (1861).
134. Timothy S. Huebner, Lincoln's Legacy: Enduring Lessons of Executive Power, 3 ALB. L.
REV. 615, 624 (2010).
135. See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go ITSELF 206-08 (2006).
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dangerous and radical.136 As a speaker at a 1934 Constitution Day cele-
bration proclaimed, the Constitution is "a bulwark against communism
and Fascism." 37 Constitution Day-an observance initiated by various
patriotic groups in the late 19 1Os-became a regular platform for denun-
ciations of Progressive and then New Deal policy.' 38 Like the Tea Party,
this movement adopted a quasi-religious language to describe its efforts.
It was a "constitutional revival" that was called for, explained Senator
William E. Borah in 1924.139 This movement sought to increase popular
understanding of the Constitution, sparking the creation of various orga-
nizations and citizens clubs, emphasizing constitutional fidelity as a par-
ticularly patriotic exercise.140 In the 1920s, members of constitutionalist
groups such as the National Security League, the National Association
for Constitutional Government, the Constitutional League were described
as "Constitution Worshippers" and "Professional Patriots."' 4'
In the 1950s and 1960s, white southerners opposed to civil rights
also sought to energize popular engagement with the Constitution and the
history of the Founding. In their efforts to oppose Brown v. Board of
Education 4 2 and the possibility of federally mandated school desegrega-
tion, southern segregationists took their stand on the Constitution. In
1956 almost all southern members of Congress put their names on a
statement, soon to be known as the "Southern Manifesto," denouncing
Brown as "unwarranted exercise of power by the Court, contrary to the
Constitution." 43
The Founding Fathers gave us a Constitution of checks and bal-
ances because they realized the inescapable lesson of history that no
man or group of men can be safely entrusted with unlimited power.
They framed this Constitution with its provisions for change by
amendment in order to secure the fundamentals of government
against the dangers of temporary popular passion or the personal
predilections of public officeholders.
We regard the decisions of the Supreme Court in the school cases
as a clear abuse of judicial power. It climaxes a trend in the Federal
Judiciary undertaking to legislate, in derogation of the authority of
Congress, and to encroach upon the reserved rights of the States and
the people.
136. Id.
137. Wall St. Observes Constitution Day, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 19, 1924, at 23 (quoting comments
of Professor William B. Guthrie, in a speech sponsored by the National Security League).
138. KAMMEN, supra note 135, at 219-23.
139. Id. at 219; see also id. at 225 (describing the emergence of "a constitutional cult . .. that
manifested strong religious overtones").
140. Id. at 206-08, 220-21.
141. Id. at 224-25.
142. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
143. 102 CONG. REC. 4459-60 (1956).
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The original Constitution does not mention education. Neither
does the 14th Amendment nor any other amendment.'4
The statement argued that the separate-but-equal principle, having
been "restated time and again, [had become] a part of the life of the peo-
ple of many of the States and confirmed their habits, traditions, and way
of life." 45 "We reaffirm our reliance on the Constitution as the funda-
mental law of the land," the southern members of Congress wrote in
conclusion.146 "We decry the Supreme Court's encroachment on the
rights reserved to the States and to the people, contrary to established
law, and to the Constitution." 47 Writing of the advocates of "massive
resistance," one contemporary observer noted: "In a sense they have be-
come 'constitutional fundamentalists,' trying to restore the true faith that
is alleged to have been corrupted by modernism." 48
Extrajudicial claims on the Constitution have been pursued for
causes of all kinds. Nonetheless, as these prominent examples suggest,
efforts to inject constitutionalism into policy debate and to energize a
social movement by highlighting constitutional principles and history
have been particularly successful when pursued those promoting an
agenda of anti-regulation, small government conservatism.
C. Progressive Constitutionalism
The current generation of liberals and progressives has sought to
counter conservative claims on the Constitution's meaning by offering
their own vision of the Constitution. There are certainly textual bases that
progressives can look to in staking their claims on the Constitution. The
Tea Party reading of the Constitution tends to focus its energies on Arti-
cle I and the Bill of Rights (particularly the Tenth Amendment). In con-
trast, a progressive reading of the Constitution tends to focus on what
comes before and after those sections. The Preamble contains what is
easily the most stirring and empowering rhetoric of the Constitution:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Bless-
ings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish






148. Lewis M. Killian, The Purge of an Agitator, 7 SOC. PROBS. 152, 153 (1959). See Powe,
supra note 14, at 866-70, for a discussion of Massive Resistance as fitting the mold of popular
constitutionalism.
149. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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These words provide a powerful platform for claiming the need for
more active government involvement in the lives of the American peo-
ple, all in the service of "establish[ing] Justice" and "promot[ing] the
general Welfare" and "secur[ing] the Blessings of Liberty."o50 These
principles, based in the Declaration of Independence as well as the Pre-
amble, are the essence of what Mark Tushnet calls the "thin Constitu-
tion"-the narrative of constitutional meaning that can function in the
extrajudicial realm.151
Rather than demonizing the state as conservative populist constitu-
tional tends to do, progressive constitutionalism, in both its judicial and
extrajudicial forms, tends to embrace a positive vision of government
power. This is a vision of federal power formulated, in tentative terms,
during the period of Radical Reconstruction, then born anew through the
struggles culminating in the New Deal and civil rights movement. It re-
jects the libertarian belief that liberty and power are invariably compet-
ing in a zero-sum game. Instead, progressives identify ways in which
government authority can affirmatively act to protect rights. Government
has the ability, perhaps even the constitutional responsibility, to uproot
entrenched inequalities and ensure certain minimum benefits for its citi-
zens without which freedom is impossible. 152 Progressive popular consti-
tutionalism occurs when people mobilize around a vision of human
equality and social justice, and do so in the name of fundamental princi-
ples contained in our Constitution and embodied in the nation's ongoing
struggle to form a "more perfect union."153 As Robin West has written,
"Only by reconceptualizing the Constitution as a source of inspiration
and guidance for legislation, rather than a superstructural constraint on
adjudication, can we make good on its richly progressive promise."l54
150. Id.
151. See TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 9.
152. See, e.g., Robin West, The Missing Jurisprudence of the Legislated Constitution, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, supra note 116, at 89 (calling for an "understanding of the state as under a
moral duty, a legal duty, and a constitutional duty to act in the interest of all, and not just a prohibi-
tion against acting in certain discriminatory ways"). This distinction between classical and modem
liberal constitutional visions is nicely captured in Justice Jackson's famous opinion in West Virginia
State Board ofEducation v. Barnette:
[T]he task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights, conceived as part
of the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on
officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth century, is one to disturb self-
confidence. These principles grew in soil which also produced a philosophy that the indi-
vidual was the center of society, that his liberty was attainable through mere absence of
governmental restraints, and that government should be entrusted with few controls and
only the mildest supervision over men's affairs. We must transplant these rights to a soil
in which the laissez-faire concept or principle of non-interference has withered at least as
to economic affairs, and social advancements are increasingly sought through closer inte-
gration of society and through expanded and strengthened governmental controls.
319 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1943).
153. See Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641,
708-10 (1990).
154. Id. at 65 1; see Robin West, Katrina, the Constitution, and the Legal Question Doctrine,
84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1127, 1129 (2006).
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William Forbath, one of the most powerful advocates of this consti-
tutional vision, has traced the development of what he calls the "social
citizenship tradition."'55 In contrast to the more commonly recognized
court-centered egalitarian tradition based on Brown and its progeny, the
social citizenship tradition "was a majoritarian tradition, addressing its
arguments to lawmakers and citizens, not to courts. Aimed against harsh
class inequalities, it centered on decent work and livelihoods, social pro-
vision, and a measure of economic independence and democracy."'s5
Forbath explains, "In public political discourse, New Dealers cast the
changes they sought as fundamental rights reinvigorating the Constitu-
tion's promise of equal citizenship by reinterpreting it."l 57 What Forbath
calls the "political Constitution"-in contrast to the "judicial Constitu-
tion"-was debated in Congress, in the executive branch, and in the pub-
lic sphere, with the courts playing little role. 5 8
On the hustings, in radio addresses, and in more sustained debates,
speeches, and writings, the lawmakers and the president argued not
simply that Congress had the power under the Constitution, rightly
understood or amended, to regulate agriculture, industry, and labor.
They argued that citizens had fundamental economic and social
rights under the Constitution, rightly understood or amended; and
Congress, therefore, had the duty to exercise its power to govern eco-
nomic and social life in a way that sought to secure those rights....
[T]he "social citizenship" tradition .... provided them not only a
rights rhetoric, but also a constitutional narrative, modes of interpre-
tation, and conceptions of the allocation of interpretive authority.
159
The central institution for institutionalizing this constitutional vi-
sion, what President Franklin D. Roosevelt called the "general Welfare
Constitution,"1 60 was Congress. "[T]he New Dealers carried forward a
long tradition of congressional constitutional argument, interpretation,
rights recognition, and precedent-making." 61
Not only do progressive legal scholars identify quite different sub-
stantive rights in the Constitution than do Tea Party constitutionalists,
favoring most substantive visions of the equal protection principle and
emphasizing the constitutional bases for active government involvement
in advancing social welfare and justice, but the basic vision of the Con-
stitution they tend to advance is in direct opposition to the Tea Party's
vision of the Constitution. The Tea Party rallies around a vision of the
155. William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998).
156. Id.
157. Forbath, supra note 4, at 182.
158. Id. at 167; see Robin West, supra note 152, at 79-91 (differentiating the "legislated Con-
stitution" from the "adjudicated Constitution").
159. Forbath, supra note 4, at 176 (emphasis added).
160. Forbath, supra note 155, at 69.
161. Forbath, supra note 4, at 167.
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Constitution as fundamentally a source of limits on government author-
ity, as a bulwark against evolving standards of proper governance, as a
way to keep the present-day Americans in touch with certain basic truths
about liberty identified by a heroic generation of founding Americans.
Progressive constitutionalists question each of these suppositions. They
locate within the Constitution sources of government authority. They
insist that constitutions have never been nor should they be static em-
bodiments of a single past moment. They note that there have been he-
roic struggles over constitutional principles since 1787 that should also
be part of our constitutional self-understanding. This is a living, respon-
sive, democratic conception of constitutional development. "Constitu-
tional politics involves reinterpreting and revising our fundamental
commitments and arriving anew at considered popular judgments about
the rights of citizens and the duties of government," Forbath explains.1 62
While the progressive claims about the core meaning of the Consti-
tution are diametrically opposed to the Tea Party's claims, there are in-
teresting parallels between the two constitutional projects. Indeed, in
many ways they are mirror images of one another. Each challenges, in
quite profound ways, the constitutional status quo. Each looks to past
moments in American history as offering guidance for achieving their
constitutional vision. Each sees the courts as basically antagonistic to
their constitutional vision. Each takes seriously the value of extrajudicial
constitutional engagement and interpretation. Each identifies Congress in
particular as the institutional focal point for their constitutional projects.
Thus we can see a good deal of overlap between Tea Party constitution-
alism and modem progressive constitutionalism, both in terms of tactics
of constitutional mobilization and assumptions about the construction of
constitutional meaning. Both take seriously the constitutional responsi-
bilities of Congress. Both recognize that members of Congress have an
obligation to interpret the Constitution, without being necessarily con-
strained by judicial interpretation.
In response to the Tea Party's war for the Constitution, progressive
legal scholars have fought back. Much of the counter-offensive has come
in the form of taking issue with the Tea Party's reading of the Constitu-
tion and claims about its history.' 6 3 "The Constitution belongs to all of
162. Id. at 176; see Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 374 ("[T]raditions of popular engagement
... authorize citizens to make claims about the Constitution's meaning and to oppose their govern-
ment-through constitutional lawmaking, electoral politics, and the institutions of civil society-
when they believe that it is not respecting the Constitution. Government officials, in turn, both resist
and respond to these citizen claims. These complex patterns of exchange have historically shaped the
meaning of our Constitution.").
163. See LEPORE, supra note 59, at 96-97; Sean Wilentz, Confounding Fathers: The Tea
Party's Cold War Roots, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 28, 2010, at 32; David H. Gans, Rand Paul, the
Tea Party, and Our Constitution, CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER, (May 21, 2010),
http://theusconstitution.org/blog.history/?p=1696; Plumer, supra note 70.
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us," writes Garrett Epps.' 64 "It's time to take it back from those who are
trying to steal it in plain sight."165 Epps is critical of liberals for being
unable or unwilling to deal with the Constitution in terms that resonate
with the American people. "Scholars from top schools hold forth with
polysyllabic theories of hermeneutics that ordinary citizens can't
fathom."1 6 6 Conservatives, on the other hand, "don't hesitate to speak
directly to the public and, often, to dumb down the Constitution."6 Yet,
Epps contends that the Constitution is not a conservative document. He
finds "precious little evidence" that the Constitution "was set up to re-
strain the federal government."' 68 "[T]he document as a whole is much
more concerned with what the government can do-not with what it
can't.... [T]he Constitution allowed for a government adequate to the
challenges facing a modern nation."l 69 Those limits on government
power that the Constitution does include, he argues "are mostly limits on
state governments and corresponding increases in federal power." 7 0 By
Epps' reckoning, "a careful reading of the Constitution" shows that the
framers "wrote a document that in essence says, 'Work it out."'l71
Epps proposes to fight the Tea Party on their own terms. "To save
our Constitution, we have to read it"-something he believes few people
take the time to do.1 72 He even becomes something of a cheerleader for
the document and the experience of reading it:
The Constitution as a whole takes effort to read; but once one puts in
the effort-several readings, all the way through, and some serious
thought about what one has read-it reveals a surprising, indeed
sometimes dazzling, array of meanings. By turns political, legal, epic
and poetic, it shows us a number of strategies for dealing with con-
temporary challenges.
At its most basic level, reading the Constitution requires the tools
that Vladimir Nabokov urged readers to bring to any text: imagina-
tion, memory, a dictionary and a willingness to use all three when the
going gets tough.1
73
And he concludes his attack on the Tea Party with a call to arms:
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Read the Constitution and measure it against the absurd claims we
hear every day. This is a matter of life and death for our Republic.
We won't find the Tea Party manifesto there; nor will we find the
agenda of progressive advocacy groups. What we will find is a set of
political tools and a language that fair-minded citizens, progressive or
conservative, can use to talk through our disagreements.
Ordinary Americans love the Constitution at least as much as far-
right ideologues. It's our Constitution too.
It's time to take it back.174
The question for progressives like Epps who put their hopes in
popular constitutional engagement is whether the principles of the thin
Constitution can be effectively mobilized. Whether accurate or not, his
description of the revelations to be found in the Constitution is hardly the
kind of call to arms offered by the Tea Party. The only clear message
Epps pulls from the text of the Constitution is that the Tea Party is wrong
in its reading of the Constitution. But the best alternative he has for the
Tea Party's libertarian constitutional vision is a call for talk. "Work it
out" is hardly a rallying cry for a constitutional movement.
CONCLUSION
The question is, then, are certain constitutional arguments more sus-
tainable in a popular arena? More specifically, is popular constitutional-
ism more effective-at least in our contemporary political climate-at
advancing a conservative-libertarian agenda than a progressive one? The
experience of the Tea Party suggests that this might very well be the
case. One of the central issues that scholars of popular constitutionalism
are going to have to assess in the wake of the emergence of the Tea Party
is whether popular constitutionalism has an ideological tilt. This ques-
tion has not been a central focus in scholarship on popular constitutional-




THE TEA PARTY'S CONSTITUTION
JARED A. GOLDSTEINt
INTRODUCTION
Since its rather sudden emergence in March 2009, the Tea Party
movement has garnered considerable attention as a rowdy group of anti-
tax, anti-health reform, anti-stimulus, anti-bailout, anti-Obama activists.
Tea Party supporters characterize the movement's central goal to be re-
claiming the Constitution and returning the government to constitutional
principles.' Tea Party groups express devotion to the Founding Fathers
and declare their commitment to "stand[] up for what our Founding Fa-
thers believed in" 2 and to "revive the spirit of the Founders . . . ."3 At
their rallies, Tea Party groups pass out pocket copies of the Constitution,
men dress in colonial costumes, and speakers routinely demand the resto-
ration of foundational constitutional principles.4 The name "Tea Party"
itself seeks to cast the movement as a modern day incarnation of the na-
tion's founders.5
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1. A typical mission statement of a Tea Party group declares: "Our demands are simple:
Return the role of the Federal government to the original design laid out in the U.S. Constitution[.]"
TRUSSVILLE TEA PARTY (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.trussvilleteaparty.com/; see also, e.g., FORT
WALTON BEACH TEA PARTY, http://fwbteaparty.com/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2011) ("Our core princi-
ples: 1. Support and defend the U.S. Constitution as the Supreme Law of the Land."); North Ala-
bama Patriots Tea Party, TEA PARTY PATRIOTS, http://www.teapartypatriots.org/GroupNew/
5cab6674-ae56-4477-8418-2258a6cdl936/NorthAlabamaPatriots Tea Party (last visited Apr. 1,
2011) ("Mission Statement[:] Promote the return of our Government based on principles set forth in
the US Constitution .... "); RAINY DAY PATRIOTS, http://www.rainydaypatriots.org/ (last visited
Apr. 1, 2011) ("We the People Fighting to Restore our Constitutional Republic[.]").
2. ST. AUGUSTINE TEA PARTY, http://unitedamericanteaparty.ning.com/ (last visited Apr. 1,
2011).
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about.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2011); see also About, SHOALS2DC,
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emnment and moral leadership."); FLORIDA TEA PARTY, http://floridateaparty.weebly.com/ (last
visited Apr. 1, 2011) ("Our founding fathers wanted our government to be a limited government.");
RAINY DAY PATRIOTS, supra note I ("We the People Fighting to Restore our Constitutional Repub-
lic.").
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TIMES, Apr. 16, 2010, at Al7; Mara Liasson, Tea Party: It's Not Just Taxes, It's The Constitution,
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The sudden prominence and power of the Tea Party call for an ex-
amination of its constitutional vision. In a very short time, the Tea Party
movement has succeeded in nominating and electing many of its pre-
ferred candidates to Congress and to state offices, and it now exercises
considerable influence-by some accounts dominant influence-within
the Republican Party. Its power to implement its constitutional goals is
growing rapidly. The constitutional principles advanced by the Tea Party
also bear examination as an example of popular constitutionalism, the
theory that ultimate authority over the meaning of the Constitution re-
sides (or should reside) in the people themselves. The central descriptive
insight developed by scholars of popular constitutionalism is that politi-
cal movements have frequently succeeded in changing constitutional law
without amending the Constitution, transforming constitutional interpre-
tations that appeared kooky or implausible yesterday into the settled doc-
trines of today.8 Larry Kramer, proponent of a normative version of
popular constitutionalism, has claimed that popular constitutionalism
once was the norm, and he has lamented what he believes to be its death
at the hands of judicial supremacy. 9 If nothing else, the Tea Party move-
ment suggests that popular engagement with the Constitution is alive and
well.
Although the Tea Party movement loudly proclaims its goal of re-
storing the government to constitutional principles, commentators have
struggled to describe the movement's understanding of the Constitu-
tion.' 0 That difficulty is understandable because the Tea Party movement
Party as a protest against excessive taxation, rather than a protest against taxation without represen-
tation. As one writer put it, the Tea Party's depiction of the American history "is to history what
astrology is to astronomy, what alchemy is to chemistry, what creationism is to evolution." Id.
6. See, e.g., Kate Zemike, For G.O.P., Tea Party Wields a Double-Edged Sword, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2010, at Al.
7. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Undercover Anti-Populism, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1343, 1344
(2005) ("The basic principle of popular constitutionalism can be briefly stated. It is, in a nutshell, the
idea that ordinary citizens are our most authoritative interpreters of the Constitution . . . ."); see also
MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 183 (1999) ("Populist
constitutional law . . . treats constitutional law not as something in the hands of lawyers and judges
but in the hands of the people themselves.").
8. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO
POLITICS 45 (1996) (arguing that "the meaning of most of the Constitution is determined through
ordinary politics"); William E. Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century: Reflec-
tions on the Dark Side, the Progressive Constitutional Imagination, and the Enduring Role ofJudi-
cial Finality in Popular Understandings of Popular Self-Rule, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 967, 969-70
(2006) ("From the New Deal right down to the present, party politics and social movements . .. have
been lively sites of popular involvement in-and popular influence over-the nation's constitutional
development.").
9. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 228 (2004) ("Apart from a few academic dissidents, everyone nowadays seems
willing to accept the Court's word as final-and to do so, moreover, regardless of the issue, regard-
less of what the Justices say, and regardless of the Court's political complexion.").
10. See Adam Liptak, Tea-ing Up the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2010, at WKI
("The content of the movement's understanding of the Constitution is not always easy to nail down .
. . ."); Liasson, supra note 4 ("Tea Party members are often vague about exactly how their constitu-
tional rights are being denied. But they all believe the federal government has expanded far beyond
what the Constitution intended.").
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is comprised of hundreds of local groups with no coordinated leadership
or official platforms." Moreover, Tea Party supporters usually invoke
the Constitution in rather vague terms without providing what lawyers
would recognize as legal arguments. As a rule, Tea Party supporters do
not invoke the Constitution as a text in need of interpretation but instead
as a repository of what they consider the fundamental and unchallenge-
able values upon which the nation was founded.12
Perhaps the best sources for exploring the Tea Party's vision of the
Constitution are two books written in the 1980s by W. Cleon Skousen
that have been enthusiastically embraced by the Tea Party movement.
The Five Thousand Year Leap is frequently characterized as the "bible"
of the Tea Party movement.' 3 Released in 1981, the book remained virtu-
ally unknown until conservative commentator Glenn Beck began touting
it as offering "answers to the questions plaguing America."' 4 Since its
2009 re-issuance, with a new introduction by Beck, the book has sold
more than 300,000 copies.' 5 It has been the nation's best-selling book on
law and, for a few months, the best-selling book, period, according to
sales on Amazon.com.' 6 The Making of America: The Substance and
Meaning of the Constitution, published by Skousen in 1985, purports to
explain the Constitution clause-by-clause.1 7 Hundreds of Tea Party
groups have used the book as the basis for seminars devoted to educating
their members and the public on the principles of the Constitution and to
11. See Jonathan Kay, Black Helicopters Over Nashville, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 9, 2010),
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/02/08/black-helicopters-over-nashville.html.
12. See, e.g., About Us, THE SOUTHERN COLORADO TEA PARTY,
http://www.socoteaparty.com/index.php?option-com content&view=article&id=97&ltemid=73
(last updated Dec. 18, 2010) ("We believe that not only are 'We the People' not being listened to but
that many of the actions taken by the government are unconstitutional."); Pony Soprano, Comment
to Why are the Tea Parties Being Called Astroturf Events and Not Grassroots?, NON-VIOLENT
ACTIVISM (Aug. 31, 2009, 10:36 PM), http://www.nonviolentactivism.info/grassroots/why-are-the-
tea-parties-being-called-astroturf-events-and-not-grassroots ("We are citizens who want our gov-
ernment to return to its roots as a republic as our founding fathers intended."); What is the Wetumpka
Tea Party?, WETUMPKA TEA PARTY, http://www.wetumpkateaparty.com/AboutUs.aspx (last visited
June. 14, 2011) ("We believe in the principles that our country was founded upon: Faith, Honesty,
Reverence, Hope, Thrift, Humility, Charity, Sincerity, Moderation, Hard Work, Courage, Personal
Responsibility, Gratitude.").
13. W. CLEON SKOUSEN, THE FIVE THOUSAND YEAR LEAP: 28 GREAT IDEAS THAT CHANGED
THE WORLD (2009); see, e.g., David Von Dreble Why the Tea Party Movement Matters, TIME (Feb.
18, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1964903,00.html ("Perhaps the most
talked-about book of the [National Tea Party Convention] was The 5,000 Year Leap .... Speaker
after speaker commended the volume .... ).
14. Book jacket, SKOUSEN, supra note 13.
15. Lee Benson, Glenn Beck Gives Skousen Book's Sales a 'Leap', DESERET NEWS (Mar. 21,
2010, 1:15 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700018281/Glenn-Beck-gives-Skousen-
books-sales-a-Leap.html.
16. Sharon Haddock, Beck's Backing Bumps Skousen Book to Top, DESERET NEWS, at BO I
(Mar. 21, 2009, 12:00 AM); David Weigel, Glenn Beck's Book Club: What the Far Right is Read-
ing, WASHINGTON MONTHLY (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/
2009/091 I.tms.html.
17. W. CLEON SKOUSEN, THE MAKING OF AMERICA: THE SUBSTANCE AND MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION vi-vii (1985).
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show that the answers to America's problems can be found in the wis-
dom of the Founding Fathers.i 8
This Essay examines the Tea Party's vision of the Constitution in
light of The Five Thousand Year Leap and The Making of America. As
Part I discusses, Skousen's books are decidedly strange sources to inspire
a contemporary political movement. They are the products of the para-
noid edges of the radical right wing of the Cold War era, and their main
thrust is that the principles embodied in the Constitution provide the only
hope to save the United States from international Communism. Skousen
presents the Constitution as a divinely ordained blueprint for govern-
ment, which implements biblical principles. Skousen asserts that these
principles made the United States the most free and prosperous nation in
history, but international socialists and wealthy bankers duped the United
States into abandoning its foundational principles. Today, nearly every-
thing the federal government does is unconstitutional, including the issu-
ance of paper money, the establishment of administrative agencies, the
adoption of federal welfare programs like Social Security, the creation of
national parks, and the enactment of environmental and labor laws. 19
With the end of the Cold War, one might have expected Skousen's
books to lose whatever appeal they once had, but the emergence of the
Tea Party movement has given them a much larger and more enthusiastic
audience. As Part II discusses, Skousen's books find widespread support
among Tea Party supporters because they share with Skousen what can
best be characterized as a fundamentalist vision of the Constitution. Like
religious fundamentalist movements, the Tea Party movement arises out
of opposition to modern developments that they believe conflict with
foundational principles. Like fundamentalist movements, the Tea Party
movement reaches back to a mythic past, the foundation of the nation, to
find what the movement's supporters believe to be the nation's funda-
mental principles, principles that believers perceive to be under attack-
belief in God, individualism, limited government, the free market, and
the sanctity of private property. To Tea Party supporters, uncompromis-
ing adherence to the fundamental principles embodied in the Constitution
serves to divide true believers in the constitutional faith from "anti-
Americans" like President Obama and his supporters who would seek to
undermine the nation's fundamental principles.
1 8. Stephanie Mencimer, One Nation Under Beck: In Which Our Reporter Learns About the
Divine Origins of the Constitution at a Tea Party Seminar MOTHER JONES, May/June 2010, at 21;
Krissah Thompson, Conservative Class on Founding Fathers' Answers to Current Woes Gains
Popularity, WASH. POST, June 5, 2010, at A04. As of August 2009, NCCS has been presenting
several seminars each week based on Skousen's work to Tea Party groups around the country. See
Upcoming NCCS Seminars, NATIONAL CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES,
http://www.nces.net/seminars/calendar.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2011); see also Thompson, supra.
19. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
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I. SKOUSEN'S COMMIE-FIGHTING CONSTITUTION
Before describing the constitutional principles found in The Five
Thousand Year Leap and The Making of America, it is worth discussing
W. Cleon Skousen, who made a career of espousing religiously-themed
communist conspiracy theories. Those theories are elaborated in The
Five Thousand Year Leap and The Making ofAmerica, in which Skousen
presented the Founding Fathers as devout Christians who discovered
ancient principles for national success based on the Anglo-Saxons and
the biblical Israelites. 20 A return to the Founders' principles, Skousen,
21advised, is the only way to save America.
A. Cleon Skousen's Long Career in the Radical Right
After working for the FBI in the 1940s and as the Salt Lake City po-
lice chief in the 1950s, Skousen received national attention in 1958 with
the publication of The Naked Communist, in which he claimed to reveal
the secret truth of the international communist conspiracy.22 The com-
munists, Skousen warned, sought to lay the groundwork for collective
government by discrediting the Constitution and the Founding Fathers,
by prohibiting prayer in public schools, by encouraging public accep-
tance of homosexuality and masturbation, and by destroying the tradi-
tional family structure. 23 Although the FBI disavowed Skousen and de-
24clared that he had no expertise on Communism, the success of The Na-
ked Communist-it sold over one and a half million copies25 -allowed
Skousen to become a fixture on the anti-communist speaking circuit.26
20. See SKOUSEN, supra note 13, at 73-77; SKOUSEN, supra note 17, at 41-62.
21. SKOUSEN, supra note 17, at 257.
22. See W. CLEON SKOUSEN, THE NAKED COMMUNIST, at Preface (3d ed. 1960).
23. Mr. Harley, 45 Goals of Communism in "The Naked Communist "-Replace "Commu-
nism" with "Dictatorship" and Things are Eerily Prescient with Regard to Today, THE COMING
CRISIS (Apr. 11, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://thecomingcrisis.blogspot.com/2011/ 04/45-goals-of-
communism-in-naked.html. Mark Hemingway, a columnist for the conservative National Review,
recently characterized The Naked Communist as "so irrational in its paranoia that it would have
made Whittaker Chambers blush." Mark Hemingway, Romney's Radical Roots: No Moderate,
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Aug. 6, 2007, 6:30 AM), http://article.nationalreview.com/323634/
romneys-radical-roots/mark-hemingway.
24. See Memorandum from FBI Chief Inspector William Sullivan to A.H. Belmont (Jan. 2,
1963), http://sites.google.com/site/emiel24102/skousen (declaring that Skousen "was not regarded
as any authority on communism while employed with the FBI").
25. Benson, supra note I5; Kevin Drum, Recycled: The Tea Party Is a Revolutionary Force.
Just Not in the Way You've Been Led to Believe, MOTHER JONES, Sept/Oct. 2010, at 50 ("One of the
most popular tracts among Birchers in the '60s was W. Cleon Skousen's The Naked Communist.").
26. See, e.g., Jack Gould, TV: Christian Anti-Communism Crusade Here, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
1961, at 71 (discussing Skousen's appearance in anti-communist TV special); Bill Becker, Right-
Wing Groups Multiplying Appeals in Southern California, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1961, at 43 (discuss-
ing the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade run by Fred Schwarz and characterizing Skousen as a
"regular on Dr. Schwarz's team of crusaders"); Roy Reed, Birch Society Is Growing in the South,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1965, at 1 (discussing Skousen speech in Birmingham, Alabama, against the
civil rights movement).
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Skousen was an ardent defender of the John Birch Society and often
spoke at events it sponsored.2 7 In 1963, Birch founder Robert Welch de-
clared that President Eisenhower was a "conscious, dedicated agent of
the communist conspiracy," and Barry Goldwater and like-minded con-
servatives such as William F. Buckley broke with the Birchers, conclud-
28
ing that they were not fit members of the conservative movement.
Skousen, however, remained a vocal defender of Welch, asserting that
attacks on the John Birch Society were themselves orchestrated by the
international communist conspiracy.29
In 1970, Skousen published The Naked Capitalist, which declares
that the international communist movement exposed in The Naked Com-
munist was actually the product of an even larger conspiracy directed by
the "dynastic families of the super-rich." 30 These families created and
manipulated both Communism and fascism to carry out their plan to cre-
ate a globalized New World Order. 3 ' The conspirators included a cabal
of international bankers, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Roth-
childs, Rockefellers, Kennedys, J.P Morgan, Henry Kissinger, John
Dewey, and Albert Einstein, among countless others.3 2 The Naked Capi-
talist continues to be cited as a leading authority by New World Order,
Illuminati, and anti-Semitic conspiracy theorists. 33
In addition to these political books, Skousen also wrote several
overtly religious books, which purport to explain human history
from a distinctly conservative Mormon point of view. Beginning
with The First 2000 Years (1953), Skousen sought to explain the
entirety of human history since the world's creation, which he be-
lieved occurred 6,000 years ago, continuing in The Third Thousand
Years (1965), and The Fourth Thousand Years (1966). Skousen's
religious beliefs informed his political views. Skousen believed
27. See Alexander Zaitchik, Meet the Man Who Changed Glenn Beck's Life, SALON (Sept. 16,
2009, 6:18 AM) http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2009/09/16/beck-skousen.
28. Buckley recounted this episode in William F. Buckley, Jr., Goldwater, the John Birch
Society, and Me, COMMENTARY MAGAZINE (Mar. 2008) http://www.commentarymagazine.com/
article/goldwater-the-john-birch-society-and-me/.
29. See W. Cleon Skousen, The Communist Attack on the John Birch Society (1963), avail-
able at http://www.ourrepubliconline.com/OurRepublic/Article/27 (asserting that the John Birch
Society had been "dishonestly ridiculed and smeared at the instigation of the international Commu-
nist conspiracy").
30. W. CLEON SKOUSEN, THE NAKED CAPITALIST (1970). Skousen presented The Naked
Capitalist as a review of Carroll Quigley's Tragedy and Hope: The History of the World in Our
Time, and claimed that Quigley's book supported his thesis. Quigley, however, disavowed Skousen,
saying "[Skousen's] personal position seems to me perilously close to the 'exclusive uniformity'
which I see in Nazism and in the Radical Right in this country. In fact, his position has echoes of the
original Nazi 25 point plan." Carroll Quigley, Roundtable Review, DIALOGUE: THE JOURNAL OF
MORMON THOUGHT, Autumn/Winter 1971, at 109, 110.
31. SKOUSEN, supra note 30, at Preface.
32. Id. at 17,21, 33, 109-11.
33. See Simon Maloy, Glenn Beck and the Paranoid Style, MEDIA MATTERS, (Dec. 18, 2009,
9:16 AM), http://mediamatters.org/columns/200912180003.
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that God himself had inspired and directed the adoption of the
United States Constitution, and that the "Founders were merely
instruments in the hands of the Lord." 34
B. "The Founding Fathers' Phenomenal Success Formula"
The Making of America and The Five Thousand Year Leap share a
singular goal: to save America from Communism by explaining the
foundational principles of American government.3 5 These principles are
not based in any significant degree on the constitutional text, which the
books largely ignore. Skousen instead finds the fundamental principles of
American government in the writings of the Founding Fathers, which the
books provide in hundreds of block quotes, along with many other
sources, including the Bible, Cicero, Blackstone, de Tocqueville, and an
assortment of Mormon and oddball theorists. 3 6
1. The Creation Myth of the Constitution
The constitutional mythology found in Skousen's books is centrally
focused on veneration for the Founders and what may be characterized as
the creation myth of the Constitution. In this narrative, the "Founders"-
a term Skousen uses to refer to both the leaders of the American inde-
pendence movement of 1776 and the framers of the Constitution of
1789-were a group of God's chosen disciples who overcame great ad-
versity and discovered God's secret formula for government, a formula
based on what Skousen pronounces to be "ancient principles." 37
In presenting the Founders as devout Christians who established the
nation based on divinely ordained principles, 8 Skousen scoffs at conven-
tional versions of American history that depict the Founders as relatively
non-religious deists, stating that the Founders "continually petitioned
God in fervent prayers, both public and private, and looked upon his di-
vine intervention in their daily lives as a singular blessing." 39 Skousen
likewise scoffs at conventional historical accounts that the constitutionai
framers were principally influenced by European philosophers of the
34. W. Cleon Skousen, The Book of Mormon and the Constitution (Jan. 14, 1990),
http://www.latterdayconservative.com/articles/w-cleon-skousen/the-book-of-mormon-and-the-
constitution-notes.
35. SKOUSEN, supra note 17, at ix.
36. Many of the quotations are taken quite far out of context. For instance, in support of the
principle that the "core unit which determines the strength of any society is the family," Skousen
quotes a letter from Benjamin Franklin attempting to persuade a friend not to take a mistress but to
marry instead. SKOUSEN, supra note 13, at 202. Skousen omits the crucial and most famous passage
of the letter in which Franklin advised that if his friend were to decide to take a mistress "then I
repeat my former advice, that in all your amours you should prefer old women to young ones." Id
Franklin then listed eight reasons why older women made better mistresses, including that they have
more experience, are more discrete, will not get pregnant, and are more grateful. Id. Traditional
family values it is not.
37. SKOUSEN, supra note 13, at 17, 15, 225.
38. Id. at 75.
39. Id. at 76.
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40
Enlighement era, including Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. On the con-
trary, Skousen asserts that the Founders rejected all "European" theo-
ries. 4 1 Although socialism was unknown at the time of the Founders,
Skousen equates eighteenth century European philosophies with social-
ism and declares that "the Founders [m]ade European [t]heories
[u]nconstitutional."42
Rather than basing the new government on the "European fads" of
Enlightenment philosophers, the Founders rediscovered certain "ancient
principles" from the Bible and the Anglo-Saxons, which formed the basis
for their political philosophy.43 The Founders also made the surprising
discovery that before the Norman invasion the Anglo-Saxons employed a
system of government almost identical to the biblical Israelites.44 Skou-
sen repeatedly exhibits supremacist devotion to the Anglo-Saxons as a
chosen people of God who may have descended from one of the lost
tribes of Israel.45
Skousen's belief in Anglo-Saxon superiority is mirrored by his
apologist history of slavery. Quoting historian Fred Albert Shannon, The
Making of America asserts that slaves were "usually a cheerful lot,
though the presence of a number of the more vicious type sometimes
made it necessary for them all to go in chains."4 6 In Skousen's history of
slavery, brutality toward slaves was almost unheard of, and white
schoolchildren envied "the freedom" of the slaves: "If pickaninnies ran
naked it was generally from choice, and when the white boys had to put
on shoes and go away to school they were likely to envy the freedom of
their colored playmates." 4 7 Although the slaves were well-treated, ate
well, and lived happily, white southerners lived in constant fear of slave
rebellions instigated by abolitionists, making their lives "a nightmare." 4 8
In fact, Skousen suggests, "the slave owners were the worst victims of
the system." 49 In 1987, these passages aroused controversy after a Cali-
fornia state commission celebrating the bicentennial of the Constitution
40. Id. at 63, 80.
41. Id. at 63.
42. Id. at 86, 88-89, 118.
43. Id. at 17. ("When the time came for the United States of America to adopt a constitution,
our forefathers modeled it after the perfect Israelite system of administration.") (quoting HOWARD B.
RAND, DIGEST OF THE DIVINE LAW 130-31 (1943); see also SKOUSEN, supra note 17, at 3-4,41-62.
44. SKOUSEN, supra note 13, at 14-18.
45. Id. at 225-31. Skousen relies on Howard B. Rand, who was the American leader of the
Anglo-Israelite movement, which asserts that the Anglo-Saxons are the descendants of the biblical
Israelites and are therefore God's chosen people. Id at 17; see generally HOWARD B. RAND,
PRIMOGENESIS: THE STORY THE BIBLE TELLS (1948). Anglo-Israelitism, in turn, provided the foun-
dation for the white separatist Christian Identity movement espoused by Randy Weaver, who died in
1992 in a shootout with federal agents, who he believed were agents of a Zionist Occupational
Government. See Leonard Zeskind, BLOOD AND POLITICs: THE HISTORY OF THE WHITE
NATIONALIST MOVEMENT FROM THE MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM (2009).
46. SKOUSEN, supra note 17, at 731-32.
47. Id. at 733.
48. Id at 735.
49. Id. at 734.
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recommended The Making of America to the public, and the commission
later apologized.50 The latest edition of The Making of America, pub-
lished in 2007, maintains these passages, although the word "pickanin-
nies" quoted above has been replaced with "[negro children]." 51
2. The Founders' Principles Provide Protection Against
Communism
The central thrust of Skousen's books is that the Constitution estab-
lishes eternal principles that can protect the nation against the spread of
world Communism. The first and most important of these "ancient prin-
ciples" is that natural law provides the only reliable basis for govern-
ment.52 For Skousen, natural law means God's laws and encompasses the
necessity for "limited government," the right to bear arms, protections
for the family and the institution of marriage, the sanctity of private
property, and the avoidance of debt.53 Such natural law principles, Skou-
sen claims, are instituted eternally and are not subject to change by mor-
tal legislators. 54 Legislation contrary to God's laws is a "scourge to hu-
manity" and is therefore unconstitutional.
Not only did the Founders believe that human laws must be consis-
tent with God's laws, they also believed that republican government
could only survive if the people and their leaders were virtuous, which
requires religious training.56 As a result, the Founders sought to inculcate
religious values in American society, supported government-funded re-
ligious education, and broadly encouraged government support of relig-
ion. 57 The Founders, in their wisdom, thus gave the American people the
means to resist atheism that would one day be advocated by Commu-
nists.
Natural law principles also prevent any programs that provide wel-
fare benefits or redistribute wealth. 8 Skousen cites a debunked story
that, when Davy Crockett was a congressman, he voted against a bill that
would have provided financial support to a navy widow because of his
conviction that the government has no right to take money from some
taxpayers to give to others no matter how worthy the cause and how
50. Katherine Bishop, Bicentennial Panel in California Assailed Over 'Racist' Textbook, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1987, at 9.
51. See generally SKOUSEN, supra note 17. Additional evidence that Skousen held white
supremacist views is his vehement defense of the Mormon Church's refusal to allow African Ameri-
cans to serve as church leaders, in which he claims that criticism of the Church's discriminatory
policies was directed by international Communism. See Hemingway, supra note 23.
52. SKOUSEN, supra note 13, at 33-40; SKOUSEN, supra note 17, at 195.
53. SKOUSEN, supra note 13, at 40, 208.
54. Id. at 40, 103-04.
55. Id. at 38.
56. Id. at41-46,47-57,59-71,73-77.
57. Id at 60, 70.
58. Id. at 87-91.
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needy the recipients. According to Skousen, Congress cannot provide
support for military widows or any citizens who need it because natural
law establishes the inviolability of property rights. Without property
rights, mankind could not carry out God's command to have dominion
over the earth.o Indeed by protecting property, the Founders sought to
refute European philosophers who believed "that the role of government
was to take from the 'haves' and give to the 'have nots."' 6 1 The Founders
disagreed and did "everything possible to make these collectivist policies
'unconstitutional."' 62
3. The Fall from Grace
According to Skousen, the Founders' establishment of the ancient
principles of the Anglo-Saxons and Israelites ushered in a golden age
that was nothing short of miraculous. It allowed humanity to make more
progress in a short time than had been made in the previous 5,000 years
of human history-hence the title, The Five Thousand Year Leap.63 This
miracle allowed the United States to become the most prosperous nation
64
the world has ever known and made its people the most free. Sadly,
however, America has turned its back on the Founders' principles. 6 5 The
result of the abandonment of the foundational principles has been disas-
trous and has wreaked havoc on American culture. 66
For Skousen, the fall from grace began in the first decades of the
twentieth century when socialists attacked the Constitution, attempting to
debunk the Founding Fathers and foment revolution by arguing that the
Constitution is out of step with an industrialized society.67 In fact, Skou-
sen asserts, the socialists were acting as agents of certain wealthy bank-
ers and other members of the "dynastic rich," who sought to gain control
of the government and grant themselves monopolies.68 The capitalist-
communist conspirators largely succeeded in duping the American peo-
ple to abandon many of the ancient principles upon which the nation was
59. SKOUSEN, supra note 17, at 391-92. The story is widely quoted among conservatives but
has no basis in fact. See, e.g., 149 Cong. Rec. H465-08, H495 (2003) (statement of Cong. Ron Paul)
("In the words of the famous essay by former Congressman Davy Crockett, this money is 'Not
Yours to Give."'); Jim Boylston, Crockett and Bunce: A Fable Examined, THE CROCKEtT
CHRONICLE, Nov. 2004.
60. SKOUSEN, supra note 13, at 124, 126.
61. Id. at 86.
62. Id. at 341.
63. SKOUSEN, supra note 17, at 5.
64. Indeed, the Constitution paved the way for the industrial revolution, the machine revolu-
tion, the transportation revolution, the communications revolution, the energy resource revolution,
and the computer revolution. Id. at 2-3.
65. Id. at ix.
66. Id; SKOUSEN, supra note 13, at 4.
67. Id.atll4-18,134.
68. SKOUSEN, supra note 17, at 216.
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founded. 69 As a result, America lost its national identity, producing a
"[g]eneration of lost Americans," and a nation of "un-Americans."o
The United States soon began to adopt one policy after another that
conflicted with its foundational principles, and today, almost everything
the federal government does is unconstitutional. 7' The primary transgres-
sion was the establishment of federal welfare programs like Social Secu-
rity and Medicare, which violate the fundamental prohibition against
redistribution of wealth.72 The entirety of the monetary system likewise
operates contrary to the Founders' formula because it is based on paper
money not backed by gold.73 The entire administrative state is also un-
constitutional because Congress cannot create agencies with regulatory
powers, and the President cannot issue executive orders or promulgate
regulations. 74 In addition, it was unconstitutional for Congress to estab-
lish national parks, national monuments, national forests, and wilderness
areas, to enact federal environmental and labor laws, and to provide for-
* - 75eign aid.
Skousen remained an unapologetic isolationist who believed that
American foreign policies, like its domestic policies, conflicts with the
Founders' plan, which was founded upon America's pursuit of "manifest
destiny" and "separatism" from international conflicts. Skousen cites
isolationist figures Charles Lindberg, Sr., and J. Reuben Clark, who op-
posed entry into World Wars I and II, positions that Skousen says "re-
flected the views of the Founders." 7 7 Discussing World War II, Skousen
ponders "how much happier, more peaceful, and more prosperous the
world would be if the United States had been following a policy of 'sepa-
ratism' as the world's great peacemaker instead of 'internationalism' as
the world's great policeman." 78
Because the United States forgot, rejected, and abandoned the
Founders' principles, the United States stands on the verge of succumb-
ing to a collectivist world government. Yet "there is still time, but not
much" to return to the Founders' eternal principles before "total disaster"
overtakes America. 7 9 Again and again, he exhorts his readers to redis-
cover the Founders' principles, to reverse the tide, and restore the
American government to its foundational roots.80 Indeed, America owes
69. Id.
70. Id. at iii, 135, 217; SKOUSEN,supra note 13, at vi.
71. SKOUSEN, supra note 17, at 407.
72. Id. at 255, 387-92.
73. Id. at 423-26.
74. Id. at 252-54; SKOUSEN, supra note 13, at 343-44.
75. SKOUSEN, supra note 17, at 388, 458-59; SKOUSEN, supra note 13, at 352-53.
76. SKOUSEN, supra note 13, at 189-97, 215-19.
77. Id. at 195-97.
78. Id. at 197.
79. Id. at 337.
80. SKOUSEN, supra note 17, at I1-12; SKOUSEN, supra note 13, at 214.
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it to humanity to restore its foundational principles because, if they were
followed, these principles may provide "the key for the survival of the
human family on the planet earth" and bring peace, freedom, and pros-
perity to all mankind.
II. THE TEA PARTY'S FUNDAMENTALIST CONSTITUTIONAL VISION
Considering that Skousen's avowed purpose in writing The Five
Thousand Year Leap and The Making of America was to protect the na-
tion against international Communism by educating his readers about the
"ancient principles" adopted by the Founding Fathers, one might have
predicted at the end of the Cold War that his books would become
merely curious relics of the paranoia of a bygone era. Yet the books have
found a much larger and more receptive audience in the Tea Party
movement than when they were first published.82 What can explain the
current enthusiasm for Skousen, the hundreds of thousands of new read-
ers his books have attracted, who enthusiastically organize and attend
seminars around the country to study and advance his vision of the Con-
stitution? The vocal support of TV and radio personality Glenn Beck has
obviously contributed, but such advertising would not have generated the
current enthusiasm for Skousen if his books did not resonate with his
new readers.
Skousen appeals to supporters of the Tea Party movement because
they share what may be characterized as a fundamentalist vision of the
Constitution. They both explain contemporary history through a common
narrative in which the Founding Fathers adopted a Constitution that em-
bodies a set of sacred and eternal principles for American government.83
The principles adopted at the time of national creation encompass what
Skousen and the Tea Party understand to be the central values and char-
acteristics of American national culture-devotion to God, limited gov-
ernment, free markets, personal property, and individualism.84 In recent
81. Id. at 2,12.
82. Benson, supra note 14 (estimating that The Five Thousand Year Leap sold 60,000 copies
in the first 25 years after its publication but has sold more than 300,000 copies since the emergence
of the Tea Party movement).
83. See, e.g., 9/12 Project Mission Statement, DEL NORTE TEA PARTY PATRIOTS,
http://delnorteteapartypatriots.com/ncolOO95/?page id=92 (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) ("At the origin
of America, our Founding Fathers built this country on 28 powerful principles.").
84. A typical Tea Party describes its mission "to promote the principles of our founding
fathers-individual liberty and responsibility, limited government and moral leadership." FIRST
COAST TEA PARTY, supra note 3; see also Founding Principles, LIBERTY CENTRAL,
http://www.libertycentral.org/five-founding-principles (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) ("From its earliest
stages, Liberty Central identified limited government, individual liberty, free enterprise, national
security, and personal responsibility as the five principles that best capture the foundations we, as a
nation, need to preserve."); About, SILICON VALLEY TEA PARTY PATRIOTS,
http://siliconvalleyteaparty.com/about (last visited April 12, 2011) ("Silicon Valley Tea Party Patri-
ots is a non-partisan movement aimed at bringing limited government, fiscal responsibility, and the
free-market principles that our country was founded on back to government."); Values, VIDALIA TEA
PARTY PATRIOTS, http://www.vidaliatpp.com/Values.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) ("The core
values of the Tea Party are the same values upon which the United States of America was founded
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years, so the Skousen-Tea Party narrative goes, these fundamental prin-
ciples have come under attack by forces deeply antagonistic to American
values, and the nation has lost sight of its foundational principles.
Skousen and the Tea Party movement offer the same solution to this per-
ceived crisis-a return to the wisdom of the Founding Fathers. 86
The narrative that lies at the heart of Skousen's books and the Tea
Party movement bears a strong resemblance to the narratives propounded
by religious fundamentalists. Although use of the term "fundamentalist"
can be controversial because it is sometimes used pejoratively or dismis-
sively, sociologists of religion have generally embraced the term to de-
scribe religious movements that arise in opposition to elements of mod-
ernity that believers perceive threaten their core identities.87 Notwith-
standing the many differences that exist among movements characterized
as fundamentalist-Sunni fundamentalists, the Haredim, Shiite funda-
mentalists, and Protestant fundamentalists-they bear common traits,
including: (1) the identification of a set of fundamental values that ad-
herents believe are under attack or have been abandoned;88 (2) the belief
that these fundamental values originated in a mythic era and are embod-
ied in a sacred text or tradition; 89 (3) the perception that the current at-
and are rooted in our belief in Natural Law. They derive from a belief in free will, the primacy of
individual and personal responsibility.").
85. See, e.g., BRUCE BEXLEY, THE TEA PARTY MOVEMENT: WHY IT STARTED, WHAT IT'S
ABOUT, AND How YOU CAN GET INVOLVED (2009) (explaining that the Tea Party movement arose
because government spending threatened to "destroy the country" and deprive the people of their
freedoms); Mission Statement, BoONE TEA PARTY, http://booneteaparty.org/mission.htm (last visited
Apr. 12, 2011) ("Our government has strayed drastically from our nation's foundation .... We are
now in grave danger of losing our fundamental rights and liberties as American citizens."); ELBERT
COUNTY TEA PARTY, http://www.elbertteaparty.com (last visited April 12, 2011) ("We are . . .
deeply concerned about the direction our government and our President are taking us as they con-
tinue to push policy and changes that are contrary to the will of the people and of our founding
documents."); FIRST COAST TEA PARTY, supra note 3, ("[T]his just might be our and our Country's
finest hour as we reclaim it from the Obama's, Pelosi's and Reid's and all the other politicians who
have either forgotten or chosen to ignore our Constitution.").
86. As Glenn Beck declares in his introduction to The Five Thousand Year Leap, "The ques-
tions that we face were foreseen by the greatest group of Americans to ever live; our Founding
Fathers. They knew we would be grappling with issues like the ones we face today at some point, so
they designed a ship that could withstand even the mightiest storm. They also knew that we would
eventually lose our way and that we would need a beacon to lead our way back." SKOUSEN, supra
note 13, at 6.
87. The Fundamentalism Project is a five-volume study sponsored by the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences, with contributions from historians, cultural anthropologists, and sociologists of
religion. See generally FUNDAMENTALISMS OBSERVED (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds.,
1991). In the introduction to first volume, the editors write that, notwithstanding misuse of the term
"fundamentalism," the term captures a set of movements that fight back against challenges that they
see as threats to their core identity. Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby, Introduction, in
FUNDAMENTALISMS OBSERVED, supra, at ix.
88. Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby, Conclusion: An Interim Report on a Hypothetical
Family, in FUNDAMENTALISMS OBSERVED, supra note 87, at 822 ("[1]n reviewing 'family traits' that
recur frequently [among various fundamentalist groups], we have observed the fundamentalist quest
for an irreducible basis for personal and communal identity.").
89. Marty & Appleby, supra note 86, at vii, ix ("Fundamentalists" movements are so named
because "they reached back to real or presumed pasts, to actual or imagined ideal original conditions
and concepts, and selected what they regarded as fundamental."); GABRIEL A. ALMOND ET AL.,
STRONG RELIGION: THE RISE OF FUNDAMENTALISMS AROUND THE WORLD 96 (2003) (describing a
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tack on the group's fundamental values represents an existential crisis for
the community of believers; 90 (4) a commitment to restoring the funda-
mental values as the movement's central goal;9' and (5) a Manichean
world view that pits supporters of the fundamental principles against
demonized enemies. 92 These elements can readily be seen in Skousen's
work and in the Tea Party movement.
Like religious fundamentalists, Skousen and Tea Party supporters
believe that their fundamental values are under attack. Tea Party groups
have declared that "the world is watching as the United States crumbles
from within, enemies maneuver beyond our borders and the cornerstone
of the country-the Constitution-is subverted in a political quagmire." 93
To Tea Party supporters, advocates of foreign, anti-American ideas have
taken over the federal government, threatening to displace true American
values, and the fate of the nation hangs in the balance.94 Again and again,
Tea Party supporters argue that the Obama Administration is "attacking"
America, that he is "anti-American," and that he is seeking to undermine
basic American values. 95 The vehemence which Tea Party members
characterize the Obama Administration's agenda as "un-American," "so-
cialist," or "communist"-or, perhaps even worse, "European"---easily
matches Skousen's own anti-communism.96
Skousen, the Tea Party movement, and religious fundamentalists
offer the same solution to the perceived crisis-a return to the fundamen-
belief in the "absolutism and inerrancy" of sacred texts to be characteristics of fundamentalist
movements).
90. Marty & Appleby, supra note 88, at 814, 822-23 ("Fundamentalisms arise or come to
prominence in times of crisis, actual or perceived," which fundamentalist adherents construe as a
"crisis of identity[.]").
91. Id. at 821-22 (discussing "missionary zeal" of fundamentalists to eradicate the "contami-
nation of the unbeliever" and return the community to a state of purity).
92. Id. at 820 ("Fundamentalists name, dramatize, and even mythologize their enemies.");
ALMOND ET AL., supra note 89, at 95-96 (characterizing "moral Manichaeanism" as characteristic of
fundamentalist movements).
93. FIRST COAST TEA PARTY, supra note 3.
94. Make no mistake, Glenn Beck warns in the introduction to The Five Thousand Year Leap,
"our Republic is at stake." SKOUSEN, supra note 13, at 7.
95. See, e.g., CHARLY GULLETr, OFFICIAL TEA PARTY HANDBOOK: A TACTICAL
PLAYBOOOK 12 (2009) ("In response to . . . all the Socialist intellectual and financial atrocities that
have been implemented by the Federal Government since Obama took office, clear-thinking Ameri-
cans (what remains of us) have taken to the streets . . . .").
96. See, e.g., Drum, supra note 25 ("'Obama isn't a US socialist,' thundered Fox News com-
mentator, Steven Milloy at a tea party convention earlier this year, 'he's an international social-
ist!"'); Mission Statement, NORTH ALABAMA PATRIOTS TEA PARTY,
http://northalabamapatriotsteaparty.com/Home.php ("Stop Socialism Before It Destroys Our Coun-
try. Simply Put: Big Government IS Socialism, a Step towards Marxism, Then You Have Totalitari-
anism. Socialism is NOT compatible with our Constitution."). Indeed, the view that Obama espouses
foreign, anti-American ideas (or that he himself is foreign) is widely proclaimed among conserva-
tives. Rush Limbaugh proclaimed that Obama is the "first anti-American President." See The Rush
Limbaugh Show (Premiere Radio Networks broadcast Aug. 18, 2010), available at
http://mediamatters.org/mmtv/201008180035. And even normally levelheaded commentators like
Steven Calabresi say that Obama is a "socialist" who "at some level does not really know America
very well nor does he thoroughly identify with it." Steven G. Calabresi, Steven G. Calabresi Bio,
POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/arena/bio/steven g calabresi.html (last visited June 16, 2011).
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tal principles that adherents claim have been attacked, abandoned, or
compromised.97 The Five Thousand Year Leap contains a ready set of the
twenty eight fundamental principles that Skousen believes constitute
foundational American principles-the centrality of natural (i.e., God's)
law and devotion to God, the necessity for limited government, and the
virtue of isolationist foreign policy, among others. 98 In his introduction
The Five Thousand Year Leap, Glenn Beck begs readers to "leam these
28 ideas, make them your own" and "teach them to your children, your
neighbors, your friends." 99 Throughout the writings of the Tea Party
movement, one finds the same goal of learning the Founders' principles
and spreading the word.' 00
Like religious fundamentalists, Skousen and the Tea Party movement
reach back to a mythic past, the time of the founding of the nation and
the adoption of the Constitution, as the source of the fundamental princi-
ples they preach.' 0 Just as fundamentalist Christians have asserted the
inerrancy of the Bible, Skousen and Tea Party supporters profess to be-
lieve in the eternal wisdom of the Founding Fathers. In words that echo
Skousen, Tea Party Patriots, a leading national Tea Party group, pro-
claims as its mission to "stand with our founders, as heirs to the republic,
to claim our rights and duties which preserve their legacy and our
own." 02 Tea Party groups uniformly seek to advance what they claim to
be the Founders' principles, principles that they assert represent the true
vision for America. o3
Skousen and the Tea Party movement, like religious fundamental-
ists, see the world in Manichean terms, a world in which believers in the
constitutional faith stand on one side and all others are demonized as
enemies who seek to undermine American values. Skousen wrote in the
97. See SKOUSEN, supra note 17, at 257.
98. Id. at ix; see also SKOUSEN, supra note 13, at vi.
99. SKOUSEN, supra note 13, at 7.
100. See, e.g., Our Mission, HARTFORD TEA PARTY PATRIOTS (Jan. 28, 2010 11:08 AM),
http://www.thehartfordteapartypatriots.com (follow "Our Mission" hyperlink) ("We are dedicated to
educating, motivating, and activating our fellow citizens, using the power of the values, ideals, and
tenets of our Founding Fathers."); see also Take Action, GEORGIA TEA PARTY
http://www.thegeorgiateaparty.org/index.php/take-action/ (last visited June 16, 2011) ("Our purpose
is to empower you with knowledge about the Constitution and to provide education about each
American's civic obligation to be engaged in the political process.").
101. As sociologists of religion have explained, fundamentalist typically seek to support an
identify they perceive to be at risk by "a selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs, and practices from a
sacred past." Marty & Appleby, supra note 90, at 835; see also ALMOND ET AL., supra note 89, at 96
(fundamentalist believe that sacred texts like the Torah, the Qu'ran, and the Bible "are of divine
(inspired) origin and true and accurate in all particulars").
102. Mission Statement, TEA PARTY PATRIOTS, http://teapartypatriots.org/Mission.aspx (last
visited June 16, 2011).
103. See Liptak, supra note 10 ("But if there is a central theme to [Tea Party supporters']
understanding of the Constitution, it is that the nation's founders knew what they were doing and
that their work must be protected."); Matthew Continetti, The Two Faces of the Tea Party: Rick
Santelli, Glenn Beck, and the Future of the Populist Insurgency, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (June 28,
2010) (describing one of the few unifying elements of the Tea Party movement that "draws its
strength from the American founding [and] celebrates the Founders and their ideas").
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1950s and 1960s that international Communism sought to undermine
American values by promoting civil rights for African Americans, by
promoting acceptance of homosexuals, and by persuading Congress to
adopt welfare programs.104 Proponents of such measures were not merely
wrong on government policies; to Skousen, they were America's ene-
mies. Tea Party supporters likewise believe that people who disagree
with them on health care reform, tax policies, and immigration are not
merely political adversaries with whom they disagree on the issues. Tea
Party supporters view proponents of health care reform and other such
measures to be deeply un-American.'0 5 Tea Party members believe that,
at best, their opponents are ignorant of the fundamental principles upon
which the country was founded or, at worst, they seek to undermine these
principles.
Indeed, the vehemence with which Tea Party activists demonize
their enemies is one of the movement's most remarkable traits. They
characterize their opponents as socialists and communists; compare
President Obama to Hitler, Stalin, and Saddam Hussein; and have a large
percentage of members who believe that President Obama is a foreigner
or a Muslim or at least someone who adheres to foreign views. 0 6 The
Tea Party movement believes that Obama is radically anti-American. 10 7
The demonization of enemies follows from the fundamentalist nature of
the Tea Party movement. Those who act contrary to what Tea Party sup-
porters believe to be the fundamental American values are perceived to
be undermining or attacking those values; they are not merely Americans
who hold differing positions; they are anti-American, and they must be
defeated in order to save America.'08
The Tea Party view of the Constitution thus is the antithesis of Jus-
tice Holmes' notion that the Constitution was "made for people of fun-
damentally differing views"1o9-in other words, that the Constitution
establishes a framework for resolving fundamental differences through
political and legal processes. In Skousen's and the Tea Party's view, the
104. See SKOUSEN, supra note 22, at 261-62.
105. See, e.g., Matt Bai, G.O.P. Uses Obama 'Otherness' as Campaign Tactic, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2010, at A23; Bookworm, Is Barack Obama Anti-American?, AMERICAN THINKER (Nov.
1, 2009), http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/1 1/is barack obama antiamerican.html
("[B]ecause the overwhelming number of Barack Obama's desires and actions are antithetical to
America's essence, he is in fact anti-American.").
106. See, e.g., Growing Number ofAmericans Say Obama is a Muslim: Religion, Politics and
the President, PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE (Aug. 18, 2010), http://pewforum.org/
Politics-and-Elections/Growing-Number-of-Americans-Say-Obama-is-a-Muslim.aspx.
107. Rush Limbaugh, for example, has characterized President Obama as "the first anti-
American President." See The Rush Limbaugh Show (Premiere Radio Networks broadcast Aug. 18,
2010), available at http://mediamatters.org/mmtv/201008180035.
108. See, e.g., Radicals or Slaves?, ROGUE OPERATOR, (Nov. 11, 2010),
http://rogueoperator.wordpress.com/2010/l l/11 /radicals-or-slaves/ (stating that "the United States is
being taken over, by stealth, subterfuge, and outright socialism, by a radical cadre of elites" who are
advancing a "process of de-Americanization").
109. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 65, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Constitution itself establishes the fundamental values-the Founders'
principles-which are eternal and to which the nation must adhere if it is
to survive. The Tea Party's Constitution does not merely provide a
framework for resolving differing political views; the Constitution itself
resolves those differences.
CONCLUSION
The Tea Party movement's enthusiasm for W. Cleon Skousen's The
Five Thousand Year Leap and The Making of America has brought into
the mainstream radical notions about the Constitution born in the ultra-
conservative right wing of the Cold War era. These notions focus on the
need to restore the Founders' true vision of the Constitution, including
the centrality of natural law, understood to mean God's laws; the neces-
sity for limited government that may not undertake welfare programs,
redistribution of wealth, or interference in any way with private property;
and the embrace of manifest destiny at home and isolationism in foreign
policy. With the growing prominence and growing power of the Tea
Party movement, Skousen's influence has spread beyond Tea Party activ-
ists, and several prominent Republican leaders-Texas Governor Rick
Perry, former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney, Senators Orrin
Hatch and Mike Lee, among others-have openly endorsed Skousen's
views. 10
The Tea Party's Constitution poses a challenge to popular constitu-
tionalism, the theory that the people themselves should have ultimate
authority to interpret the Constitution."' Some academic supporters of
popular constitutionalism have suggested that, although they question the
positions taken by Tea Party supporters, they welcome the movement to
the national dialogue because public engagement on the meaning of the
Constitution strengthens constitutional democracy." 2 Yet there is nothing
inherently good about public discussion about the Constitution, any more
than public discussion of race or other charged issues is always good.
Although some may discuss racial issues in ways that advance under-
standing, others may employ racial rhetoric to incite hatred, misunder-
standing, and violence, and the same is true of discussions of the Consti-
tution.
110. Wayne Slater, Perry Uses Glenn Beck Favorite as Election Ally, DALL. MORNING NEWS,
Oct. 1, 2009, at 3A; Marc Hansen, Best Part of Romney Interview Was Off Air, DES MOINES
REGISTER, Aug. 9, 2007, at Bl; Hemingway, supra note 23. Senator Hatch spoke at Skousen's
funeral and read a poem he had written to honor Skousen. Funeral Program for Willard Clean
Skousen, W. CLEON SKOUSEN, (Jan. 14, 2006), http://www.skousen2000.com/funeral.htm. Russell
Pearce, the chief sponsor of Arizona's recent immigration law, is a devoted follower of Skousen. See
Iron Will Drives Pearce, Agenda, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 6, 2010, at Al.
111. Larry D. Kramer, Undercover Anti-Populism, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1343, 1344 (2005);
see also TUSHNET, supra note 7, at 182 ("Populist constitutional law . .. treats constitutional law not
as something in the hands of lawyers and judges but in the hands of the people themselves.").
112. Liptak, supra note 10; ANDREW E. BUSCH, THE CONSTITUTION ON THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL
8 (2007) ("All other things being equal, more constitutional rhetoric is better than less.")
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The Tea Party's fundamentalist vision of the Constitution shows
that invocations of the Constitution in popular politics can equally serve
as a means of channeling nationalist and authoritarian impulses, just as it
can promote popular democracy and human rights. As Sanford Levinson
has argued, because the Constitution is a potent symbol of national val-
ues-the "sacred text" of our "civil religion"-invocations of the Consti-
tution in popular democracy may emphasize shared values but just as
easily may sow division and animosity.3 Tea Party supporters project
onto the Constitution the values they hold most sacred. Because they
ascribe foundational and constitutional status to their most cherished
values, Tea Party supporters believe that those who do not fully support
these values are not simply wrong but are un-American or even anti-
American. The use of constitutional rhetoric to divide "true Americans"
from "anti-Americans" is not a trend to be welcomed but should be con-
demned as a danger to constitutional democracy.
113. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 17 (1988).
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SUPREME COURT AVOIDS CRUSHING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: WHY THE DECISION IN UNITED STATES V.
STEVENS WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE PRESERVATION OF
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court often grants free speech protec-
tions to the types of speech that society deems unworthy of rights.
Whether the Court is extending protection to hate speech advocates,
allowing pornographers to have less-restricted access to cable viewers,2
or permitting Internet sites the freedom to publish virtual child pornogra-
phy,3 the Supreme Court has constantly faced criticism for preserving the
First Amendment. The recent decision in United States v. Stevens,4 in-
validating a law prohibiting depictions of animal cruelty, will prove no
different. Crusaders for animal rights are bound to blame the Supreme
Court for setting back their cause. However, as this Comment demon-
strates, the Supreme Court is not to blame. This Comment argues that the
Supreme Court made the right decision in invalidating the statute on
animal crush videos (§ 48),5 and that the responsibility of halting the
crusade against crush videos and animal cruelty should be placed on the
statute itself.
Part I of this Comment examines the First Amendment, the circum-
stances leading to the enactment of § 48, and the case law that shaped the
Court's interpretation of § 48. Part II summarizes the facts, procedural
history, and opinions of Stevens. Part III commends the Supreme Court's
decision to protect First Amendment rights and argues that it was Con-
gress's failure to draft a proper statute that caused § 48 to fail judicial
review. Finally, this Comment concludes that the Supreme Court's strict
defense of the First Amendment is crucial to the preservation of the right
to free speech.
I. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-45 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that the
speech of a Ku Klux Klan member advocating violence toward minority groups constituted pro-
tected speech under the First Amendment).
2. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 806-07 (2000) (holding that
requiring cable operators to scramble sexually explicit channels violated the First Amendment).
3. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239-40 (2002) (finding that lack of a
concrete connection between virtual child pomography and child abuse enabled virtual child
pornography to enjoy First Amendment protections).
4. 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Freedom of Speech
The right to free speech is enshrined in the First Amendment's pro-
hibition that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech."6 The prerogative derived from this right, to freely express one's
opinions, ideas, and criticisms, is often credited as the cornerstone to
democracy and individual liberty in the United States. However, free
speech protections have not always been observed with such reverence.
Between the enactment of the First Amendment in 1791 and the be-
ginning of the twentieth century, the concept of "free speech" did not
pose a great barrier to government restriction. For instance, it was not
until 1845 that an explicit First Amendment challenge concerning free
speech was entertained by the Supreme Court. 9 In the subsequent dec-
ades, the Court's opinions concerning the First Amendment right to free
speech were, at best, "hostile" to speech interests.10 By the turn of the
nineteenth century the Court opined that government self-preservation
justified regulation of speech in United States ex rel. Turner v. Wil-
liams." The Turner Court upheld a statute preventing immigration into
the United States, reasoning that certain political beliefs professed by
immigrants may threaten the government.1 The dangerous rationale of
the Turner decision led the Court to validate "shockingly repressive"
statutes during the 1920s.' Among its decisions during this era, the
Court criminalized speech in support of socialism, 14 illegalized criticism
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7. Vickie S. Byrd, Reno v. ACLU-A Lesson in Juridical Impropriety, 42 How. L.J. 365,
365 (1999) ("[T]he First Amendment's guarantee to freedom of speech is the cornerstone of individ-
ual liberty and democracy."); see also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) ("For it is a
prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all
public institutions."); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (describing the First
Amendment as "a fundamental principle of our constitutional system").
8. Howard 0. Hunter, Problems in Search of Principles: The First Amendment in the Su-
preme Court from 1791-1930, 35 EMORY L.J. 59, 89 (1986) ("[T]he Supreme Court during its first
full century of operation ... read the first amendment as a restatement of the English common law
... which allowed government regulation of many areas of speech.").
9. Id. at 70; see Permoli v. City of New Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (3 How.) (1845) (holding that
the First Amendment did not apply to the States).
10. Hunter, supra note 8, at 127 ("[F]rom 1791 to 1930 ... [t]he Court's opinions were
sketchy and usually hostile to the speech interests that were asserted."). Before twentieth century
case law concerning freedom of speech, the Court often placed the interests of the postal service
above that of the First Amendment. See Ex parte Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 134-35 (1892) (holding that
congressional discretion to withhold lottery tickets from the mail did not infringe on the freedom of
communication); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (holding that the exclusion of maga-
zines and newspapers from the postal system was constitutional).
11. 194 U.S. 279, 284, 290 (1904).
12. Id at 290.
13. Daniel Hildebrand, Free Speech and Constitutional Transformation, 10 CONST.
COMMENTARY 133, 134 (1993).
14. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212, 216-17 (1919).
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of American war efforts,' 5 and held a newspaper in contempt for criticiz-
ing a local court.' 6
However, the Court changed its stance on free speech in 1931 with
its decision that the display of a red flag symbolizing opposition to gov-
ernment constituted "free political discussion . . . essential to the security
of the Republic."' 7 Free speech, rediscovered as "a fundamental principle
of our constitutional system,"' 8 finally gained a foundation for the consti-
tutional value it holds today.'9 While free speech continued to face diffi-
cult challenges throughout the twentieth century, such as overcoming the
Smith Act 20 and advancing protestor's rights during the Vietnam War,21
the hard-fought victories of the past have established extensive constitu-
tional protections to contemporary speech.
Today, the First Amendment prohibits the government from restrict-
ing the content, message, or idea expressed within speech.22 Expression
need not be of any serious value to enjoy the shield of the First Amend-
ment,23 and regulations as to the time, manner, and location of speech
must survive a "narrowly tailored" test to be deemed constitutional. 24
The First Amendment provides the strongest protections against content-
based restrictions on speech, making such regulations presumptively
invalid.25
15. Id.
16. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 412, 420-21 (1918).
17. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
18. Id.
19. See Hunter, supra note 8, at 137.
20. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318-21 (1957) (ruling that the conviction of
several Communist Parity leaders for advocating the overthrow of the American government was
unconstitutional because advocacy of "evil ideas" was protected by the First Amendment so long as
the advocacy was not coupled with an effort to instigate action designed to achieve governmental
overthrow).
21. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (holding that
in absence of demonstration of any facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to
forecast substantial disruption of, or material interference with, school activities, or any showing that
disturbances or disorders on school premises in fact occurred when students wore black armbands on
their sleeves to exhibit their disapproval of Vietnam hostilities, regulation prohibiting wearing arm-
bands and providing for suspension of any student refusing to remove armbands was an unconstitu-
tional denial of students' right of expression of opinion).
22. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002). "[A]s a general matter, 'the First Amend-
ment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content."' Id. (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65
(1983)) (alteration in original).
23. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1590 (2010) (describing how most speech
protected by the First Amendment does not fall within a category of serious value).
24. Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and Improper
Legislative Purpose, 38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 38 (2003) (discussing the standards for con-
tent-neutral speech regulations).
25. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).
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B. Presumptively Invalid Statutes
Statutes that regulate the content of speech are presumptively inva-
lid26 and the government bears the burden of rebutting this presump-
tion.27 The government may refute this presumption by demonstrating
that the content-based restrictive statute can survive a strict scrutiny test
or that the content under restriction belongs to a category of speech that
does not warrant First Amendment protection. 28 The strict scrutiny test
requires the government to establish that: (1) a statute prohibiting speech
content seeks to achieve a compelling state interest; (2) the statute is nar-
rowly tailored to achieve that interest; and (3) the means chosen to
achieve that interest are the least restrictive means available. 29 Since the
test's inception the Supreme Court has invalidated every statute sub-
jected to strict scrutiny based on the content-based speech restrictions,
proving strict scrutiny to be a nearly impassible test.30
The government may also overcome a presumption of invalidity by
showing that a content-based restriction proscribes speech outside the
realm of First Amendment protections.' Categories of unprotected
speech share two common characteristics: (1) they have traditional roots
in United States history as being beyond free speech safeguards, and (2)
they are narrowly defined classes of speech.32 Obscenity, defamation,
fighting words, fraud, incitement to illegal action, and speech integral to
criminal conduct are all beyond the purviews of free speech.33 These
groups of speech have never been afforded protection,3 4 have faced pro-
hibition since the founding of the United States, 35 or have historic foun-
dations in Supreme Court decisions as early as the 1920s.36 In addition,
these classes of speech are specifically defined and narrowly construed.3 7
For example, obscenity has a long legal history in America as being un-
26. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584 (quoting City ofSt. Paul, 505 U.S. at 382).
27. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1580 ("Government bears the burden to rebut that presumption.").
28. See United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2008), aff'd, 130 S. Ct. 1577
(2010).
29. See id. (describing how § 48 fails the strict scrutiny test).
30. Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust. Rethinking the Content Approach to Protecting
the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1365 (2006) ("In the twenty cases ...
where a majority of the Court has applied a strict scrutiny standard for reasons of [speech] content
discrimination, it has found every one to be unconstitutional.").
31. City ofSt. Paul, 505 U.S. at 382-83.
32. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584.
33. Id (listing obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal con-
duct as unprotected speech); see also United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2008)
(listing fighting words as unprotected speech), affd, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
34. Cf Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) ("Un-
truthful speech ... has never been protected for its own sake.").
35. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482-83 (1957) (pointing out that 10 states had
statutes prohibiting libel at the time the Constitution was ratified; that obscenity had been prohibited
as early as 1712).
36. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (referring to a case in the 1920s which
instructed that advocacy of violent acts, without more, did not warrant First Amendment protection).
37. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584.
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protected by the First Amendment and it proscribes very specific speech-
content.38 Moreover, even though child pornography has a relatively
new legal history of being beyond First Amendment protection, its con-
tent-based proscriptions are grounded in age-old doctrine and it also pro-
scribes a particularly narrow category of speech.
1. Miller v. California40
Early in American history, obscenity defined a wide class of speech
including depictions of violence. 4 1 Now, under Miller v. California, ob-
scenity extends only to a narrow category of content involving prurient
interests and illegal sexual conduct.42 In Miller, the Court addressed the
issue of whether sexually explicit material distributed through the mail
constituted obscenity.4 3 Deciding that the publications were obscene, the
Court defined obscenity as either depictions that, when taken as a whole,
violate prurient interests according to contemporary community stan-
dards, or as depictions of patently offensive sexual acts that violate spe-
cific state laws.44 However, the Miller Court went on to narrow the defi-
nition by including an exceptions clause affording First Amendment pro-
tections to sexual deceptions having serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.45 As a result, obscenity forbids only a very specific class
of speech.
2. New York v. Ferber46
In 1982, the Supreme Court declared a new narrowly defined cate-
gory of unprotected speech with its decision in New York v. Ferber.47
The Ferber Court was faced with a statute that prohibited all depictions
of child pornography, even those that did not rise to the level of obscen-
ity.48 Unable to prohibit the speech as obscene because the Court recog-
nized that some child pornography may have literary, artistic, political or
scientific value, 49 the Ferber Court determined that child pornography
38. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18, 24 (1973).
39. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760-65 (1982).
40. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
41. Kevin W. Saunders, Media Violence and the Obscenity Exception to the First Amendment,
3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 107, 176-77 (1994).
42. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 508, 519 (1948) (holding that violent criminal
reports do not appeal to prurient interests and are not considered obscene); see also Emma Ricaurte,
Comment, Son ofSam and Dog ofSam: Regulating Depictions ofAnimal Cruelty Through the Use
of Criminal Anti-Profit Statutes, 16 ANIMAL L. 171, 191-92 (2009).
43. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 18.
44. Id. at 24.
45. Id.
46. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
47. See id at 764-65.
48. Id. at 749 (referring to a New York criminal statute that prohibits people from knowingly
promoting sexual performances by children under age sixteen).
49. Id. at 760-61 (explaining that child pornography need not be 'patently offensive' in order
to physically and psychologically harm the children involved, and whether the work has serious
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was an entirely unprotected class of speech under the First Amendment
despite its lack of a historical foundation as unprotected speech.50
The Court reasoned that even if some value could be derived from
using children in pornographic productions, it was so minimal as to be de
minimus. Moreover, the Court viewed the production of child pornog-
raphy as constituting child abuse, finding a compelling state interest in
protecting children from abuse.52 Ultimately, the Court decided that pro-
hibiting the distribution of child pornography was an effective way to
control the production of child pornography. While child pornography
had no history of being beyond First Amendment protection, this reason-
ing employed by the Court entrenched child pornography in a historical
category of unprotected speech-speech integral to criminal conduct.54
Child pornography's role as an integral component to the criminal
conduct of child abuse enabled the Supreme Court to characterize it as a
55
category of proscribed speech. However, the Court limited the govern-
mental restrictions on child pornography to visual depictions of sexual
conduct involving children under a specific age.56 Additionally, the vis-
ual depictions had to be specific, involving live performances or visual
reproductions of live performances concerning the sexual conduct of
children.57 The Court crafted child pornography's exception to the First
Amendment as a very narrow category of unprotected speech, demon-
strated with the Court's decision that virtual child pornography was
within the confines of free speech.
C. Overbreadth Doctrine
Even if a law regulating speech content passes the strict scrutiny test
or regulates an unprotected category of speech, it may still be rendered
literary, artistic, political or scientific value is irrelevant to the children who are harmed in the mak-
ing of child pornography).
50. See id. at 763-64.
51. Id. at 762 ("The value of permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of
children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.").
52. Id at 756-57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607
(1982)) ("It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's interest in 'safeguarding the
physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is 'compelling."').
53. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 760 ("[T]he only practical method of law enforcement [of child por-
nography laws] may be to dry up the market for this material. . , ."),
54. See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) ("It has rarely been
suggested that ... freedom for speech ... extends its immunity to speech . . . used as an integral part
of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.").
55. Ricaurte, supra note 42, at 189 (describing how child pornography is intrinsically related
to child abuse).
56. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764 & n.17 (leaving to the states the authority to define at what
age a person is considered a child, and providing that under federal law, the age is under sixteen
years).
57. Id.at764-65.
58. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002).
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unconstitutional where the scope of the law is too broad. 9 As described
in United States v. Williams,60 the overbreadth doctrine seeks to invali-
date statutes that, while permissibly proscribing unprotected speech, also
restrict speech protected under the First Amendment.61 The overbreadth
doctrine invalidates a law when a substantial number of its applications
are unconstitutional in relation "to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep."62 In order to make this determination, the Court must ascertain
not only that speech the statute is actually designed to restrict, but those
other types of speech the statute may potentially restrict.
63
The Court utilizes the doctrine when a challenger claims that a stat-
ute is facially invalid.64 Typically when asserting a facial challenge, a
challenger must show that the statute is unconstitutional in all circum-
stances. In the context of overbreadth, however, the challenger need
only show that a substantial number of the statute's applications are un-
constitutional.66 In effect, the doctrine allows a party to challenge a stat-
ute that violates the rights of others without necessarily having to show
infringement on the party's own rights.
Precedent suggests that the overbreadth analysis ought to be under-
taken only after determining the validity of a statute as applied to the
challenging party.68 This coincides with typical constitutional proceed-
ings because courts prefer to exercise judicial restraint, addressing spe-
cific questions as opposed to determining expansive constitutional is-
sues.69 However, the analysis the Court employs in evaluating a content-
based restrictive statute depends on the manner in which the parties in-
volved present the issue to the Court.70
D. Prohibiting Depictions ofAnimal Cruelty
Depictions of animal cruelty have no historical foundation in Amer-
ica as being unlawful; however, cruelty against animals has long been
59. Chen, supra note 24, at 39-40 (describing an overbreadth analysis as being concerned
with the scope of a regulation as opposed to whether the law regulates content).
60. 553 U.S. 285 (2008).
61. See id. at 292.
62. Id. at 292-93.
63. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010) (quoting Williams, 533 U.S. at
293) ("[T]he first step in overbreadth analysis is to construe the challenged statute . . . .").
64. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586-87 ("Stevens challenged § 48 on its face .... [T]his Court
recognizes 'a second type of facial challenge,' whereby a law may be invalidated as overbroad
65. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
66. Williams, 533 U.S. at 292.
67. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1593 (Alito, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 1593-94 (quoting Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484-485 (1989)) ("[I]t is not
the usual judicial practice . . . to proceed to an overbreadth issue . . . before it is determined that the
statute would be valid as applied.").
69. Chen, supra note 24, at 43-45.
70. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1587 ("As the parties have presented the issue ... the constitutional-
ity [of the statute] hinges on how broadly it is construed.").
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considered illegal in the United States. 7 1 Dating back to the mid-1600s,
laws enacted by various states made criminal offenses out of beating,
maliciously killing, or torturing animals.72 Today, every state maintains
laws governing animal cruelty, including prohibitions against dogfight-
ing and cockfighting, and the majority of states provide felony penalties
for certain animal cruelty offenses.73
Current animal cruelty laws are ineffective against a particular type
of animal cruelty found in crush videos.74 Crush videos usually entail a
75
small animal, a kitten or hamster, constrained to the floor of a room.
Unable to escape, the animal is then horrifically tortured by a woman,
who crushes the animal to death with her feet while wearing high heeled
shoes. This type of animal cruelty is hard to prosecute and prevent due
to the camera angle used to capture the cruelty.77 The video typically
portrays only a knee-down frame of the woman mutilating the animal,
keeping her and the producer's identities secret.78 In addition, the limited
angle of the shot makes it difficult to determine where such videos are
produced, allowing any producers who have been identified to success-
fully challenge a court's jurisdiction.79
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 48 with the purpose of impeding
crush video animal cruelty.80 The language of the statute criminalized the
creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty8 1 when ille-
gal federally or within the state where the creation, sale or possession
occurs, regardless of whether the animal cruelty took place in that state.82
However, because of the difficulty in stopping crush video production, §
48 was primarily aimed at preventing the distribution of crush videos.83
By prohibiting depictions of animal cruelty § 48 enabled the government
to pursue distributors of crush videos.84 Congress's intent in targeting
71. See Ricaurte, supra note 42, at 176-77 (describing one of the earliest animal cruelty laws
dating back to 1641 in Massachusetts).
72. Id. at 177.
73. Id. ("Forty-three of the states make certain acts of animal cruelty a felony.").
74. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583 ("[C]rush videos rarely disclose participants' identities, inhib-




78. See Michael Reynolds, Note, Depictions of the Pig Roast: Restricting Violent Speech
Without Burning the House, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 341, 344 (2009).
79. Id (describing how it is impossible to discern the location or date of production from the
video content alone).
80. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583 ("The legislative background of § 48 focused primarily on
the interstate market for 'crush videos."').
81. 18 U.S.C. § 48(a).
82. See § 48(c).
83. Reynolds, supra note 78, at 344 ("The bill was introduced ... to combat the distribution
of 'crush videos' . . . .").
84. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1598 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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distributors was to dry up the market for crush videos 5 in order to dis-
courage production and in turn help end the associated animal cruelty.
However, Congress drafted § 48 to encompass far more than crush
video content. The Statute defines depictions of animal cruelty as "any
visual or auditory depiction . . . in which a living animal is intentionally
maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed."87 Additionally, § 48
contains limited exceptions for depictions that have "serious religious,
political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic
value."88 While enabling authorities to pursue and prevent a variety of
animal cruelty, the statute's broad scope beyond crush videos exposed it
to judicial review. Moreover, since § 48 proscribes speech content, the
statute's restrictions are presumptively invalid.
II. UNITED STATES V. STEVENS
Following its enactment in 1999, § 48 went unchallenged in court
until Robert J. Stevens was indicted under the statute in 2004.90 Stevens
was not charged for violating the main aim of § 48 by having created,
possessed, or depicted crush videos.9 1 Rather, he was responsible for
distributing videos of a different type of animal cruelty-dog fighting.92
Stevens' challenge of § 48 as being facially invalid would lead to six
years of subsequent litigation resulting in the Supreme Court's opinion
that § 48 was too broad of a restriction on speech.9 3
A. Facts
Dogfighting is outlawed as a form of animal cruelty in all fifty
states and the District of Columbia, and "has been restricted by federal
law since 1976."94 In the spring of 2003, federal investigators and Penn-
sylvania law enforcement agents discovered that Robert J. Stevens had
been advertising dogfight videos and other merchandise in an under-
ground publication. 95 The investigators uncovered that Stevens' business,
"Dogs of Velvet and Steel," maintained a website through which videos
of dogfighting were sold.96 Based on this information, law enforcement
85. Id. ("Congress concluded that the only effective way of stopping the underling criminal
conduct was to prohibit the commercial exploitation of the videos .... ).
86. Id. at 1600 ("[T]he criminal acts shown in crush videos cannot be prevented without
targeting the ... creation, sale, and possession for sale of depictions of animal torture . . .
87. § 48(c).
88. § 48(b).
89. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1584.
90. Reynolds, supra note 78, at 345 (noting that the first prosecution to come to trail under
§ 48 was Stevens' indictment in 2004).
91. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1590.
92. Id.
93. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
94. Id. at 1583 (describing how dogfighting is illegal in the United States).
95. United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2008), af'd, 130 S. Ct. 1577
(2010).
96. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583.
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officers purchased three videos from the website and discovered depic-
tions of gruesome dogfights upon review.97
On April 23, 2003 the investigators executed a search warrant for
Stevens' Virginia residence and found several copies of the three dog
fighting videos.98 The supply of videos, coupled with the advertisements
and distribution network on his website, formed the basis for the gov-
ernment's multiple indictments against Stevens. 9 9
B. Procedural History
On March 2, 2004, a grand jury indicted Stevens with three counts
of "knowingly selling depictions of animal cruelty with the intention of
placing those depictions in interstate commerce for commercial gain, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 48."i00 Stevens moved to dismiss his indictments
asserting that § 48 was facially invalid under the First Amendment.101
The District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied Ste-
vens' motion to dismiss, finding that the depictions subject to § 48 were
"categorically unprotected by the First Amendment."l 02 The District
Court upheld the constitutionality of § 48 based on the statute's excep-
tions clause.10 3 According to the District Court, the clause narrowed the
content-based restrictions of § 48 to speech that had no "serious" value,
avoiding overly broad limitations on speech.104 The jury found Stevens
guilty on all counts,'05 and he was consequently sentenced to thirty-seven
months imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release.io0
On appeal, the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, declared § 48 facially
invalid and vacated Stevens' conviction on the grounds that § 48 did not
create a new category of unprotected speech. 0 7 The court of appeals rea-
soned that to circumvent the free speech protection afforded by the First
Amendment, § 48 had to achieve a compelling state interest similar to
the statute in Ferber.08 The Third Circuit held that § 48's purpose, to
protect animals against cruelty, was not a compelling state interest. 0 9
97. Stevens, 553 F.3d at 221 (describing the videos to include dogfights in the United States
and Japan, and an instructional hunting video displaying horrific images of pit bulls attacking wild
pigs).




101. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1583.
102. Id
103. Id; see also 18 U.S.C. § 48(b) (2006) (permitting any depictions of animal cruelty that
have "serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value").
104. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1582-83.
105. Id at 1583.
106. Id.
107. United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) ("In sum, the speech restricted
by 18 U.S.C. § 48 is protected by the First Amendment."), affd, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
108. See id.
109. Id. at 226-28.
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Moreover, the Third Circuit discussed the history of categories of unpro-
tected speech, pointing to the absence of any precedent suggesting that a
statute restricting free speech in order to protect animals constituted a
compelling interest.110 The Third Circuit was critical of the link between
§ 48's restriction of depictions of animal cruelty and prevention of ani-
mal cruelty altogether."' The disconnect between § 48's restriction on all
depictions of animal cruelty and its alleged purpose of preventing crush
video animal cruelty further convinced the Third Circuit that it did not
serve a compelling state interest.l12
Finding that § 48 did not create a new category of unprotected
speech, the Third Circuit evaluated the statute under a strict scrutiny
analysis." 3 Having determined that § 48 did not contain a compelling
state interest, the court held that § 48 was not tailored narrowly enough
to survive strict scrutiny.11 4 First, § 48 was underinclusive because it
prohibited depictions of animal cruelty only for interstate commercial
use, yet did nothing to prevent intrastate sale and use. 1 Second, § 48
was overinclusive because it made selling a depiction of a legal activity
in one state illegal in another state based on variances in state law.116 As
a result, and because of the lack of a compelling state interest and the
lack of narrowly tailored means of preventing animal cruelty, the Third
Circuit found § 48 to be facially invalid." 7
C. The United States Supreme Court Opinion
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
Third Circuit, but relied on the reasoning that § 48 was too broad." 8 The
Court based its opinion on the fact that § 48 had the potential to proscribe
speech well beyond crush videos."' 9 Invalid under the overbreadth doc-
trine, the Court felt no need to address whether or not crush videos could
110. Id. at 227-28 ("Nothing in these cases suggests that a statute that restricts an individual's
free speech rights in favor of protecting an animal is compelling.").
11. Id. at 228-29 ("While this justification is plausible for crush videos, it is meaningless
when evaluating § 48 as written. By its terms, the statute applies without regard to whether the
identities of individuals in a depiction, or the location of a depiction's production, are obscured.").
112. Id. ("Preventing cruelty to animals ... simply does not implicate interests of the same
magnitude as protecting children .... ).
113. Id. at 232 ("Because the speech encompassed by § 48 does not qualify as unprotected
speech, it must survive a heightened form of scrutiny.").
114. Id. at 233-34 ("The Supreme Court routinely strikes down content-based restrictions on
speech on the narrow tailoring/least restrictive means prong of strict scrutiny.").
115. Id.at233.
116. Id. at 233-34 ("If the government interest is to prevent acts of animal cruelty, the statute's
criminalization of depictions that were legal in the geographic region where they were produced
makes § 48 overinclusive.").
117. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010).
118. Id. at 1592 (holding that § 48 is "substantially overbroad, and therefore invalid under the
First Amendment.").
119. Id. at 1590 (explaining that most hunting videos could likely fall within the confines of §
48's restrictions).
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ever constitute a class of speech unworthy of First Amendment protec-
tion.12
1. Depictions of Animal Cruelty Are Protected Speech
Like the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court was unwilling to catego-
rize depictions of animal cruelty as unprotected speech.12' The Court
reasoned that only historically unprotected speech, or speech restrictions
grounded in previously recognized categories of unprotected speech,
warranted unprotected categorization.12 2 The government offered only a
value balance test, weighing the social costs of depicting animal cruelty
against the social benefits, and the Court reasoned that the government
had not done enough to establish depictions of animal cruelty as a new
category of unprotected speech. 12 3
The Court contrasted the government's argument with the holding
in Ferber to demonstrate that a new category of unprotected speech re-
quires more than a balancing of competing interests.124 Ferber declared
child pornography categorically unprotected speech by demonstrating
that the market for child pornography was an integral part of the produc-
tion of such materials, which were illegal.125 By showing an intrinsic
relationship between child pornography and child abuse, the Court
grounded the holding in Ferber with the integral part of criminal conduct
doctrine,126 a previously-recognized category of unprotected speech.127
2. 18 U.S.C. § 48's Overly Broad Restriction on Speech
Subjecting § 48 to First Amendment analysis, the Court utilized the
overbreadth doctrine to determine the statute's constitutionality.128 Ste-
vens asserted a general claim challenging the constitutionality of § 48,
rather than challenging the applicability of the statute to his case,12 9 and
the government had similarly construed Stevens' claim as a general chal-
120. Id. at 1592.
121. Id. at 1586 (noting that "depictions of animal cruelty" does not constitute a new category
of unprotected speech).
122. Id. at 1585-86 (holding that animal cruelty is not a new category of unprotected speech
because the Court is "unaware of any similar tradition excluding depictions of animal cruelty from
the freedom of speech") (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Id. at 1585 ("[F]ree speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad
hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.").
124. Id. at 1586 ("When we have identified categories of speech as fully outside the protection
of the First Amendment, it has not been on the basis of a simple cost-benefit analysis.").
125. Id. (highlighting that the decision in Ferber did not rest solely on the balance of compet-
ing interests, those of protecting children against the value of child pornography to society).
126. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) ("It rarely has been
suggested that . . . freedom [of] speech . . . extends its immunity to speech . . . used as an integral
part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute. We reject the contention now.").
127. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586 ("Ferber thus grounded its analysis in a previously recognized,
long-established category of unprotected speech . . .
128. Id. at 1587 & n.3.
129. Id ("Whether or not [an overbreadth analysis is premature], here no as-applied claim has
been preserved.").
588 [Vol. 88:3
UNITED STATES V. STEVENS
lenge to § 48.130 Therefore, the Court determined that the overbreadth
analysis was warranted by the parties' presentation of the case.
Relying on the test from United States v. Williams, the Court con-
strued § 48 widely to determine the full reach of the statute.'31 Reviewing
the text of the statute, the Court determined that it did not require the
depicted conduct to be cruel,13 2 and while requiring that the depicted
conduct be illegal under the state's laws, illegality did not equate to cru-
elty. 133 Moreover, the Court reasoned that depicted conduct may be ille-
gal in one state but legal in another.134 The differences in law from state
to state concerned the Court that confusion as to the legality of depictions
might vary depending on jurisdiction.135
The Court neglected to extend the canon of noscitur a sociis in or-
der to resolve the discrepancies of cruelty because the phrase "wounded
... or killed" contained little ambiguity. 3 6 The Court pointed out that the
words should retain their normal meaning and they do not include cruelty
or a degree of cruelty in their definition.1 37 Additionally, the Court gave
extensive examples of hunting laws and agricultural regulations that vary
from state to state to demonstrate how broad § 48 could be interpreted,
making conduct illegal in jurisdictions where such conduct is not consid-
ered cruel.138
Unlike the district court, the Supreme Court did not find that the ex-
ceptions clause'" narrowed § 48 enough to save it from invalidation. 40
For one, § 48(b) required any depiction of animal cruelty worthy of ex-
emption to have serious value in one of the named categories of ex-
empted speech.14'1 The Court explained that most speech protected by the
First Amendment did not have serious value in education, science, jour-
nalism, or any other category included in the exemption clause.142 Ac-
cordingly, the Court held that § 48(b) did little to limit the statute.14 3 In
130. Id. at 1587 n.3 (highlighting that the Government did not construe Stevens' briefs as
adequately developing a separated attack on a defined subset of the statute's applications).
131. Id. at 1587-88.
132. Id. at 1588 (noting that nothing about wounding or killing requires cruelty).
133. Id. (highlighting how the humane killing of endangered species is illegal but may not
constitute cruelty).
134. Id
135. Id. at 1588-89 ("A depiction of entirely lawful conduct runs afoul of the ban if that depic-
tion later finds its way into another State where the same conduct is unlawful.").
136. Id. at 1588 (alteration in original) (highlighting that the cannon of noscitur a sociis is
appropriate only when terms are ambiguous).
137. Id.
138. Id at 1589-90.
139. 18 U.S.C. § 48(b) (2006) (permitting any depictions of animal cruelty that have "serious
religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value").
140. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
141. Id at 1590.
142. Id. ("Most speech does not [fall into one of the enumerated categories].").
143. Id. ("There is simply no adequate reading of the exceptions clause that results in the
statute's banning only the depictions the Government would like to ban.").
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addition, the Court rejected the idea that since the exceptions clause was
drafted after Miller,'" it sufficiently narrowed § 48.145 The Court rea-
soned that Miller applies only to obscenity speech and not speech in gen-
eral. 146
In response, the government declared that § 48, while broad, would
not be enforced to the detriment of the First Amendment and § 48 would
only be used combat wanton animal cruelty.147 The Court thought the
idea of executive discretion in the application of § 48 was a merit-less
argument.148 The Court argued that it would not uphold an unconstitu-
tional statute merely based on the government's promise to use it respon-
sibly.149 Moreover, the Court hesitated to construe the statutory language
to avoid serious constitutional doubts because of fears of legislative in-
fringement. 5 0
D. Justice Alito's Dissent
The sole dissenter, Justice Alito, contended that the Court should
not have utilized the overbreadth doctrine.' 51 Instead, Justice Alito ar-
gued for an as-applied analysis of § 48 to Stevens' dogfighting videos.152
The dissent suggested that such an analysis would render § 48 constitu-
tional when applied to dogfighting videos rather than in addition to the
unusual hunting or agricultural situations suggested by the majority.153
Justice Alito further argued that § 48 was also valid under the over-
breadth analysis.154 Reiterating Williams, Justice Alito focused on the
substantiality of a statute's breadth relative to its plainly legitimate
sweep.'55 Since the suggested hunting and agricultural practices that the
majority relied on to construe the statute as overly broad were rare situa-
144. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973) (noting that obscene speech with serious
value in scientific, political, or artistic realms would be deemed protected speech).
145. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1591 (noting the Govemment's contention that the exception clause
is sufficient to avoid First Amendment objection because it was drafted after the Miller decision).
146. Id ("We did not, however, determine that serious value could be used as a general pre-
condition to protecting other types of speech in the first place.").
147. Id
148. Id ("This prosecution [of Stevens] is itself evidence of the danger in putting faith in
government representations of prosecutorial restraint.").
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1592 ("We will not rewrite a .. . law to conform it to constitutional requirements ...
for doing so would constitute a serious invasion of the legislative domain . . ) (first alteration in
original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. Id. at 1594 (Alito, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 1593 & n.1 ("A party seeking to challenge the constitutionality of a statute generally
must show that the statute violates the party's own rights.").
153. Id at 1602 ("[Section] 48 may validly be applied to . . .dogfighting videos.... Moreover
... the record does not show that § 48, properly interpreted, bans a substantial amount of protected
speech in absolute terms.").
154. Id.
155. See id. at 1594 ("In determining whether a statute's overbreadth is substantial, we con-
sider a statute's application to real-world conduct, not fanciful hypotheticals.").
[Vol. 88:3590
UNITED STATES V. STEVENS
tions, Alito argued that they did not constitute a substantial amount of
protected speech.156
Next, Justice Alito looked to Ferber to argue for the addition of
crush videos and dogfighting videos to the realm of unprotected
speech.157 Comparing the case to the child pornography in Ferber, Jus-
tice Alito reasoned that crush videos and dogfighting videos followed the
same logical course to unprotected status. Justice Alito highlighted the
Ferber Court's focus on the integral relationship between child pornog-
raphy and child abuse, the lack of effective prevention of child abuse
without prohibiting child pornography distribution, and the value of child
pornography being de minimus.159 While Justice Alito noted that the
prevention of child abuse was more important than the prevention of
animal cruelty, he claimed that crush and dogfighting videos could be
classified as unprotected speech because each of these Ferber factors
applied to these videos.' 60
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's choice to invalidate § 48 was not only the cor-
rect decision, but it was also important for the preservation of First
Amendment rights. Rather than trying to reconstruct a statute that had
thus far proven useful for government authorities, the Court recognized
the overbreadth of § 48 and its potential to restrict protected speech. By
forcing Congress to redraft a narrow statute proscribing only crush video
content, the Court foreclosed on any opportunity, however slight, for the
government to abuse § 48 and infringe on speech worthy of First
Amendment protections. In light of the hard fought history of free speech
rights, any opportunity to encroach on the First Amendment should be
countered, and by invalidating § 48 the Stevens Court has assured that
rescissions of free speech will not easily happen.
A. Proper Decision by the Supreme Court
The issue in Stevens encompassed far more than whether depictions
of crushing animals to death deserved unprotected status under the First
Amendment. 161 The Supreme Court was presented with the question
whether "depictions of animal cruelty, as a class, are categorically unpro-
156. Id. at 1595-97 (criticizing hypotheticals involving illegal crossbow hunting, depicting
humane slaughter of cows, and other acts that happen to be illegal for reasons that have "nothing to
do with the prevention of animal cruelty").
157. Id. at 1598-99, 1601-02.
158. Id. (arguing that crush video creation is a crime, the acts within the video cannot be pre-
vented without targeting the distribution of the videos, and the harm caused by the videos adds little
value, if any, to society).
159. Id. at 1599-1600 (highlighting that in Ferber, the production of the work, not its content,
was the target of the statute).
160. See id. at 1599-1602 ("[P]reventing the abuse of children is certainly much more impor-
tant than preventing the torture of the animals used in crush videos.").
I61. See id. at 1582, 1584 (majority opinion).
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tected."1 6 2 This wide range of content-based restricted speech was justi-
fied by the government on the ground that this speech is "of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and moral-
ity."
While the government's reasoning has been reiterated throughout
First Amendment case law,16 4 it has never been classified as a test in de-
termining whether a certain type of speech deserves protection under the
First Amendment. 165 Rather, this idiom has served as a description of
speech already determined to be without protection.' 66 The Stevens Court
rightfully declined to recognize the use of the government's reasoning as
a test, thereby declining to empower the government beyond permissible
means.
As a test, the government would have had the power to censor a
speaker by balancing the value of expression against the indefinable
standards of both order and morality.16 7 Determinations of social value
would no doubt vary due to the subjectivity of such a test, and any meas-
ure devised to establish when the benefits of speech outweighed order
and morality would be arbitrary.'68 The Stevens Court's determination
reminds us that the purpose behind the First Amendment is to prevent
arbitrary governmental restrictions on speech when speech is classified
as "not worth [First Amendment protections]."l 69
1. Neglecting to Recognize a New Category of Unprotected Speech
Balancing speech against order and morality may enable the gov-
ernment to utilize helpful laws, but the First Amendment cannot be cir-
cumvented at the connivance of the government statutes that has thus far
proved useful.170
Notwithstanding apparent faults in a balancing test, some scholars
argue that a categorical weighing of speech value against social harms is
162. Id. at 1584.
163. Id. at 1585 (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992)).
164. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-59 (2003); City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. at
383; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
165. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585-86 (distinguishing between descriptions of historically pro-
tected speech and historically unprotected speech).
166. See, e.g., Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 ("It has been well observed that such utterances
[unprotected by the First Amendment] are . . . of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.") (emphasis added).
167. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585-86 (suggesting that, under a cost benefit analysis test, free
speech could be proscribed when the cost of protecting it "tilts in a statute's favor").
168. See id.
169. Id. at 1585 ("Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise [the First Amendment
guarantee to free speech] simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.").
170. See id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803)) ("The Constitu-
tion is not a document 'prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleas-
ure."').
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the preferable method of distinguishing between protected and unpro-
tected speech. 71 For example, it is argued that applying a balancing test
consisting of the factors articulated in Ferber would increase transpar-
ency and provide a more predictable outcome when determining whether
speech fell within the protections of the First Amendment.172 While a
balancing test might resort to an arbitrary cost-benefit calculation, it
would provide a clearer standard for litigators than the case-by-case ad-
judication centered on strict scrutiny or the comparisons to existing un-
protected categories of speech.173 Admittedly, a balancing test would
empower the Court to differentiate between free speech and recognized
unprotected speech with greater ease. 174 However, recognizing a simple
balancing test as a measure of the protected status of speech has danger-
ous consequences.175 While such a test might work to easily discern de-
pictions of animal cruelty or even crush videos as unprotected speech,
the general nature of a balancing test would enable future litigants to
argue for its applicability in other realms of free speech contests.176 Rec-
ognizing a "highly manipulable" 77 balancing test in order to assure pre-
dictability in free speech litigation would lead to a deterioration of the
hard fought and rigid restrictions on governmental censorship central to
American notions of liberty. Therefore, the Stevens Court appropri-
ately rejected a free speech balancing test presented by the government
under the veil of animal cruelty.
In addition to its balancing test, the government attempted to pro-
scribe depictions of animal cruelty as categorically unprotected speech
by pointing to the long history associated with the prohibition of animal
cruelty in the United States.179 While categories of unprotected speech in
171. The Supreme Court, 2009 Term-Leading Cases, 124 HARV. L. REV. 239, 248 (2010)
[hereinafter Leading Cases].
172. Id. at 248-49 (explaining that the Ferber factors provided a clear framework for a balanc-
ing test; that this test was preferable to the Stevens Court's redefinition of Ferber as anchored in
historical unprotected speech; and that the balance test provides a clearer standard than case-by-case
analyses of speech contests).
173. Id. ("While definitional balancing may sometimes approximate a cost-benefit calculus
instead of the more speech-protective method of weighing First Amendment values, it provides a
clearer standard than case-by-case strict scrutiny analyses . . . .").
174. Id. ("[T]he Court's recharacterization of Ferber [away from the balancing test] ... pro-
vides fewer doctrinal tools to distinguish speech closely analogous to previously recognized unpro-
tected categories.").
175. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) (describing a balancing test as
"startling and dangerous").
176. See id. at 1586 ("[A balancing test] do[es] not set forth a test that may be applied as a
general matter. . .
177. Id.
178. Elizabeth L. Kinsella, Note, A Crushing Blow: United States v. Stevens and the Freedom
to Profit from Animal Cruelty, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 347, 353 (2009); see also Hunter, supra note
8, at 70, 87-89, 127 (describing the long history of government restriction on speech during early
American history).
179. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585 (highlighting that animal cruelty laws have existed since
colonial times in the United States).
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the United States have historical foundations, 80 the Supreme Court cor-
rectly distinguished between historically illegal conduct and illegal de-
pictions, finding that illegal conduct did not make the depictions of such
conduct illegal. s8 Illegalizing speech because of the illegality of the con-
duct displayed in the speech would open a flood gate of issues concern-
ing the depiction of illegal conduct, best demonstrated by speech meant
to entertain, such as films depicting murder.' 82 Without any information
establishing that depictions of animal cruelty have a history of being
illegal in the United States,183 the Supreme Court rightly decided to keep
depictions of animal cruelty as protected speech.
Although the Stevens Court failed to grant depictions of animal cru-
elty unprotected status, it did not specifically rule that crush video con-
tent or dogfighting video content will always be protected speech. 18 4
Rather, the Stevens Court noted that it was "not foreclos[ing on] the fu-
ture recognition of such additional categories [of unprotected speech]."18 5
The dissent provided a substantial framework for future litigators and
prosecutors to establish crush video and dogfighting video content as
unprotected categories of speech, in accordance with the Ferber deci-
sion.186 While the government tried to employ the Ferber rationale to
§ 48 as a whole, it failed to demonstrate any intrinsic criminal relation-
ship between animal abuse and depictions of animal cruelty beyond
crush videos and dogfighting videos.'8 As a result, the majority did not
evaluate crush videos apart from § 48 according to Ferber.18 The major-
ity's scant dismissal of the government's attempt to entrench § 48 in
prior doctrine,' 89 coupled with the Court's acknowledgement that other
types of speech may become proscribed, 190 suggests that crush videos by
themselves may one day be classified as unprotected speech.
The Court made the right move staying within its judicial realm in-
stead of wildly interpreting § 48 to proscribe crush and dogfighting vid-
eos. Interpreting § 48 in such a way would have allowed the Court to
infringe upon the legislative duties of Congressl 91 which specifically
180. Id.
181. Id. ("[W]e are unaware of any similar tradition excluding depictions of animal cruelty
from 'the freedom of speech' .... .").
182. Id. at 1590 (highlighting that hunting videos for pure entertainment purposes would be
considered illegal for not having "serious" value).
183. Id. at 1 585.
184. See id at 1585-86.
185. Id. at 1586.
186. See id. at 1599-1602 (Alito, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 1592 (majority opinion).
188. Id
189. Id (discussing the failure of the government to establish that the obscenity or intrinsic
criminal relationship categories of unprotected speech extend to other areas of speech proscribed by
§ 48 other than crush and dogfighting videos).
190. Id. at 1586.
191. Id. (quoting United States v. Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479 n.26 (1995))
("[Flor doing so would constitute a 'serious invasion of the legislative domain."').
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drafted § 48 to apply to content other than just crush videos.1 92 Moreover,
the Court should not be inclined to take up the responsibility entrusted to
executive prosecutors when they fail to provide any defense to § 48 be-
yond crush and dogfighting videos.' 9 3
2. Overbreadth Analysis
While the overbreadth analysis was appropriate because of the fa-
cial challenge to the content-based First Amendment restrictions imposed
by § 48,194 the use of the doctrine before considering the constitutionality
of § 48 as applied to Stevens is contentious. 195 However, the Court's di-
vergence from general practicesl9 was warranted because of the nature
of the statute's restriction and the way the issue was presented to the
court.
First, § 48 restricted the type of speech that most appropriately war-
rants an overbreadth analysis. Pure speech challenges warrant evaluation
under the overbreadth doctrine more so than other expressive concerns
under the First Amendment.197 Prohibiting depictions of animal cruelty
restricts pure speech; therefore, § 48 was more deserving of an over-
breadth analysis than cases involving the prohibition of expressive politi-
cal conduct 98 or strict regulation of commercial speech.' 99
Overbroad analyses have typically been prefaced by as-applied
analyses where the challenger brings a broad challenge along with an as-
applied challenge.200 In Board of Trustees v. Fox,20' the overbreadth
analysis was considered after the challengers brought a specific claim
regarding their commercial speech in addition to a claim asserting a
broad non-commercial restriction on speech.202 In Broadrick v. Okla-
192. 18 U.S.C. § 48(a) (2006) (including all depictions of animal cruelty).
193. See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1591-92 ("[T]he Government makes no effort to defend the
constitutionality of § 48 as applied beyond crush videos and depictions of animal fighting.").
194. Id. at 1587 n.3 (arguing that an overbreadth analysis was appropriate because an as-
applied challenge had not been preserved).
195. Id. at 1593 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("[O]verbreadth invalidation need not and generally
should not be administered when the statute under attack is unconstitutional as applied . . , .").
196. Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1989) ("It is not the usual judicial practice ...
to proceed to an overbreadth issue . . . before it is determined that the statute would be valid as
applied.").
197. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) ("[O]verbreadth adjudication . . . at-
tenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from 'pure
speech' toward conduct . . . .").
198. Id. at 616-18 (reviewing a statute that prohibits political expressive conduct under the
overbreadth doctrine).
199. Fox, 492 U.S. at 483-85 (discussing the applicability of the overbreadth doctrine to com-
mercial speech).
200. Id. at 484-85 ("It is not the usual judicial practice, however, nor do we consider it gener-
ally desirable, to proceed to an overbreadth issue unnecessarily-that is, before it is determined that
the statute would be valid as applied.").
201. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
202. Id. at 483-86 (declining to determine if the statute was overbroad because a proper as-
applied analysis had yet to be completed).
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homa,2 03 the overbreadth analysis was considered after the challengers
had conceded that the statute in question was valid when applied to
204them. Unlike these prior cases constructing the precedent, Stevens did
not bring a claim against the statute as it applied to him, nor did he stipu-
late that it would be valid as applied to him.205
Despite the fact that courts typically prefer to conduct as-applied
analysis prior to an overbreadth analysis no precedent suggests that the
Court has to conduct an as-applied analysis prior to engaging in an over-
broad analysis. 20 6 As-applied analyses are merely encouraged where they
would increase judicial ease and efficiency.2 07 Since the Court assumed
that § 48 was valid as-applied to the content at issue in Stevens, it prop-
erly continued with an overbreadth analysis, and thereby effectuated effi-
208cient justice by preventing future litigation concerning the same issues.
The Court's interpretation of § 48 as overbroad was proper for sev-
eral reasons. First, a non-literal interpretation of statutory text creates
opportunities for congressional lethargies. 2 0 9 Such a practice is dangerous
for any realm of law, but especially in respect to the sacred nature of the
210First Amendment, this cannot be encouraged. The Court's refusal to
recognize noscitur a sociis or other canons of construction211 was there-
fore appropriate.
Second, the Court's sweeping interpretation of § 48 to encompass
212unusual hunting practices and agricultural regulations was necessary to
satisfy the requirements of the overbreadth doctrine as described in Wil-
liams.213 Furthermore, the majority of content subjected to § 48 restric-
203. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
204. Id. at 612-18 (considering the overbreadth doctrine, and holding the statute not over-
broad).
205. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 n.3 (2010) ("The sentence in Steven's
appellate brief mentioning his unrelated sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge hardly developed a
First Amendment as-applied claim.").
206. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)
(discussing the Court's hesitancy in applying the "strong medicine" of overbreadth analyses); see
also Fox, 492 U.S. at 484 (noting that courts do not find it "generally desirable" to consider an
overbreadth analysis prior to an as-applied analysis); Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613 (discussing how the
overbreadth analysis has historically been employed "sparingly" by the Court).
207. Fox, 492 U.S. at 485.
208. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1594 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court tacitly assumes for the
sake of argument that § 48 is valid as applied to [crush video and deadly animal fight] depictions
209. Id at 1592 (majority opinion) ("[To] 'rewrite a ... law to conform it to constitutional
requirements' , . . would ... sharply diminish Congress's 'incentive to draft a narrowly tailored law
in the first place."' (first alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
210. Kinsella, supra note 178, at 353 ("Americans generally believe free speech is a national
right central to notions of liberty.").
211. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1588, 1592 (declining to consider alternate canons of construction).
212. Id at 1596 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing hunting methods involving a crossbow,
hunting rare birds, and agricultural practices such as docking the tails of dairy cows).
213. Id at 1587 (majority opinion) (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285,
293(2008)) ("[l]t is impossible to determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing
what the statute covers.").
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1 1 214tions were regular hunting practices from videos or magazines which,
as the Court correctly argued, overwhelmingly outnumbered depictions
of animal cruelty in the commercial market.215 The purpose of the over-
breadth analysis, to preserve free speech at the expense of allowing some
impermissible forms of speech,2 16 was properly carried out by the Ste-
vens Court's invalidation of § 48.
B. Congressional Drafting
The invalidation of § 48 should be attributed to Congress rather than
to the Supreme Court because the statute was bound to infringe upon the
217First Amendment from its enactment. Rather than constrain § 48 to
only crush video content, Congress acted against minority concerns and
drafted a sweeping law with substantial breadth .218 Since § 48's invalida-
tion, Congress has constructed a new law to combat crush videos,219 and
this time Congress did what it should have done in the first place: create
a narrow law that both prevents crush videos and respects the First
Amendment.
1. Inherent Faults of 18 U.S.C. § 48
Worries about the constitutionality of § 48 were abundant during
the House debate on § 48 as a bill.220 House Representative Robert Scott,
of Virginia, highlighted constitutional concerns by declaring that the bill
restricted speech content, and that because § 48 did not wholly qualify as
obscenity it would be subjected to strict scrutiny review. 221 Relying on
the same case law as the Third Circuit did in its Stevens decision, 222 Rep-
resentative Scott informed the House that § 48 would likely fail the strict
scrutiny test because animal rights were not compelling enough to super-
sede human constitutional rights.223 Representative Ron Paul, of Texas,
also expressed concern regarding the statute's constitutional inadequacy,
arguing that the proposed statute was broadly written and that animal
214. See, e.g., id. at 1596 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing the predominantly tolerant views
regarding hunting and listing activities commonly perceived to be normal, such as fishing).
215. Id. at 1589 (majority opinion) ("The demand for hunting depictions exceeds the estimated
demand for crush videos or animal fighting depictions by several orders of magnitude.").
216. Id. at 1587 (recognizing that the focus of the overbreadth doctrine hinges on the substanti-
ality of unconstitutional applications when compared to the legitimate sweep of the statute).
217. Reynolds, supra note 78, at 345 ("Possible First Amendment troubles were pointed out
immediately by opponents of the bill [that would become § 48].").
218. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. H 10268 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1999) (statement of Rep. Robert
Scott).
219. Bill Mears, Obama Signs Law Banning 'Crush Videos' Depicting Animal Cruelty, CNN
POLITICS, (Dec. 10, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-1 0/politics/animal.cruelty I-dog-
fighting-videos-cmsh-videos-animal-cruelty?_s=PM:POLITICS.
220. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. H 10268 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1999) (statement of Rep. Robert
Scott).
221. Id.
222. United States v. Stevens, 553 F.3d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 2008), aff'd, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
223. 145 CONG. REC. H10268.
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cruelty was not well defined.224 He went on to point out that regardless of
the intention of the statute-preventing crush video animal cruelty-the
broad drafting of the statute provided an opportunity for misinterpreta-
tion of the law.225
Proponents of the bill seemed less concerned with constitutional
problems and more concerned with preventing crush video animal cru-
elty.226 Some legislators assured protestors that § 48 would pass constitu-
tional muster, pointing to the exceptions clause as properly narrowing the
227statute. In fact, one legislator went so far as to say that § 48 would
"only prevent the interstate trafficking of videos that feature people
crushing small animals to death with their feet."228
Although § 48 passed in Congress with overwhelming support, wor-
ries about § 48's unconstitutionality were so well noticed that President
Bill Clinton issued a signed statement addressing the matter.229 President
Clinton acknowledged congressional apprehensions that, if applied in
certain contexts, § 48 would violate the First Amendment.230 In an effort
to prevent unconstitutional applications, President Clinton ordered prose-
cutions to be limited to depictions of wanton cruelty to animals designed
to appeal to prurient interests in sex. 2 3 1 The President's efforts, as well as
congressional assurances that § 48 would apply only to crush videos,
proved fruitless, as § 48's first prosecution to reach trial concerned dog-
fighting.2 32
2. Alternatives Under the Son of Sam Laws
As demonstrated by the result in Stevens, Congress should have
drafted § 48 differently. One recommendation is that an attempt at a new
restriction on crush videos should be enacted under the Son of Sam
laws. 233 These laws prevent criminals from utilizing free speech to col-
lect profit by depicting the conduct of their previously-committed
crimes. 234 Some argue that a statute enacted under the Son of Sam laws
would be narrower, and thus more likely subjected to a lower level of
224. 145 CONG. REC. H10270 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1999) (statement of Rep. Ron Paul).
225. Id.
226. Id. at H10271-73.
227. Id. at H 10267 (statement of Rep. Bill McCollum) ("These exceptions would ensure that
an entertainment program ... or a news documentary ... would not violate the new statute.").
228. Id. at H 10268 (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith).
229. Presidential Statement on Signing Legislation to Establish Federal Criminal Penalties for
Commerce in Depiction ofAnimal Cruelty, 35 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 2557 (Dec. 9, 1999).
230. Id. at 2557-58.
231. Id. at 2558.
232. Reynolds, supra note 78, at 345 (noting that the first prosecution to come to trail under
§ 48 was Stevens' indictment in 2004).
233. Ricaurte, supra note 42, at 195 (arguing that Son of Sam laws may be constitutionally
applied to depictions of animal cruelty).
234. Id. ("Son of Sam, or criminal anti-profit laws, are based on the general principle that
criminals should not profit from their crimes. The laws typically seek to prevent criminals from
profiting based on their notoriety from previously committed crimes." (footnote omitted)).
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judicial scrutiny, because speech infringements would have to relate spe-
cifically to crush videos.2 35
However, such a law would be ineffective in the crush video con-
text. The primary reason for the enactment of § 48 was the difficulty in
236
apprehending and convicting the producers of crush videos. Any Son
of Sam law looking to prohibit the distribution of crush videos could
apply only to persons convicted or accused of the animal cruelty crime
conducted in the crush video. 2 37 While narrowing the speech restriction
to survive judicial scrutiny, a crush video Son of Sam law would give
prosecutors an impassible obstacle: having to prove that the detained
distributor is the producer of the crush video. As a result, such a statute
would do little to prevent the production and distribution of crush videos.
3. An Improved Crush Video Statute
Rather than a broad prohibition on animal cruelty depictions or an
ineffective Son of Sam law concerning crush videos, Congress has now
created an effective crush video statute that will prove constitutional. On
December 9th, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law a nar-
238
rowly drafted crush video statute, designed to solely prohibit the crea-
tion and distribution of animal crush videos.239 Crush videos are now
described as "any photograph, motion-picture film, video or digital re-
cording, or electronic image that depicts actual conduct [of one] or more
non-human mammals, birds, reptiles, or amphibians [being] intentionally
crushed, burned, drowned, suffocated, impaled, or otherwise subjected to
serious bodily injury." 2 40 Moreover, the new statute excludes agricultural
husbandry, animal slaughter for food purposes, and hunting and fishing
depictions from criminality. 24 ' The specific focus of the new statute ad-
dresses the weight of the Supreme Court's overbreadth analysis in Ste-
vens, the substantiality of the market of hunting and agricultural videos
as against crush videos.2 4 2 Additionally, the well-defined description of
animals precludes the new statute from reaching other forms of protected
235. Id. at 199 (arguing that a Son of Sam law relating to depictions of animal cruelty "would
apply to a narrower category of speech," be less underinclusive and overinclusive restrictions on
speech, and would face a lower level of scrutiny because of the content-neutral restriction imposed
on speech).
236. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1583 (2010) ("[C]rush videos rarely disclose
the participants' identities, inhibiting prosecution of the underlying conduct.").
237. Ricaurte, supra note 42, at 202 (admitting that third parties, not involved in the animal
abuse, could still sell depictions of the dog fighting and animal cruelty videos).
238. Mears, supra note 219.
239. 156 CONG. REc. S8202 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2010).
240. Id. at S8203.
241. Id.
242. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1589 (2010) ("The demand for hunting depic-
tions exceeds the estimated demand for crush videos or animal fighting depictions by several orders
of magnitude.").
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speech, such as insect extermination advertisements.243 The new statute's
narrow applicability will likely survive an overbreadth analysis since its
potential reach extends only to crush videos.24
While addressing a properly narrow scope of speech, the new stat-
ute prohibits content-based speech and must survive strict scrutiny or
qualify as unprotected speech to survive judicial review.245 The new stat-
ute will likely face difficulty passing a strict scrutiny analysis. The Su-
preme Court's focus on the overbreadth doctrine in Stevens provides
246little insight, but the prior Third Circuit decision may.
Survival of strict scrutiny under the First Amendment is dependent
upon a finding that the statute at issue aims to achieve a compelling state
interest with the least restrictive means possible.2 47 The Third Circuit
determined that protecting animals did not amount to a compelling state
interest.248 However, this determination was made in regards to the broad
range of cruelties encompassed in § 48 and not specifically regarding
crush videos. 24 9 Moreover, the only Supreme Court decision considering
the matter argues that animal interests do not supersede the rights guar-
anteed by the Free Exercise Clause.250 While this instruction does not
rule out the chance that crush animal cruelty may constitute a compelling
state interest when weighed against free speech, the bleak history of con-
tent-based speech restrictions surviving strict scrutiny suggests that, if
2511subjected to strict scrutiny, the new statute would fail.
Despite this drawback, the new statute prohibits speech that falls
outside the protections of the First Amendment since by definition ani-
mal crush videos must be obscene in order to be criminalized.252 Follow-
ing the directions of the Stevens Court, Congress grounded this new
crush video statute in obscenity, a narrowly defined and historically un-
protected category of speech. 2 5 3 While obscenity determinations are de-
243. Compare 156 CONG. REC. S8203 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2010), with 145 CONG. REC. H10269
(daily ed. Oct. 19, 1999) (statement of Rep. Paul).
244. 156 CONG. REC. S8203.
245. Id.
246. See Kinsella, supra note 178, at 374-75 (highlighting that the Third Circuit found that §
48 did not satisfy the compelling interest prong of a strict scrutiny analysis).
247. See id. at 372-73; see also United States v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 232 (2008), af'd, 130
S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (discussing the presumptive invalidity of content-based restrictive statutes, which
must pass strict scrutiny by showing a compelling state interest and a narrow tailoring to achieve that
interest to survive a facial challenge).
248. Kinsella, supra note 178, at 372 (arguing that the Third Circuit was incorrect when find-
ing that preventing animal cruelty was not a compelling interest).
249. Id. at 369-70.
250. Id at 375 ("The [Supreme] Court recognized a compelling government interest in pre-
venting animal cruelty, but ultimately determined the legislature's actual motive was to suppress
religion.").
251. 156 CONG. REC. S8202-03 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2010).
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pendent upon "contemporary community standards," 254 the statute will
likely prove effective because the specific prurient sexual nature and
patently offensive content of crush videos will likely violate nearly all
contemporary community standards.255
In addition, the new specific crush video statute may also be
grounded in another category of unprotected speech: speech integral to
criminal conduct. Commentators suggest that if the government can
demonstrate that the animal abuse taking place in crush videos is created
only for the purpose of making the videos, then the videos can be classi-
256fled as integral to criminal conduct. The Court's declination to evalu-
ate crush videos as integral to criminal conduct centered on the inade-
quacy of the government's argument as to § 48 as a whole, not on
whether evidence substantiated a connection between animal abuse and
crush videos.257 The Court's reservation of such an analysis leaves open
the path for crush video content to be intrinsically tied to animal abuse,
and the Stevens dissent provides clear instructions on how to navigate
that path.2 5 8 The only hindrance noted by the Stevens dissent is the fact
that preserving the rights of humans is much more important that pre-
serving the rights of animals.259
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court will face criticism for striking down a law de-
scribed by Justice Alito as an entirely valuable statute meant to prevent
the horrific acts of animal cruelty portrayed in crush videos.260 Evidence
suggests that 18 U.S.C. § 48 effectually combated the crush video indus-
try, and that after the Third Circuit's invalidation of § 48, the crush video
market was reborn. 26' However, § 48 was written and executed to effect a
254. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
255. See 156 CONG. REC. S8203 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2010) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("Indeed,
these animal crush videos ... can be banned consistent with the Supreme Court's obscenity juris-
prudence.").
256. Nadine Strossen, United States v. Stevens: Restricting Two Major Rationales for Content-
Based Speech Restrictions, 67 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 68, 102 (2010) ("If the government could sup-
port this contention through empirical evidence, that could be enough to encompass crush videos
within the historic, traditional First Amendment exception for expression that is an integral aspect of
criminal conduct." (footnote omitted)).
257. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010) ("We need not foreclose the future
recognition of such additional categories [of unprotected speech] . . .
258. Id. at 1599-1602 (Alito, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 1600 ([P]reventing the abuse of children is certainly much more important than
preventing the torture of the animals used in crush videos."); see also Julie China, Animal Welfare
vs. Free Speech, 57-Jun FED. LAW. 4 (2010) ("[T]he time is not ripe . . . to recognize a new unpro-
tected category of speech that extends protections to animals, because animals . . . are still consid-
ered personal property under the law.").
260. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("The Court strikes down ... a valuable
statute . . . that was enacted not to suppress speech, but to prevent horrific acts of animal cruelty
261. Id. at 1598 ("[A]fter the Third Circuit's decision [facially invalidating the statute], crush
videos are already back online." (second alteration in original)).
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broader category of speech than just crush video content.2 6 2 This over-
breadth caused § 48 to fail.
Long standing principles embodied in our constitution demand that
263
Congress, not the Supreme Court, draft the law. Interpreting § 48 con-
tra to the clear language of the statute would infringe upon this principle
and discourage Congress to write clear laws altogether. 2 64 Such practices
would endanger more than just the rights of animals; it would threaten
the notion of American liberty in its entirety. The Supreme Court's deci-
sion forced Congress to do what it should have done over ten years
ago-draft a narrowly defined statute that specifically prevents crush
video creation and distribution.265 This new statute should have the same
effect on the crush video industry as the invalidated § 48,266 and it avoids
threatening other realms of speech that clearly enjoy First Amendment
protections.267
The United States Government should not be able to restrict a large
portion of speech on the basis that some smaller portion of speech is gro-
tesque.268 Moreover, the First Amendment protects citizens against the
government; it does not allow the government to choose at its will which
speech it will censor.269 These hard fought ideas necessitate the preserva-
tion of the First Amendment's integrity against the evils § 48 sought to
prevent. The Supreme Court made the right decision in Stevens.
Matthew Broderick*
262. Id. at 1591 (majority opinion) (noting that §48 "presumptively extends to many forms of
speech").
263. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § I ("All legislative Powers . . . shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States .... ").
264. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592 (arguing that to interpret § 48 narrowly would equate to rewrit-
ing it, and doing so would encourage Congress to write broad laws).
265. 156 CONG. REC. S8203 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2010).
266. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1598 ("[A]fter the Third Circuit's decision [facially invalidating the
statute], crush videos are already back online." (second alteration in original)).
267. 156 CONG. REC. S8203 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2010) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
268. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 610, 612 (1973) ("[T]he possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that protected
speech of others may be muted . . . because of the possible inhibitory effects of overly broad stat-
utes.").
269. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1591 (arguing that the First Amendment does not leave us at the
mercy of noblesse oblige).
* I would like to thank the Editorial Board of the Denver University Law Review and my
fellow Editors for all of their hard work and contributions, without you all this Comment would not
have been possible. I am indebted to Professor Alan K. Chen for his invaluable insight, and to An-
drea Ahn for her guidance during this process. I also want to thank my friends and family for their
endless support, especially my brother Jake who always knows exactly what to say to motivate me.
Any mistakes or errors within this Comment are mine.
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SALAZAR V. BuoNo: A BLOw AGAINST THE ENDORSEMENT
TEST'S CORE PRINCIPLE
INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution declares, in
part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion."' In the past half-century, the Establishment Clause's decep-
tively simple words have ignited an intense philosophical and jurispru-
dential debate over the requisite distance between religion and govern-
ment. In Lemon v. Kurtzman,2 the United States Supreme Court offered
guidance in the form of a three prong test used to determine whether
church and state have become unconstitutionally intertwined. But
Lemon was far from the final word on Establishment Clause interpreta-
tion, and since that case, a spectrum of conceptualizations have competed
for dominance within the Court. Although the concept of an imperme-
able "wall of separation" between church and state is a dead ideal in the
current Court,4 two other broad Establishment Clause interpretations
have remained relevant. The first refines the Lemon test into an inquiry
invalidating state action that endorses or discourages religion in the eyes
of a reasonable observer or is intended to do so (endorsement test).' The
other resists Lemon, viewing religion's significance in American history
as vindication of a permissive interpretation allowing the government to
accommodate religion so long as it does not exert government force to
6coerce religious practice (coercion test).
The recent Supreme Court case of Salazar v. Buono7 captured the
attention of commentators hoping the Supreme Court would finally re-
solve whether and when displays of religious icons violate the Estab-
lishment Clause. Disappointingly, the case's procedural quagmire pre-
vented the Court from reaching its most compelling doctrinal questions.9
1. U.S. Const. amend. 1.
2. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
3. The three prongs are (1) "the statute must have a secular legislative purpose"; (2) "its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion"; and (3) "the
statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' Id. at 612-13 (quot-
ing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
4. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Undoing Neutrality? From Church-State Separation to Judeo-
Christian Tolerance, 46 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 691, 706 (2010).
5. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
6. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686-
88 (2005).
7. (Buono), 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010).
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Instead, the Court remanded the case to the district court to conduct a so-
called endorsement inquiry.10 However, the analytical framework the
Court provided to the district court embodied values adverse to those that
the endorsement test was designed to protect. By blurring the distinction
between the endorsement test's independent prongs, injecting incongru-
ous principles into the test, and calling the test's "reasonable observer"
standard into question, the Court effectively hollowed out the endorse-
ment test and replaced its core with that of the coercion test.
This Comment argues that Buono endangers a worthwhile value
embedded in the endorsement test-the principle that government may
not make "adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's
standing in the political community."" Although displays of religious
iconography do not technically compel citizens to religious observance,
they potentially threaten religious liberty by conveying the message that
the government favors a particular religion. Such a message exerts pres-
sure on individual citizens to adhere to the favored religion so that they
may benefit from government favoritism.12 On remand, the district court
should be conscious that this rationale brought about the Court's initial
development of the endorsement test and should strive to preserve it.
Part I of this Comment presents a line of Supreme Court Establish-
ment Clause cases, highlighting the tension between the endorsement and
coercion tests. Part II summarizes Buono's facts, procedural history, and
opinions. Part III defends the endorsement test as the best means for pre-
venting the government from dividing the community into favored and
disfavored members on the basis of religion, explores how Buono's dis-
tortion of the endorsement test threatens the principle of separation of
church and state, and suggests how the district court's analysis on re-
mand could follow the Supreme Court's framework while still keeping
that principle alive. This Comment concludes that while Buono stopped
short of definitively repudiating the endorsement test, it undeniably jeop-
ardized the test's core value.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Endorsement Test's Origin
The First Amendment of the Constitution secures some of the most
fundamental rights recognized by free societies. Specifically, the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion." 3 This language
10. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1820-21.
I1. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
12. See Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1160 (10th Cir. 2010) (invalidating state
displays of crosses because they may lead non-Christians to believe they could receive benefits for
becoming Christian).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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poses interpretive difficulties because the definition of "establishment" is
contentious and because the word "respecting" indicates that the gov-
ernment's religious involvement must stop at some point short of full
establishment.14
1. Lemon v. Kurtzman
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court resolved the clause's interpretive
difficulties through a case law synthesis. Drawing upon past Establish-
ment Clause decisions, the Court developed three requirements the gov-
ernment must meet when its actions become associated with religion: (1)
the action must have a secular purpose (purpose prong); (2) the action's
principal effect must "neither advance[] nor inhibit[] religion" (effect
prong); and (3) the action must not foster excessive government entan-
glement with religion (entanglement prong).15 These three prongs appear
to correspond with each of "three main evils" identified by the Lemon
Court as the primary harms against which the Establishment Clause was
intended to protect: (1) state sponsorship of religion; (2) state financial
- * 16
support of religion; and (3) state involvement in religious activity.
In Lemon, the Court applied the above test to invalidate two state
statutory programs that allocated public funds to religious private
schools.17 Both programs were held to be unconstitutional despite the
fact that public assistance could only be used to fund secular instruction
under the statutes.1 In its analysis, the Court found that the legislature's
express intention to enhance the secular components of parochial educa-
tion was a valid secular purpose under the purpose prong.19 However, the
Court found that in order to implement the programs in accordance with
their secular purpose, the states would need to engage with religion in a
manner that constituted excessive entanglement. 20 First, the fact that the
government would need to institute a "comprehensive, discriminating,
and continuing . . . surveillance" of religious private schools and super-
vise teachers to ensure the public funds were used only for non-
ideological education. 2' The surveillance would necessitate perpetual
entanglement between the state governments and religious schools.22
Second, a danger of excessive government entanglement with religion
stemmed from the programs' politically divisive nature.23 The Court rea-
soned that the need for annual appropriations would incentivize parochial
14. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
15. Id. at 612-13.
16. Id. at 612.
17. See id. at 615-22.
18. Id. at 613-14.
19. Id. at 613.
20. Id. at 619-22.
21. Id. at 619.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 622.
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schools to use political action to secure greater appropriations. 2 4 Fearing
that voters, presented with the choice of whether or not to allocate more
funds to religious schools, would align with their individual sects,25 the
Court recognized the potential of creating a "political division along re-
ligious lines," which the Court noted was "one of the principal evils
against which the First Amendment was intended to protect." 26 There-
fore, both the surveillance that was required to ensure that the schools
used the public funds for nonreligious instruction and the potential for
political divisiveness along religious lines constituted excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion.27 Having resolved the case under the
entanglement prong, the Court lacked occasion to analyze the programs
under the effect prong.28
Lemon has become a seminal case in Establishment Clause juris-
prudence, but not a universally accepted one. In future decisions, the
Court became divided between critics and supporters of Lemon's under-
lying themes of government neutrality in religious matters and limited
involvement between church and state.
2. Lynch v. Donnelly
In Lynch v. Donnelly29, the Court validated a city-owned display
featuring a cr~che, 30 among several secular objects associated with
Christmas, under the Establishment Clause.31 In doing so, the majority
undermined the authority of the Lemon test as merely useful considera-
32tions based on the context of the case. Refusing to subscribe to a single
rule, the Court characterized the line between permissible and impermis-
sible government involvement with religion as blurred and unfixed, and
declared that attempting to erect an unwavering wall between church and
state would contradict American historical traditions."
Consequently, the Court took into consideration what it called
America's "unbroken history of official acknowledgement" and accom-
modation of religion.34 In doing so, the Court pointed to governmental
acts such as Congress's enactment of "legislation providing for paid
chaplains to the House and Senate" the same week it approved the Estab-
24. Id. at 622-23.
25. Id at 622.
26. Id. at 622 (citing Paul A. Freund, Comment, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV.
L. REv. 1680, 1692 (1969)).
27. Id at 613-14, 620-22.
28. Id. at 613-14.
29. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
30. A cr6che, also called a Nativity scene, is described as consisting of "traditional figures,
including the Infant Jesus, Mary and Joseph, angels, shepherds, kings, and animals." Id. at 671.
31. Id. at 680-86.
32. Id. at 679.
33. Id. at 678-79.
34. Id at 674.
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lishment Clause. 5 The Court also noted several other historical examples
of the United States affirmatively accommodating and acknowledging
religion, including: President George Washington's religiously-
influenced declaration of Thanksgiving as a national holiday with relig-
ious overtones; the motto "In God We Trust" on our currency; and the
phrase "One Nation, under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance.16 The
Court reasoned that if such overt government advancements of religion
were acceptable under the First Amendment, then a "passive" creche
display in the context of the Christmas season could not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause.3 7
3. Development of the Endorsement Test
Justice O'Connor wrote an influential concurring opinion in Lynch
introducing the endorsement test to clarify the Court's Establishment
38Clause doctrine. Justice O'Connor reasoned that the Establishment
Clause's primary purpose is to prevent the "government from making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the
political community." 39 According to Justice O'Connor, the state could
violate this prohibition in two ways: (1) through excessive entanglement
with religion or (2) through endorsement or disapproval of religion.4 0
Under Justice O'Connor's rationale, endorsement affected citizens' po-
litical standing by designating adherents and nonadherents as insiders
and outsiders, and thus divided them into favored and disfavored politi-
cal community members. 4' The division frustrated religious liberty by
pressuring citizens to adhere to the favored religion in hopes of preferen-
tial treatment. Although most government actions send some sort of mes-
sage encouraging or discouraging certain behavior, the Establishment
Clause created a constitutional mandate that the government withhold
from exerting this type of influence over matters of religion.
Some commentators have described the endorsement test as a revi-
42sion of the three prong Lemon test into a test with two parts. Lemon's
entanglement prong remained unaffected, but its purpose and effect
prongs were combined into a single test inquiring whether the govern-
ment had the purpose or effect of endorsing religion.4 3 It is important to
emphasize that, although the purpose and effect prongs are "combined"
in the sense that they both now focus on endorsement, Justice O'Connor
35. Id.
36. Id. at 674-77.
37. See id. at 686.
38. Id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 687-88.
41. Id. at 688.
42. See e.g., Paul Forster, Note, Separating Church and State: Transfers of Government Land
as Cures for Establishment Clause Violations, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 401, 405 (2010).
43. Id
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explicitly preserved them as distinct subparts of the overall analysis. In
applying the endorsement test, Justice O'Connor found that the Estab-
lishment Clause was violated either where the government subjectively
intended to endorse or disapprove of religion, thus infringing on the pur-
pose prong, or when it ran afoul of the purpose prong by "objectively"
conveying a message that would in fact endorse or disapprove of religion
in the eyes of a reasonable observer.4 5 The four Lynch dissenters also
applied the endorsement test,4 6 making it the standard agreed upon by a
five-Justice majority.
B. Tension Between Endorsement and Coercion
1. County ofAllegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter47
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, the
Court again considered whether city-owned displays associated with
religious holidays violated the Establishment Clause.48 There were two
displays at issue, both in downtown Pittsburgh. 49 The first was a creche
located on the county courthouse steps.50 The second was a Chanukah
menorah placed alongside a Christmas tree and a "sign saluting liberty"
located outside a building jointly owned by the City of Pittsburgh and the
County of Allegheny.
In evaluating the constitutionality of these displays, the majority
adopted the endorsement test. 52 The Court defined "endorsement" as
government action that conveys or attempts to convey "a message that
religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred."53 The
Court elaborated that it would evaluate the message conveyed by public
religious displays through the eyes of a hypothetical "reasonable ob-
server." 54
Applying this standard, the Court found that the creche display vio-
lated the Establishment Clause. 5 The creche failed the endorsement
test's effect prong because it had "the effect of endorsing a patently
Christian message." 6 Unlike the display at issue in Lynch, the cr6che
57
was not surrounded by secular symbols to offset its religious message.
44. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (reasoning that Pawtucket did not
intend a message of endorsement of Christianity or disapproval of non-Christian religions).
45. See id.
46. Id. at 695 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).




52. See id. at 592.
53. Id at 593 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
54. Id at 620.
55. Id at 579.
56. Id at 601.
57. See id. at 598-99.
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The menorah, on the other hand, survived the Court's scrutiny because it
was displayed alongside a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty, and
the menorah was seen as a symbol of Chanukah, which has "religious
and secular dimensions."58 The Court determined that these objects dis-
played together created an "overall holiday setting" that would lead a
reasonable observer to interpret the display as a secular recognition of
various traditions with no favoritism or preference on the part of the
State."
Justice Kennedy wrote separately in Allegheny, stating that the ma-
jority's approach "reflect[ed] an unjustified hostility toward religion."
60
He reasoned that the endorsement test was "flawed in its fundamentals
and unworkable in practice[,]" and that if applied consistently, would
invalidate longstanding traditions of accommodating, acknowledging,
and supporting religion.6'
According to Justice Kennedy, under the Establishment Clause, the
government is limited in recognizing and accommodating religion by
two principles: (1) the government may not coerce its subjects to practice
religion, 62 and (2) the government may not confer direct benefits upon
religion so substantial that they would tend to establish a national faith.63
Justice Kennedy's test became known as the coercion test,64 under which
religious displays were found to be acceptable passive accommodations
because a passersby may freely ignore them.6 5
2. The Ten Commandments Cases
For the two decades since the Allegheny decision, the endorsement
test has been the touchstone Establishment Clause test; however, not all
Justices on the Court have agreed that it is the proper test to use.66 The
tension between the Justices' widely varying views on the Establishment
Clause recently led the Court toward seemingly contradictory rulings
67
regarding permanent Ten Commandments displays on public property.
58. Id. at 613-14.
59. See id. at 614, 20.
60. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61. See id. at 669-70.
62. Id. at 659. Examples of legal coercion include compulsory "participation or attendance at
a religious activity, requiring religious oaths to obtain government office or benefits, or delegating
government power to religious groups." Id. at 660 (citations omitted).
63. Id. at 659. Examples of sufficiently substantial direct benefits to religion include "taxation
to . . . sustain a state-established faith, direct compulsion to observance, or governmental exhortation
to religiosity that amounts in fact to proselytizing." Id. at 659-60.
64. See Forster, supra note 42, at 410.
65. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664.
66. Leading Cases, supra note 8, at 219.
67. Compare McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (upholding the
Sixth Circuit's ruling on a preliminary injunction finding that the government's purpose was to
emphasize the Ten Commandments' religious message in violation of the Establishment Clause),
with Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691-92 (2005) (ruling that a monument inscribed with the
Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds did not violate the Establishment Clause).
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In Van Orden v. Perry" and McCreary County v. ACL U of Kentucky,69
the Justices were again divided between those asserting that the govern-
ment may not express favoritism toward particular religions70 and those
preferring to accommodate religious government displays.71
The Justices favoring the constitutionality of government "acknow-
ledgement" of religion prevailed in Van Orden. The display at issue was
a six-foot high stone monument depicting the text of the Ten Com-
mandments and incorporating an eagle, an American flag, stone tablets,
two Stars of David, and the Greek characters Chi and Rho signifying
Christ. 72 The monument was located on public land near the Texas State
Capitol building.73 Although the plurality opinion did not articulate a
bright-line test, it emphasized the history of religious accommodation
and acknowledgement in America and emphasized the monument's pas-
sive nature. 74 The Court's analysis is therefore consistent with the coer-
cion test formulated in Justice Kennedy's Allegheny dissent, which up-
holds passive displays that citizens may easily turn away from because
they do not constitute compulsion to religious adherence. 75 Justice Ste-
vens's dissent decried the Ten Commandments display as an "official
state endorsement" of the monotheistic religions.76
However, the Court reached the opposite result in McCreary.77
There, the displays at issue were framed copies of the Ten Command-
ments hung in the courthouses of two Kentucky counties. One of the
displays had been hung in a ceremony presided over by a person holding
the public office of "Judge-Executive" accompanied by his pastor, who
testified to the existence of God. 79 After the American Civil Liberties
Union of Kentucky requested an injunction prohibiting the display, but
before the district court responded to the request, the Counties' legisla-
tures authorized the displays' expansion.80 The expansion included pas-
sages from the Declaration of Independence, the Preamble to the Consti-
tution of Kentucky, the motto "In God We Trust," a Congressional Re-
68. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
69. 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
70. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 859-62; Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 718 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. See McCreary, 545 U.S. at 894 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686-88;
see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1139 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(opining that there are "very good reasons" to believe a permanent Ten Commandments monument
in a public park did not violate the Establishment Clause).
72. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 686, 691.
75. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 664 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that "purely passive"
monuments are not coercive, and therefore, not inconsistent with the Establishment Clause because
passersby are free to avert their eyes from them).
76. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 712 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring).
78. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 850.
79. Id. at 851.
80. Id. at 852-53.
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cord proclaiming 1983 as the Year of the Bible, and other documents
containing phrases alluding to religion.8' The only commonality among
the documents was that each had a "religious theme or [was] excerpted to
highlight a religious element."82 After the district court granted the
ACLU's request for an injunction, the counties again revised the dis-
play. The third display incorporated secular and religious political
documents 84 alongside the Ten Commandments and was labeled "The
Foundations of American Law and Government Display."
In invalidating the third display, the Court stated that its guiding
principle was neutrality between religion and non-religion. 86 Although
the Court did not explicitly apply the endorsement test, it referenced its
rationale and reaffirmed the aspect of the test prohibiting a state from
intentionally preferring religion.87 In response to Justice Scalia's dis-
sent, the Court noted that governmental approval of the core tenants of
a favored religion "should trouble anyone who prizes religious liberty"
because such beliefs should be "reserved for the conscience of the indi-
vidual."89 The Court thus had the endorsement test's central concerns
well in mind. The Court ruled that the previous overtly religious displays
clearly indicated to any reasonable observer that the third display, though
containing secular elements, was a ploy "to keep a religious document on
the walls of courthouses constitutionally required to embody religious
neutrality."90
Justice Breyer was the only swing vote between McCreary and Van
Orden. To explain the difference between the cases, Justice Breyer's
concurrence in Van Orden pointed to the McCreary displays' "stormy
history" rife with religious motive as demonstrating the county govern-
ments' religious objectives.9' Justice Breyer then distinguished the dis-
81. Id. at 853-54.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 854-55.
84. These documents were the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of
Rights, the lyrics of the Star Spangled Banner, the Mayflower Compact, the motto "In God We
Trust," the Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution, and a picture of Lady Justice. Id. at 856.
85. Id. at 855-56.
86. Id. at 860.
87. See id. ("By showing a purpose to favor religion, the government sends the ... message to
... nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an ac-
companying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members . . . ." (quoting Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000)) (alterations in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
88. Justice Scalia's dissent asserted that the Constitution permits government acknowledge-
ment of a single creator and "disregard of polytheists and believers in unconcerned deities, just as it
permits the disregard of devout atheists" in govemmental acknowledgment of a single creator.
McCreary, 545 U.S. at 893 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
89. See id. at 880-81 (majority opinion).
90. Id. at 872-73.
91. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 703 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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play at issue in Van Orden as having no such history clearly underscor-
ing an impermissible religious purpose. 92
These cases demonstrate that the Court is split almost down the
middle between Justices who see an Establishment Clause allowing gov-
ernmental acknowledgement, accommodation, and even favoritism of
religious sects in the absence of coercion, and Justices who interpret the
Establishment Clause to demand neutrality and prohibit government en-
dorsement of religion. The most recent development in this conflict is
seen in Salazar v. Buono, in which the principles of "accommodation"
invade the endorsement test.
II. SALAZAR V. BuoNo
A. Facts
The Mojave National Preserve (Preserve) sits in the Mojave De-
sert of Southeastern California.9 3 The federal government owns ninety
percent of the Preserve's roughly 25,000 square miles, including a gran-
ite outcropping known as Sunrise Rock.94 In 1934, a private organization
known as the Veterans of Foreign Wars erected an eight-foot tall Latin
cross on Sunrise Rock, as a memorial to fallen World War I soldiers. 95
The cross was visible from a small nearby road and the site came to host
periodic Easter gatherings. 9 6 The cross was initially accompanied by
plaques declaring "The Cross, Erected in Memory of the Dead of All
Wars" and "Erected 1934 by Members of Veterans of Fore[ign] Wars,
Death Valley post 2884." 97 However, at the time of the litigation, the
cross stood without any markers. 98
In 1999, the National Park Service denied a request to place a Bud-
dhist shrine near the cross.99 As an alternative to allowing equal access to
Sunrise Rock for all religious groups, the National Park Service an-
nounced that it would remove the cross. 00 Shortly before litigation com-
92. Id.
93. Salazar v. Buono (Buono), 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (2010).
94. Id.
95. Id at 1811-12.
96. Id. at 1812.
97. Id (quoting Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2008), rev'd, 130 S. Ct.
1803 (2010)). Since this case was decided, the cross has been stolen off of Sunrise Rock. A metal
replacement cross was placed on the rock by an anonymous party. The National Park Service has
since removed the replacement cross. Mary Jean Dolan, Salazar v. Buono: The Cross Between
Endorsement and History, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42, 43-44 (2010), http://www.law.
northwestem.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/21 /LRColl201O0n21 Dolan.pdf.
98. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1812.
99. Lisa Shaw Roy, Salazar v. Buono: The Perils of Piecemeal Adjudication, 105 Nw. U. L.





commenced, Congress responded by enacting a statute "forbidding the
use of governmental funds to remove the cross."
101
Frank Buono is a retired National Park Service employee who regu-
larly encounters the cross. 102 Buono first became aware of the cross while
working as the assistant superintendent of the Preserve in 1995.103 While
driving down the nearby road, he saw the cross affixed to Sunrise
Rock. 104 Buono took offense to the cross's presence on public land be-
cause he believed it was wrong for the government to display the symbol
of one religion in an area not open to displays of symbols representing
other religions. 05 He was not, however, offended by the cross itself and
did not claim that it personally excluded or coerced him. 06 Buono
claimed that he would take less convenient routes to traverse the preserve
in order to avoid the cross. 107
B. Procedural History
Buono filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California, alleging that the cross's presence on federal land
violated the Establishment Clause. 08 While the case was pending, Con-
gress designated the cross and the land upon which it stood as a national
memorial.'0 9
In a July 2002 ruling, the district court found that Buono had stand-
ing to challenge the cross's display on public lands." 0 The parties agreed
that the court should settle the dispute's merits under the Lemon test."'
The court did not consider Lemon's purpose or entanglement prongs be-
cause it found that the case could be resolved under the effect prong.112
The court ruled that the cross had an effect of advancing religion because
the reasonable observer would perceive the cross as a governmental en-
dorsement of religion." 3 The district court issued a permanent injunction
forbidding the government "from permitting the display of the Latin
cross in the area of Sunrise Rock in the Mojave National Preserve.""14
101. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1813 (citing Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No.
106-554, § 133, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-230 (2000)).
102. Id. at 1812.
103. Buono v. Norton (Buono II), 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2002), affd, 371 F.3d
543 (9th Cir. 2004).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1814.
107. Buono II, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1207.
108. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1812.
109. Id at 1813 (citing Department of Defense and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States Act, 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-117, § 8137(a), 115 Stat. 2230, 2278).
110. Id. at 1812.
111. Id.
112. Buono II, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1214-16.
113. Id. at 1216.
114. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1812.
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After the district court's decision, Congress passed a second statute
forbidding government spending to remove the cross."'s While the Gov-
ernment's appeal was pending, Congress passed yet another statute pro-
viding for the transfer of the cross and the adjoining land to the Veterans
of Foreign Wars. In exchange, the government was to receive land in the
preserve owned by a Veterans of Foreign Wars member." 6 The parcel of
land to be transferred to the Veterans of Foreign Wars was one acre in
area." 7 This statute provided that the land would revert back to the gov-
ernment if it ceased to be a World War I memorial." 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's ruling in its entirety." 9 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit
declined to consider the potential impact of the pending land transfer on
the suit.120 Although the Government urged the Ninth Circuit to declare
the case moot because the land transfer would end any state action that
could violate the Establishment Clause, the court refused to consider
whether the land transfer affected the cross's constitutionality.12' The
court provided three reasons for not reaching the issue of the land trans-
fer. First, the court noted that the pending land transfer might have taken
years to actually complete, meaning that the constitutionality of the cross
before the transfer was not necessarily moot now, nor would it be any-
time soon.122 Second, Sunrise Rock might still ultimately fall into gov-
ernment ownership if the transfer's reversionary clause came into ef-
fect.123 Third, the court cited precedent from the Seventh Circuit suggest-
ing that transfers of property containing religious iconography to private
holders do not necessarily cure Establishment Clause violations, so
mootness in the event of the transfer was not a foregone conclusion.124
The Government did not appeal the Ninth Circuit's ruling to the Supreme
Court. Therefore, the judgment that the cross violated the Establishment
Clause while it stood on federal land became final and unreviewable.12 5
Buono then brought action to prevent the land transfer under an en-
forcement or modification of the 2002 injunction.12 6 The district court
ruled that Congress had enacted the land transfer statute with the explicit
purpose of circumventing the injunction to permit continued display of
115. Id. at 1813 (citing Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-248,
§ 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1519, 1551 (2002)).
116. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1813 (citing Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-87, § 8121(a), 117 Stat. 1054, 1100 (2003)).
117. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1829 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Department of Defense Appmpriations Act, 2004 § 8121(e).
119. Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 546-50 (9th Cir. 2004).
120. Id. at 545-46.
121. Id. at 545-46.
122. Id. at 545.
123. Id. at 546.
124. Id (citing Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 496
(7th Cir. 2000)).
125. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1813.
126. Id. at 1813-14.
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the cross on Sunrise Rock. Consequently, the court invalidated the land
transfer statute in order to protect Buono's rights under the 2002 judg-
ment.12 The court of appeals affirmed and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.128
C. United States Supreme Court Plurality Opinion
Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts, and joined in part by Justice Alito.129 After addressing
Buono's standing to sue and the merits of his claim, the Court remanded
the case to the district court without answering whether Congress could
evade the Establishment Clause through a transfer of land. 130
First, addressing Buono's standing, the Court set forth the general
rule that a plaintiff must allege a sufficient personal stake in a case's
outcome to invoke federal court jurisdiction.' 3 ' The Court ruled that
Buono had standing to seek enforcement of the injunction against the
land transfer because he had a personal stake in the Government's com-
pliance with the judgment in his favor.' 32 The Government could not
challenge Buono's standing to obtain the original injunction because the
Government's failure to seek Supreme Court review of the 2002 judg-
ment foreclosed reconsideration of the original injunction.133
Next, the Court considered the merits of the case. The Court criti-
cized the district court's scrutiny of Congress's purpose in enacting the
land transfer statute. Justice Kennedy argued that the analysis ignored
three contextual considerations of Congress's decision to transfer the
land.134 First, the cross's initial placement on Sunrise Rock was an effort
to memorialize soldiers, rather than to endorse Christianity.135 Second,
the cross's existence on the Preserve for seven straight decades had ce-
mented it in the public consciousness.136 Third, in enacting the land
transfer statute, Congress reconciled a dilemma between violating the
injunction and conveying disrespect for the memorialized soldiers. 37 In
doing so, Congress chose "a policy of accommodation" to avoid convey-
ing disrespect and stewing "the very kind of religiously based divisive-
ness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid."' 3 8 According to the
127. Id. at 1814 (citing Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005)).
128. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1814.
129. Id.at1808.
130. Id. at 1820-21.
131. Id. at 1814 (quoting Home v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579, 2592 (2009)).
132. Id. at 1814-15.
133. Id. at 1814.
134. Id. at 1816.
135. Id. at 1816-17.
136. Id.at1817.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1817, 1820 (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring)).
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Court, the context at hand suggested a sincere congressional attempt "to
balance opposing interests." 39
Finally, grudgingly assuming the 2002 injunction's propriety, 140 the
Court asserted that the district court should not have evaluated the in-
junction's applicability to the land transfer under a purpose inquiry.141
Rather, the district court should have considered the injunction's appli-
cability in light of its original objective, avoiding perceptions of govern-
mental religious endorsement.142 Justice Kennedy outlined the proper
analysis, stating that the district court must: (1) consider whether the
reasonable observer standard applies to objects on private land; 143 (2)
reassess the findings underlying the 2002 injunction in light of the new
circumstances surrounding the cross, affording particular consideration
to Congress's "policy of accommodation";144and (3) consider remedies
less severe than a full invalidation of the land transfer.14 5
Declining to offer any more guidance on the constitutional issues,
the Court remanded the case to the district court.146
D. Dissent
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor,
argued in favor of upholding the ruling below. 47 According to Justice
Stevens, the land transfer constituted an affirmative government act de-
signed to permit the cross's display in violation of the injunction's bar
against "permitting the display of the Latin cross in the area of Sunrise
Rock in the Mojave National Preserve."1 4 8
139. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1817.
140. See id. at 1818 ("[T]he propriety of the 2002 injunction may be assumed, [but] the follow-
ing discussion should not be read to suggest this Court's agreement with the judgment . . . . The
constitution does not oblige government to avoid any public acknowledgement of religion's role in
society.").
141. Id. at 1819.
142. Id.
143. Id. A question to which the court suggests an answer in the negative. Id.
144. Id. at 1820.
145. Id
146. Id. at 1820-21. In addition to Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion, three Justices wrote
concurring opinions. Chief Justice Roberts's concurring opinion briefly noted that Buono's counsel
admitted it would likely be consistent with the injunction if the government tore down the cross,
transferred the land to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and allowed them raise the cross again. Id. at
1821 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice asserted it would make no difference "to skip
that empty ritual." Id. Justice Alito agreed with the plurality, but argued that the Court should have
ruled on the merits because the factual record was sufficiently developed to support a ruling in the
government's favor. Id. (Alito, J., concurring in pars and concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia,
joined by Justice Thomas, argued that the Court should have dismissed Buono's complaint for lack
of standing. Id. at 1824-25 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
147. Id. at 1828 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissent. He argued
that the Court should resolve the case in Buono's favor under the law of injunctions, which grants
great deference to a district court's interpretation of scope of its own injunctive orders. Id. at 1842-
45 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 1831 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Additionally, Justice Stevens argued that the land transfer would not
cure the endorsement that prompted the 2002 injunction because a rea-
sonable observer would still perceive a governmental endorsement after
the land transfer. 149 Justice Stevens reasoned that an observer would
know that the cross had stood on government land prior to the transfer,
that the district court had enjoined the government from displaying it,
and that Congress had designated the cross as a national memorial and
transferred the underlying land to a purchaser it knew would display the
cross. 1o Furthermore, Justice Stevens argued that Congress's purpose in
enacting the land transfer statute was to preserve the Christian symbol,
which in and of itself manifested religious endorsement.' 5' In stating that
"continued endorsement" of a message as "starkly sectarian" as the one
symbolized by the cross was unlawful, Justice Stevens's dissent unambi-
guously embraced the endorsement test and declared that the cross at
issue failed it.152
III. ANALYSIS
In Buono, the Court directed the district court to reassess the en-
forceability of Buono's injunction in light of its original objective of
"avoiding the perception of government endorsement." 53 However, the
Court's actual framework resembled the endorsement test only in name.
The endorsement test, as originally formulated, protects a worthwhile
constitutional principle. Buono raises important concerns with respect to
that principle. The district court can stave off the erosion of that principle
by carefully applying the Court's framework in a manner consistent with
the reasons the test was developed in the first place.
A. The Endorsement Test's Core Value
The Court developed the endorsement test to protect the worthwhile
principle that government should not "mak[e] adherence to a religion
relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community.", 54
In other words, the government should not encourage the perception that
members of certain religious groups are favored or preferred over mem-
bers of other religious groups. When the government indicates that it
favors or prefers particular religious beliefs, it "sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community."'s Individuals
149. Id. at 1832-33.
150. Id. at 1833-34.
151. Id. at 1837-38.
152. Id. at 1828, 1832-33.
153. Id. at 1819 (plurality opinion).
154. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94
(1989) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
155. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
2011] 617
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
then find themselves in a position where they must choose between the
religious convictions of their consciences and adherence to beliefs that
will earn them a perceived favored status in the community. This di-
lemma is an obstacle to enjoying the religious liberty that the Establish-
ment Clause is intended to protect. Because the endorsement test pre-
vents the government from creating that pressure and forcing such a
choice, it protects religion from government manipulation to a far greater
degree than a test that would only protect against direct legal compulsion
to practice religion. The endorsement test is particularly helpful where
messages conveyed by public religious displays implicate the Establish-
ment Clause because the test focuses on the communicative effect of the
*156state action.
It has been argued that the Establishment Clause tests have proven
so manipulable that the impact of using one test instead of the other is
minimal. 15 7 According to this perspective, knowing the test will not help
one predict the outcome of cases because what really matters is the atti-
tude of the judges deciding the case. While it is true that one cannot stop
a Supreme Court Justice determined to bend a constitutional test to reach
the result that Justice wants, it goes too far to say the tests are inter-
changeable.' The endorsement test invalidates official actions that en-
dorse religion in purpose or effect, or if they entangle government too
closely with religion. The coercion test, on the other hand, only invali-
dates laws that compel citizens to practice religion or confer extraordi-
narily direct benefits to religion. The coercion test sees religious monu-
ments as too passive and their benefits to religion too incidental to fail
under the Constitution. So while religious displays like the cross in
Buono could conceivably fail the endorsement test, their invalidation
under the coercion test is very unlikely."'9 Conceptually, at least, the en-
dorsement test protects against a wider swath of official action than the
coercion test.
Recognizing and curtailing the evil of endorsement helps realize the
Establishment Clause's core principle. The framers of the Constitution
included the religion clauses precisely because of the nation's religious
diversity,' 6 0 and they did so to "assure the fullest possible scope of relig-
ious liberty and tolerance for all."' 6 ' When the government conveys mes-
156. Forster, supra note 42, at 405.
157. Christopher Lund, Salazar v. Buono and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 105 Nw.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 60, 70 (2010), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2010/
22/LRColl20 I 0n22Lund.pdf.
158. See Ian Bartum, Salazar v. Buono: Sacred Symbolism and the Secular State, 105 Nw. U.
L. REV. COLLOQUY 31, 38 (2010), http://www.law.northwestern.edullawreview/colloquy/2010/20/
LRColl201 0n20Bartrum.pdf ("The doctrinal test the Court adopts necessarily reflects its conception
of exactly what the Establishment Clause guarantees. . .
159. See Gedicks, supra note 4, at 704.
160. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 589-90.
161. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Sch. Dist.
of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
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sages that demonstrate favoritism toward a particular sect, it narrows the
scope of liberty by precluding the individual's ability to form his or her
own religious values uninhibited by an official doctrine.162 As Justice
Breyer wrote in his controlling concurrence in Van Orden, although the
Establishment Clause does not require absolute elimination of religion in
the public square, realizing the framers' vision requires that the govern-
ment "effect no favoritism among sects." 63
Coercion test proponents argue that historical evidence demon-
strates that the Framers could not have intended to prohibit public relig-
ious preference, citing numerous early American official acts that might
fail the endorsement test, such as Congress passing a resolution in 1789
asking President Washington to declare "a day of public thanksgiving
and prayer" and state legislative sessions opening with prayer led by
publically paid chaplains.16
The responses to this contention are twofold. First, the historical
evidence cuts both ways. Thomas Jefferson refused to issue Thanksgiv-
ing proclamations, believing they violated the Establishment Clause, and
James Madison wrote that publically paid chaplains were inconsistent
with the "immunity of Religion from civil jurisdiction."165 Second, the
endorsement test is not necessarily inconsistent with allowing traditional
public allusions to religion, such as those mentioned above and the
phrases "under God" and "In God We Trust," when they serve to "sol-
emniz[e] public occasions, or inspir[e] commitment to meet some na-
tional challenge." 66 These functions give such practices an "essentially
secular meaning" under the endorsement test because their purpose and
effects are not to advance religious ideals and because the impact of their
religious meaning has been blunted through repetition.167
The latter point has been criticized as a disingenuous attempt to ig-
nore the religious significance inherent in religious statements, even
when ubiquitously or ceremonially used.168 After all, it is not clear why
reference to God would serve to solemnize occasions or strengthen the
nation's resolve in the face of a challenge unless the listener accepts the
premise that God is real. There is some validity to the contention that if
the Court were consistent in applying the endorsement test, then a num-
ber of entrenched, politically popular, and in some instances longstand-
ing governmental acknowledgement of religion would have to be invali-
162. See Steven G. Gey, The Procedural Annihilation of Structural Rights, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1,
11(2009).
163. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698-99 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at
305 (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
164. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686-88 (plurality opinion).
165. Id. at 724-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716-17 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
167. Id.
168. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 695 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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dated. It is perhaps most honest to say that the agreed-upon contours of
the Establishment Clause have been slow to form and at some points in
American history the opponents of government neutrality in matters of
religion have succeeded in distorting the line. As described above, dis-
agreement over how much the Establishment Clause separates church
from state is as old as the Establishment Clause itself, so it is not surpris-
ing that one would find historical examples of government action that
contradicts any given test. This, however, is no reason to abandon the
test most conducive to religious liberty going forward. The endorsement
test has allowed the Court to actualize the ideal of religious neutrality to
the greatest extent feasible given the political reality that some govern-
ment acknowledgements of religion have become too engrained to realis-
tically abolish.16 9
For the reasons outlined above, the endorsement test preserves and
protects an individual's religious choice. The next most viable alterna-
tive, the coercion test, protects against too little.
B. Concerns Raised by Buono
The Buono plurality opinion raises concerns that the endorsement
test's core principle, stating that adherence to religion should not affect a
person's political standing, may be endangered. The Court's mandate
that the district court reassess the injunction's enforceability in light of
the objective to avoid religious endorsement does not serve to assure the
maintenance of that principle. Specifically, the plurality directed the dis-
trict court to engage in an endorsement inquiry because that was the basis
for the 2002 injunction,' 70 and not because the Court supported the gen-
eral use of the test. In fact, Justice Kennedy has criticized the endorse-
ment test as "flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice[,]"
arguing instead for a standard that allows any government accommoda-
tion of religion short of legal coercion or conferring direct benefits on
religion to a degree that tends to establish a state faith."' Additionally, in
his McCreary dissent, Justice Scalia has interpreted the Establishment
Clause as allowing "public acknowledgement of [a specifically monothe-
istic] Creator."1 72 Moreover, Justice Roberts has previously lobbied for
the Lemon test's abandonment in favor of a coercion standard. Further-
more, the endorsement test's champion, Justice O'Connor, has been re-
placed by Justice Alito, who favored defendants in Establishment Clause
cases as a Third Circuit judge.17 3 Thus, strong evidence suggests that a
majority of the current Justices would definitively renounce the en-
169. See Gedicks, supra note 4, at 700.
170. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819 (2010).
171. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 659-60, 669
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
172. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 893 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
173. Forster, supra note 42, at 409- 10.
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dorsement test if presented with a case where, unlike in Buono, the pro-
cedural posture did not foreclose the opportunity to reach the Establish-
ment Clause claim. 174 Commentators have identified the coercion test as
likely to replace the endorsement test as the prevailing Establishment
Clause analysis in the near future.'75
Although the Court did not use Buono as an opportunity to repudi-
ate the endorsement test, it has nonetheless begun to erode the test.
Buono's distorted interpretation and application of the endorsement test
raises three concerns: (1) a blurring of formerly independent aspects of
the endorsement analysis; (2) the injection of aspects of the coercion
standard that are inconsistent with the endorsement test's central value;
and (3) the suggestion that the reasonable observer standard may be
categorically inapplicable to objects on private land.
1. Blending the Purpose and Effect Prongs
First, Buono improperly blends the purpose and effect inquiries of
the endorsement analysis. While Justice O'Connor's endorsement test
combined the first two prongs of the Lemon test in the sense that they
now both focus on endorsement, she made it clear that the law's purpose
and effect would continue to be examined independently of one an-
other. 176 Under the endorsement test's original formulation, state action
could run afoul of the Establishment Clause if either the government
passed the law with the purpose to endorse religion or if the action con-
veyed endorsement in effect, regardless of the government's intent. 77
The district court explicitly issued the 2002 injunction after an effect
analysis and did not consider whether the cross's presence had a secular
purpose. 178
The Buono plurality mandated that the district court reevaluate the
land transfer's constitutionality in light of the objectives of the 2002 in-
junction, even declaring the district court's illicit purpose inquiry im-
proper. 179 It would appear, then, that the Court intends for the district
court on remand to only examine the land transfer's effect of endorsing
religion and not the transfer's purpose. However, in telling the district
court to reassess its findings "in light of the policy of accommodation
that Congress had embraced" to "balance opposing interests,"180 the
174. It is also interesting to note that Justice Stevens, the chief dissenter and advocate for the
endorsement test in Buono, has since been replaced by Justice Kagan. Justice Kagan argued on
behalf of the government in Buono as solicitor general. This, of course, does not necessarily mean
she will be permissive of religious endorsement in her role as Justice.
175. Gedicks, supra note 4, at 692.
176. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-90 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 690.
178. Buono v. Norton (Buono II), 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1215 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff'd, 371 F.3d
543 (9th Cir. 2004).
179. Salazar v. Buono (Buono), 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819 (2010).
180. Id. at 1817, 1820.
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Court directs the district court to ask whether Congress's purpose would
affect the "perceived governmental endorsement"'8 ' in a reasonable ob-
server with the knowledge of "all the pertinent facts and circumstances
surrounding the symbol and its placement."l 8 2 The Court has made the
reasonable observer an exceptionally aware person, knowledgeable of
the motivations of members of Congress. This causes the government's
purpose to become a central component of the inquiry into whether state
action has the effect of endorsing religion, effectively eliminating "ef-
fect" as a sufficient ground for invalidating government action independ-
ent of "purpose." Therefore, Buono could make the endorsement test's
original vision of invalidating certain instances of government action
because they in fact send a message of religious endorsement-
regardless of whether that was the government's intent-difficult to real-
ize.
In blurring the distinction between purpose and effect, the Court en-
dangers protection against government action that inadvertently conveys
religious endorsement to a reasonable observer. If the endorsement test
was only designed to regulate the government's intentions, then this
might be a logical development. However, the endorsement test also pro-
tects individuals from social or political perceptions that inhibit their
freedom of religion. If the government carelessly conveys messages that
create perceptions of religious favoritism, then the harm occurs regard-
less of the government's actual objectives. The Court would brush aside
the protection from the harm if it forced plaintiffs to challenge the gov-
ernment's purpose in order to establish an impermissible effect.
The first post-Buono appellate case addressing whether a public re-
ligious display violates the Establishment Clause, American Atheists, Inc.
v. Duncan,183 offers a potential solution to this merging of purpose and
effect by recognizing, and deemphasizing, the relevance of the govern-
ment's purpose toward the effect of religious endorsement. In American
Atheists, a number of twelve-foot-high crosses were erected by the Utah
Highway Patrol Association (UHPA) to honor fallen Utah Highway Pa-
trol (UHP) officers.' 84 With UHP's permission, UHPA placed the crosses
on publically owned property including rights-of-way near the highways,
rest areas, and the lawn outside the UHP office.' 85 Each cross also de-
picted the UHP insignia.'86 In determining whether these crosses violated
the Establishment Clause under the endorsement test, the Tenth Circuit
first found that the crosses had primarily secular purposes: honoring
181. Id. at 1819.
182. Id. at 1819-20.
183. 616 F.3d 1145 (10th Cir. 2010).
184. Id. at 1150. The Utah Highway Patrol Association is a private organization supporting the





fallen troopers and promoting highway safety.187 Next, the court pro-
ceeded to an effects analysis, in which the secular purpose was consid-
ered. However, the court did not afford Utah's purpose much weight at
that stage of the analysis, ruling that the State's purpose was "merely one
element of the larger factual and historical context" pertaining to the
effect of endorsement.188 Because the crosses were the "preeminent sym-
bol of Christianity,"1 89 were not displayed alongside other symbols to
dilute their religious meaning, bore the insignia of the UHP, and were
found on public land, the court concluded that a reasonable observer
would infer that Utah endorsed Christianity.190 Declaring this to consti-
tute an Establishment Clause violation, the court noted that such an effect
was harmful because reasonable observers would fear that Christians
would receive preferential treatment by UHP on the highways and in
UHP's hiring processes.1'9 The Tenth Circuit emphasized that the pur-
pose of the designers of the cross would not always coincide with their
effect on a reasonable observer. 192 While this case bodes well for the
endorsement test's continued force after Buono, it does not seem to re-
flect the preeminent role the Buono plurality desired purpose to play in
the effect inquiry. How future cases will separate these concepts remains
a major concern.
2. Infusing the Endorsement Test with the Coercion Test's
Principles
Next, by infusing the endorsement test with the coercion test's prin-
ciples, the Buono Court distorts the endorsement test. As discussed
above, Justice Kennedy understood the United States' long history of
"accommodation" and "acknowledgment" of religion to favor an Estab-
lishment Clause interpretation upholding government action as long as it
does not involve coercion or direct benefits toward religion. 93 The coer-
cion test would make it difficult for observers to challenge the constitu-
tionality of religious displays to which they can freely turn their backs,' 94
even if such challenges are needed to prevent any stigmas from being
placed on non-adherents when the government endorses religion. Justice
Kennedy's coercion test offers no protection against the coercive effect
on a person's religious choices when the government stirs up the percep-
tion that certain religions are preferred over others using the potent
communicative tool of religious displays. The coercion test's favorable
treatment of acknowledgement and accommodation of particular relig-
187. Id. at 1157.
188. Id.at1159.
189. Id. at 1160 (quoting Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 2004)).
190. Am. Athiests, Inc., 616 F.3d. at 1160.
191. Id. at 1160-61.
192. Id. at 1163.
193. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
194. See id. at 664.
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ious views to the exclusion of others in fact seems to invite the percep-
tion of favoritism. In this way, the coercion standard is antithetical to the
religious liberty values the endorsement test was designed to protect.
However, the Buono Court's mandate that the district court reassess
whether a reasonable observer would perceive a religious endorsement in
light of Congress's policy of accommodation' 9 5 subtly plants the seeds of
the endorsement test's mutation into the coercion standard. The Buono
Court recasts the reasonable observer as someone sympathetic to public
policies "accommodating" religion as defined by Justice Kennedy. This
affords minimal protection against perceptions of exclusion by members
of minority religious groups.1 9 6 A hypothetical observer agreeable to the
coercion standard's foundation would allow judges to effectively conduct
coercion inquiries in the guise of an endorsement analysis. For example,
the observer might see all religious displays which have the effect of
identifying a favored religion as not endorsing religion because they are
non-coercive, passive accommodations of religion, thereby reaching the
same result as would be reached under the coercion test. One could see a
merging of Establishment Clause interpretations as something positive
because it allows the Court to take account of both sets of values and
come closer to a settled rule that will not be so fiercely contested. 197
However, if the endorsement test loses all its teeth and fails to protect
religious liberty any more than the coercion test, then the endorsement
test will be the product of a hostile takeover rather than a benign com-
promise.
3. Casting Doubt on the Reasonable Observer Standard
The third concern the Buono decision raises stems from the doubt it
casts on the reasonable observer standard's applicability to objects on
private land. 198 If the reasonable observer standard does not apply, the
likely test to replace it, given the current Court's attitude toward Estab-
lishment Clause claims, is a per se rule categorically barring challenges
to privately owned religious displays because they do not constitute gov-
ernment action. The tone of the Buono plurality and concurrences
strongly indicates that this is where the Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence is heading.199 But, as evidenced by the facts of Buono, the gov-
ernment can have substantial connections to private objects on private
land, arguably rising to the level of endorsement. Even if the land trans-
fer in this case were implemented, the cross and the land upon which it
stands would still have a history of government ownership and would
195. Salazar v. Buono (Buono), 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1820-21 (2010).
196. See Dolan, supra note 97, at 58.
197. Id. at 57.
198. See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819.
199. Leading Cases, supra note 8, at 227-28.
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still be a national memorial. 200 The small size of the land transferred rela-
tive to the Preserve's vast tracts of public land and the lack of markers to
distinguish public from private land also tend to minimize the govern-
ment's distance from the cross. 201 By selling the land to the very group
that erected the cross, the government made its best effort to ensure that
202the cross would stay in place. The government did not consider any
transferees other than the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the one group most
invested in maintaining the cross. 203 Such favoritism to the one group
most likely to preserve the Christian symbol places the government's
imprimatur on that symbol. Based on these factors, one could entertain
the notion that the cross conveys enough government endorsement of
religion to avoid a categorical rejection of the claim.
Taken to its logical extreme, a per se rule might allow the govern-
ment to exploit a loophole through which it could maintain the display of
religious symbols by transferring small patches of land within any of its
properties to organizations that the government knows will display the
favored symbol.2 04 Public areas widely peppered with religious imagery
would send a message of endorsement, even to observers who know that
private entities own the title to the otherwise indistinguishable patches of
land. In order to prevent this result, the Court must employ an individual-
ized fact-sensitive analysiS205 rather than a per se rule.
C. Applying the Core Principle on Remand
Although the Supreme Court's framework biases endorsement in-
quiries toward results similar to those that would be reached under the
coercion standard, and although the Court at most thinly veils its desire
to see the cross left in place,206 the district court can still adhere to that
framework without losing sight of the rationales that led to the Court's
development of the endorsement test. The Supreme Court essentially
provided a three-step analytical framework that the district court must
use to evaluate whether the 2002 injunction's objectives necessitate the
land transfer's invalidation. First, the district court must consider
whether the reasonable observer standard still controls, given the land
transfer.207 The district court must then reconsider whether a reasonable
observer, if such a construct is still relevant, would perceive an endorse-
ment in light of the land transfer and its context.208 Finally, the district
200. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1833-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201. Forster, supra note 42, at 424.
202. See Roy, supra note 99, at 74.
203. Lund, supra note 157, at 67.
204. Leading Cases, supra note 8, at 228-29.
205. Id.
206. Roy, supra note 99, at 76.
207. Salazar v. Buono (Buono), 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819 (2010).
208. Id. at 1819-20.
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court must consider potential relief that is less drastic than an invalida-
tion of the land transfer statute.209
First, for reasons already stated, a per se rule restricting the reason-
able observer standard's applicability to objects only on public land
could produce results inconsistent with preventing governmental relig-
ious endorsement. The district court should recognize that the govern-
ment is capable of endorsing religious symbols regardless of their loca-
tions. With an eye toward preventing endorsement, the relevant question
in Buono should not be whether the cross stands on government land.
Rather, the proper question should be whether a reasonable observer
would continue to perceive government endorsement of the cross after
the land transfer or whether the transfer itself, made to an organization
friendly to the cross, is an endorsement of the cross. All else being equal,
a cross displayed on private land conveys less government endorsement
of Christianity than the same cross displayed on federally owned land.
This is because the government directly controls land to which it has title
so anything on that land is more directly attributable to the government.
But, in the complex case presented by Buono, ownership of the land was
only one of many factors bearing on public perception of the cross.
Buono also involved the cross's designation as a national memorial, the
reversionary clause requiring that the site be used as a memorial, the
government's choice of transferee, and the statutes enacted by Congress
to preserve the cross.210 It may be that none of these factors are sufficient
on their own to necessitate removal of the cross, but when taken together
a court might reach that conclusion. This is precisely why this case and
others like it should be examined in light of all applicable factors through
the eyes of a reasonable observer and should not boil down to the single
question of whether or not the religious display stands on publically-
owned land. 2 11 Although the reasonable observer standard could be sub-
ject to each individual Justice's perception of reasonableness, its con-
tours are capable of becoming better defined over time through case law,
providing more consistency and better protection against religious en-
dorsement than the possible alternatives.
Second, once the district court has settled on the applicable stan-
dard, it must apply that standard, taking into account the observer's
knowledge that Congress chose a policy of accommodation to balance
compliance with the injunction against the impact that would have on
religious adherents. 212 In general, the desire not to upset members of a
particular religion advanced by an Establishment Clause violation does
not justify a continued violation. If it did, then the courts could leave
most constitutional violations that benefit one individual or group over
209. Id. at 1820.
210. Id. at 1833-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
211. Leading Cases, supra note 8, at 228-29.
212. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819-20 (plurality opinion).
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another uncured because losses of illicit advantages usually upset their
beneficiaries. Even here, where the public's concern involves secular
sensitivity toward seeing a war memorial's removal, such concern does
not necessarily overwhelm the compelling need to avoid governmental
demonstration of preference for Christian symbols. The Supreme Court
has bound the district court to afford due weight to Congress's "di-
lemma," but it ought not to forget the reasons it originally found the land
transfer in violation of the 2002 injunction. If the government's interest
in accommodating religion takes precedence over all other factors, then
the endorsement test will lose its teeth as well as its distinctiveness from
the coercion test.
In applying the reasonable observer standard, the district court
should be mindful of how much knowledge it is attributing to the ob-
server. The Buono plurality has described an observer far more knowl-
edgeable about the cross's seventy-year history, the litigation surround-
ing it, the acts of congress pertaining to it, and the motivations behind
those acts than most of the park-goers who would realistically encounter
the cross. The district court must follow this conception of a reasonable
observer. However, if the observer is attributed as much knowledge of
the facts as someone who has versed himself or herself in the history of
Sunrise Rock, has read the briefs in Salazar v. Buono, and was privy to
the litigants' oral arguments, then the facts will in effect be viewed
through the eyes of a judge rather than through the eyes of a hypothetical
observer. Resorting to the subjective perceptions of the Court would de-
feat the purpose of the reasonable observer construct, which is intended
to achieve an objective lens through which to view religious endorse-
213ment. In order to maintain the advantages of the endorsement test, the
district court should take care not to assume the observer is omniscient
and attribute to him or her little if any more knowledge than the Supreme
Court has explicitly mandated.
Finally, should the district court determine relief is necessary, it
must consider a remedy "less drastic than [a] complete invalidation of
the land-transfer statute" and removal of the cross. 214 The court should
tailor its relief with an eye toward eliminating the perception that the
government favors the Christian members of the political community. If
an effect of endorsement exists, then the solution would not be as simple
as ensuring that passersby know that the cross is privately owned. This is
because the Court has bound the district court to attribute knowledge of
the land's private ownership to the hypothetical observer.215 Visual indi-
cia of private ownership would therefore not tell the observer anything
213. Joseph Blocher, Schr6dinger's Cross: The Quantum Mechanics of the Establishment
Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 51, 59 (2010), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2010/10/
25/blocher.pdf.
214. Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1820.
215. See id. at 1819-20.
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that he or she does not already know. However, indicia of private owner-
ship might still decrease endorsement by showing to those who already
know that the cross is privately owned that the government is making
efforts to distance itself from the religious symbol. If observers can see
the government attempting to diminish its imprimatur on the cross as
much as possible, they will be less likely to perceive favoritism of the
cross. Simply installing replicas of the plaques declaring that the Veter-
ans of Foreign Wars erected the cross, as mentioned by the Court, 216may
not sufficiently quash endorsement perceptions. Such a sign would fail to
unambiguously emphasize the land's private ownership and might not be
visible from the road. A physical barrier like a fence would help distin-
guish the public and private tracts of land, though that is also problematic
because it could turn what is meant to be elegant symbolism, a white
cross standing alone in the desert, into an eyesore. That result might not
reflect the policy of accommodation that the Court had in mind. A larger
transfer of land surrounding the cross would reduce perceptions of en-
dorsement by reducing the cross's proximity to government-owned
land.217 Some might criticize a larger transfer of land to the organization
that erected the cross as constituting a worse Establishment Clause viola-
tion because it confers a larger benefit on an organization bent on dis-
playing religious symbolism, but if the government exacts a fair price in
exchange, then that benefit will be mitigated. A larger land exchange
combined with some visual indication that the government does not en-
dorse the cross, like a tasteful sign visible from the road labeling the land
as private property, would most likely be sufficient to minimize percep-
tions of endorsement. Although the district court must assume observers
automatically know the cross sits on private land,2 18 these efforts would
still reduce perceptions of endorsement by demonstrating a bona fide
effort by the government to distance itself from the cross.
CONCLUSION
While Buono did not offer the Court an opportunity to definitively
repudiate the endorsement test, the plurality opinion has nonetheless
managed to endanger the policy at the heart of that test. Through its dis-
torted framework, the Buono Court has begun to twist the endorsement
test into the coercion standard's mold. Because the coercion test does not
prevent the degradation of religious liberty that occurs when the govern-
ment conveys or attempts to convey messages dividing citizens into in-
siders and outsiders on the basis of their religions, this trend ought to end
at Buono. Religion is harmed when government manipulation of popular
perceptions inhibits individuals from aligning their faiths with their con-
sciences. As the current Court is comprised of Justices hostile to the en-
216. Id. at 1820.
217. Forster, supra note 42, at 424.
218. See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819-20.
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dorsement test, the prospects are not promising. On remand, the district
court can resist abandoning core constitutional values by carefully apply-
ing the Supreme Court's framework without letting go of the rationale
behind the initial development of the endorsement test.
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